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1-2 December 2015 | Geneva, Switzerland
WHO INFORMAL CONSULTATION
MEETING REPORT
Anticipating Emerging Infectious Disease Epidemics
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© World Health Organization 2016
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WHO/OHE/PED/2016.2
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Foreword
Executive summary
01 Introduction
02 Opening Session
03 Session 1: Back to the future: Learning from the past
04 Session 2: Future epidemics: moving and blurry targets
05 Session 3: Science and technology: opportunities and
challenges
06 Session 4: Making the most of Big Brother
07 Session 5: Curing and not harming: that is the question
08 Session 6: Preventing the spread of infectious diseases in a
global village
09 Closing session: Convergence and looking forward
10 Major discussion themes
Annex 1: List of Participants
Annex 2: Agenda at a glance
Annex 3: Speakers by session
Annex 4: Ideas Wall and Ideas Box
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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One of the greatest threats to global health is the spread of
uncontrolled epidemics due to highly pathogenic
infectious diseases, especially those that easily cross borders
and have the potential to wreak havoc on societies
and their economies. The West Africa Ebola outbreak sounded
an alarm to all of the actors involved in securing
the health of populations by highlighting the critical need for
forethought and pre-emptive action, even when
dealing with well-known epidemic-prone diseases. Anticipation
and preparedness are key to safeguarding
global health security.
Today we have at our disposal, more than at any other time in
history, technological advances and collaborative
partnerships that can transcend the outdated tactic of reactive
outbreak control. Epidemics are complex
phenomena, the details of which must be better understood to
rapidly and effectively detect their emergence,
control their spread and mitigate their impact. The increasing
convergence of a number of factors that drive
and amplify outbreaks requires multi-disciplinary, multi-
sectoral and multi-faceted approaches.
This consultation of experts was an open forum, conducted as
the first in a series of steps the World Health
Organization (WHO) is taking to further explore and address the
complexity of epidemics. By understanding
all the diverse elements involved in infectious disease
epidemics – not just the pathogens and their hosts
but also and in particular the biologic, socioeconomic, and
physical environments in which they interact – we
will gain a clearer picture of how and when we can best
intervene to limit their spread. The discussions and
deliberations in this consultation are aiding WHO as it adapts to
the changing world of global health, with
a clear vision based on solid evidence and a strong spirit of
partnership to ensure countries and their health
systems are resilient enough to withstand future epidemic
threats.
Dr R Bruce Aylward
Executive Director a.i.
Outbreaks and Health Emergencies and
Special Representative of the Director-General for the Ebola
Response
FOREWORD
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Background
Having the ability to anticipate epidemic-prone emerging
infectious diseases will give us the necessary edge
to battle outbreaks which are becoming more frequent. This
foresight, if reliable, is central to global health
security and provides the tools and strategies to reduce
avoidable loss of life, minimize illness and suffering,
and reduce harm to national and global economies.
With the rapid evolution of technology, know-how, and an
increasing appreciation of the interconnectedness
of everyone on the planet, on 1 and 2 December 2015, the
World Health Organization convened some of the
world’s most eminent scientists, experts and practitioners to
identify a path forward to better, more accurately
and systematically predict epidemics and thereby meaningfully
strengthen global and national readiness to
address these emerging infectious disease threats.
The informal consultation on anticipating epidemics was the
first step in an intensified initiative to better
predict and be ready to respond to epidemics. It aimed to (1)
create a forum for discussion by bringing
together multi-disciplinary experts in a forward-thinking
exercise on how to better anticipate and prepare
for epidemics; (2) engage with a wide range of expertise and
experience in order to shape international
collaboration to tackle future infectious risks; and (3) identify
approaches to improve detection, early analysis
and interpretation of factors that drive emergence and
amplification of infectious disease epidemics.
Summary of discussion
The experts agreed that the frame has changed fundamentally
for preventing, detecting, responding to and
managing global epidemics in the recent years. Some of these
key shifts include:
• From managing known outbreaks we have to manage
uncertainties and unknowns
• From relying on official government reports to anyone
potentially alerting on unusual events
• A proliferation of information and technology in the hands of
many, almost everyone, rather than a few
• Health-centred approach (mostly MOH, WHO) to
multisectoral approach (all UN, whole of society, One
Health)
• Explosion of initiatives and players that require coordination
(e.g. GHSA, PEF, NGOs, defence agencies, etc.)
• Rather than be centrist, there is a need to engage and
empower local communities in all aspects of
preparedness and response
• Human activity and behaviour are the main drivers of
emergence and amplification of new pathogens
(globalization, food, trade, population expansion, urbanization,
tourism, migration etc)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Based on this, many traditional concepts and interventions, such
as restrictions at points of entry, quarantine
measures, are out-of-date and increasingly difficult to
implement. They need to be reviewed as international
borders become increasingly porous and movement of people
and goods follow ever-increasing and crowded
paths. Therefore the overall approach to and strategy for
preparedness, readiness and response needs to be
overhauled. Deploying resources has to be re-thought.
Strategies to build trust among an increasing number
of players, in turn enabling coordination, need to be crafted and
dynamically reviewed as the context evolves.
At-risk populations and the communities to which they belong
are no longer homogeneous groups in a
specific location. The concept of “community“ is increasingly
complex and they must each be identified for
their beliefs, values, behaviours along with their role in
combating epidemics. They need to be understood by
their interests and often virtual and dispersed in large
geographic areas. Community engagement should be
strengthened, especially understanding the “resistance” of local
frontline communities affected by epidemics
to desired behaviours to manage the outbreak. The role of social
scientists in preparedness and response
and in two-way communication, especially reaching out to the
most vulnerable (e.g. periurban populations
defined by inequality and informality), is crucial early in an
epidemic.
The fundamental and changing role of the health sector in
controlling epidemics requires recognition of the
key function of clinicians in the early identification of
outbreaks. Engaging the community of health care
workers who play a critical function in detecting and responding
to outbreaks is essential. However, they
are often criticized for not following public health principles of
infection control measures and vaccination
compliance. Acknowledgement of their potential to amplify
epidemics as a result of their role within the
health system is essential to ensuring appropriate prevention is
in place.
The number of players interested and involved in preparedness
and response to epidemics has increased
significantly leading to a coordination challenge of the many
disciplines and many sectors with different
but important agendas, perspectives and approaches.
Participants at the consultation called for an improved
management of the “humanitarian circus” where coordination
creates space for everyone to contribute
constructively. Some of the elements that are needed include a
good definition of roles and responsibilities;
a good incident management system that allows inter-
operability between players; and a willing leadership
as well as followership.
New technologies allow for a rapid access to many more types
of information and their sources than ever
before. Given the multidimensional nature of infectious disease
risks, integrating data elements from the
micro level (genes) to the macro level (social, political, climate,
global mobility patterns) would allow for
better information systems to anticipate, assess risks and
prepare for epidemics. New approaches such as
foresight to identify blind spots, popular epidemiology and local
risk mapping are to be considered to ensure
the relevant analysis of complex events that could give us an
added edge to curtailing their amplification.
There are still a number of challenges for the use of data
(quality, privacy, data sharing, ownership, ethics)
and its interpretation (analysis, risk assessment) and eventually
translation into actions (political, social,
individual).
Public health strategies and interventions are based on the
traditional biomedical paradigms for infectious
disease but these are becoming obsolete. New and emerging
paradigms demand that we re-visit the
approach accordingly. Early detection can only happen if front
line responders (health care workers, clinicians,
farmers) are involved in the preparedness, surveillance and
response. Endemic problems and known risks
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should be utilized to strengthen multidisciplinary and
multisectoral preparedness and readiness especially
in low resources settings so that prevention is prioritized, for
Rift Valley Fever outbreaks that occur regularly.
Disease outbreaks may be inevitable but epidemics are
preventable. There are known hot spots for
emergence and amplification where targeted efforts for
preparedness, surveillance, prevention and response
should be focussed using the analogy of smoke detectors and
fire fighters being in the same place. There is
a need to identify those hot spots analysing biological,
ecological and behavioural drivers and concentrating
appropriate resources and efforts from different players in
specific at-risk settings to ensure more sustainable
and robust investments. Multidisciplinary outbreak
investigation teams including social and political
scientists as well as risk communication experts are needed to
fully understand the risks and, barriers
to response actions and identify the most effective options for
containment within the early phase of the
epidemic. Many new technologies (diagnostics, software
applications) are now available to improve detection
and control of epidemics that need to be better integrated into
mainstream public health strategies and
systems. Nevertheless, it is people who remain at the centre.
Improved education and training is necessary for
the epidemic prevention and control workforce of tomorrow to
be in line with contemporary and future risks
and interventions.
Risk communication is perhaps the most essential element of
the response to epidemics in the 21st
Century. Communication can hamper or facilitate a good
response. With ubiquity of the internet and
communication technologies, modalities of risk communication
have changed fundamentally. Principles
of transparency, consistency and trust remain paramount in
communicating with affected populations. New
elements to consider and to be better understood for the future
are the social-emotional patterns of fear and
hope in communities and individuals and the social thermometer
of risk perception. It is necessary to have
multiple channels of communication including local and
religious leaders not only during the an epidemic
but also during inter-epidemic periods. Health care givers who
are usually the most trusted information
source for the population have to adapt to new technologies and
use them appropriately to remain a solid
pillar of the response.
Conclusion
Three major conclusions emerged from this consultation:
(1) just response is not enough in dealing with epidemics.
Preparedness for outbreaks requires
increased readiness and building resilient health system.
(2) technologically advanced tools are required to anticipate
the emergence and, more so, the
amplification of infectious disease outbreaks.
(3) new risks in the context of big cities and intense mobility
of a globalized world necessitate
newer, better adapted public health interventions.
Effectively anticipating epidemics will contribute to reinforcing
global health security mechanisms
including assessment of infectious disease risks under the IHR
2005. It is expected that the outputs of
this consultation will inform and guide preparedness efforts in
the future.
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Background and purpose
The world stands at a critical juncture in public health.
Epidemics of infectious diseases are able to disrupt
many spheres of human existence and the impact can be felt
across the globe. To better prepare for and
respond to those threats, it is imperative that we make
fundamental changes to the way we understand them.
Significant changes in the world today, mean that it is not
enough to just implement traditional measures such
as quarantine and isolation for epidemic control. We have to
move beyond and find innovative approaches
that are relevant for today’s fast-paced, technologically-
advanced world and, more importantly, that of the
future.
Recent major public health crises such as the SARS, H1N1 2009
Pandemic and Ebola in West Africa have
unequivocally demonstrated the importance of understanding
the many non-biomedical factors that influence
the emergence and spread of epidemics. There is no doubt that
such epidemic and pandemic diseases will
continue to threaten humanity. Following the re-emergence of
H5N1 and the spread of SARS, WHO Member
States adopted the revised International Health Regulations
(IHR 2005). After Ebola in West Africa in 2014,
the global community is similarly looking at the necessary
mechanisms to better protect humankind from
devastating epidemics. We have the benefit of hindsight and an
unprecedented opportunity to revamp our
collective approach to preventing and controlling epidemics so
that we can mitigate their impact.
As a forward-thinking exercise, this meeting engaged a broad
range of global experts from multi-disciplinary
fields along with key stakeholders and partners to define the
elements within which epidemics of the future
will occur. The ideas and deliberations elucidated some of the
drivers of emergence and amplification of
infectious disease outbreaks. It is expected that the outputs of
this consultation will guide and inform future
preparedness; calibrate response, including research and
development efforts; and reinforce global health
security mechanisms.
Objectives
The specific objectives of this consultation were:
• To create a forum for discussion by bringing together multi-
disciplinary experts in a forward-thinking
exercise on how to better anticipate and prepare for epidemics;
• To engage with a wide range of expertise and experience in
order to shape international collaboration to
tackle future infectious risks;
• To identify approaches to improve detection, early analysis
and interpretation of factors that drive emergence
and amplification of emerging disease epidemics.
01 INTRODUCTION
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Methodology
The consultation was designed to include a variety of
disciplines and partners relevant to emerging infectious
diseases from all over the world. The structure of the meeting
entailed moderated panels for each of six
sessions followed by extensive discussion with the audience.
The panelists’ remarks were restricted to five
minutes each with the aim of engendering as much dialogue
amongst the participants as possible in order
to spark ideas and exchange. The meeting followed Chatham
House rules whereby comments are not directly
attributed to individuals in order to maintain their
confidentiality and therefore allow them to speak candidly.
The full proceedings of the meeting were recorded in real-time
by a “live scribe” who graphically represented
the topics and issues as they were being discussed. These
graphic posters along with biographical sketches of
each of the participants; abstracts of the panelists; video
interviews; and the presentations from each of the
sessions are available on the WHO meeting website
(http://www.who.int/csr/disease/anticipating_epidemics/
events/informal-consultation/en/). This report summarizes the
proceedings. To capture additional ideas and
thoughts, participants were encouraged to write these down and
post them on an “idea wall” or put them
in a box. These comments have been collated and can be found
as an annex to this report (Annex 4). This
report itself provides a brief summary of the interventions by
moderators and panellists and a summary of
the discussion with the audience.
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Dr R Bruce Aylward, acting Executive Director of WHO’s
recently established WHO Health Emergencies
Programme, said the new Programme has been one of several
responses by the Organization in the face
of the increasing frequency of epidemics in recent years, their
increasing severity, and their destabilizing
effects on nations, regions, and – in the case of Ebola virus
disease – the world. It is clear that health
systems have to be better at anticipating outbreaks so that
responses can be more rapid and effective.
The enormously complex challenge of doing so will be made
more difficult by broad trends such as
urbanization, deforestation, and climate change. Accordingly,
those present at the meeting included not
only health experts but experts in the environment and
meteorology, the social sciences, information
and communication technology, and other fields. It was
important to remember that whatever high-
level or technically complex steps are taken in coming years,
they will depend for success on what
communities do: non-experts have to be able to understand
disease threats and often have to be
persuaded to change traditional behaviours. “If we don’t get
that right,” Dr Aylward said, “it will be very
hard to combat epidemics.”
Dr Sylvie Briand, Director of the WHO Department of
Pandemic and Epidemic Diseases, said upcoming
crises likely will be different from those recently faced. Steps
can be taken to define possible scenarios, to
guide preparedness, and to build in the flexibility necessary for
responding to the unexpected. The goal
is to have a global system that allows for anticipation, for early
detection of emerging disease threats, for
rapid containment, and for mitigation.
02 OPENING SESSION
EMERGENCE
DRIVERS FOR EMERGENCE DRIVERS FOR
AMPLIFICATION
OUTBREAK
Localized
transmission
EPIDEMIC
Amplification
CONTROL
Anticipation Early detection Containment Mitigation
Fig. 1: Drivers for emergence and amplification
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This first session focussed on lessons learned from the recent
epidemics of Ebola, H1N1 pandemic, SARS and
the collective global response to similar emerging disease
epidemics. The moderator highlighted that though
we know that we must learn from our past experiences, we tend
to have a forgetful memory. Anticipating
new outbreaks and for epidemic risk assessment and risk
management a better understanding of human
factors is required in order to understand the impact of changing
global trends including intensification of air
travel and migration, political upheaval, climate change and
deforestation, and new communications tools.
We need to modernize and put at the forefront the social
sciences for making decisions by focussing on trust,
behaviours, and beliefs.
03
Ebola in West Africa: drivers and lessons learned
Seven countries in Africa had Ebola outbreaks in 2014-15. In
three
countries, there were devastating events; but in the other four
the
spread was contained. Rapidly detecting the imported cases and
establishing accurate laboratory diagnosis of the infection, they
introduced classical infection prevention and control (IPC)
measures
to successfully contain Ebola virus disease (EVD) from
spreading
widely in their territories. These countries demonstrated that
given
basic facilities and infrastructures, combined with strong
political
leadership, effective coordination of an immediate and
aggressive
response, disease outbreaks can be controlled before they
become
major public health events. Securing the health of citizens of a
nation, including protection from the ravages of disease
outbreaks,
is the primary responsibility of the government of the nations in
which they occur.
This first session focussed on lessons learned from the recent
epidemics of Ebola, H1N1 pandemic, SARS and the collective
global
response to similar emerging disease epidemics. The moderator
highlighted that though we know that we must learn from our
past
experiences, we tend to have a forgetful memory. Anticipating
new
outbreaks and for epidemic risk assessment and risk
management
a better understanding of human factors is required to
understand
changing global trends including intensification of air travel
and
It is primarily the national
governments’ responsibility
to ensure their populations
are protected from epidemics.
This requires not only a
strong health system but also
government-led coordination
with many non-health sectors.
SESSION 1
Back to the future: Learning from the past
The session explored the following key questions:
• What are the critical lessons to be learned from major recent
epidemics?
• What signals and information should we have anticipated that
made “routine” events extraordinary?
• What are the drivers of emergence and amplification that can
turn an outbreak into an epidemic?
• What important drivers need to be integrated into the risk
assessment?
• How can we enhance our preparedness and response by
“thinking outside the box”?
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Preparedness requires planning and exercising to be
rigorous. But in the midst of uncertainties, the response
must allow for nimble and flexible implementation of
strategies to meet actual needs.
migration, political upheaval, climate change and deforestation,
and new communications tools. We need to modernize and put
at
the forefront the social sciences for making decisions by
focussing
on trust, behaviours, and beliefs.
Ebola in West Africa: drivers and lessons learned
Seven countries in Africa had Ebola outbreaks in 2014-15. In
three
countries, there were devastating events; but in the other four
the spread was contained. Rapidly detecting the imported cases
and establishing accurate laboratory diagnosis of the infection,
they introduced classical infection prevention and control (IPC)
measures to successfully contain EVD from spreading widely in
their
territories. These countries demonstrated that given basic
facilities
and infrastructures, combined with strong political leadership,
effective coordination of an immediate and aggressive response
, disease outbreaks can be controlled before they become major
public health events. Securing the health of citizens of a nation,
including protection from the ravages of disease outbreaks, is
the
primary responsibility of the government of the nations in
which
they occur.
New perspectives on outbreak response after SARS in Canada
SARS was the first major international event of this century
which
showed that any local crisis can become an international
problem
and that no country can consider itself isolated from the
impacts.
In many ways it is an example of what might be expected when
the next global outbreak occurs. Secondary effects were felt
beyond surveillance, morbidity and mortality in terms of travel
and transportation, social services for quarantined persons, huge
economic consequences for the city, media frenzies, political
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concerns, and more. The experience raised the spectre of a more
easily transmissible agent that will produce even greater, far-
reaching distress.
A mild H1N1 pandemic: critics and anticipation
There are medical interventions such as vaccines and antivirals
available for influenza but their use raised a number of
criticisms
and suspicions in many affected countries with parliamentarian
investigations after the 2009 H1N1 pandemic crisis. As the
world
had been preparing for the next pandemic for many years,
response
plans were deployed including the rapid development of
pandemic-
specific influenza vaccine and the use of antiviral stockpiles (in
those countries where they were available). The overall impact
of
the pandemic was ultimately considered comparable to that of a
moderately severe influenza season. Criticism of over-reaction
was
voiced and many lessons were learned that led to revision of the
WHO global approach to pandemic influenza as well as to
national
response plans.
Multidisciplinary response: strengths and challenges
Different partners exist, including non-health sector ones, and
they
each bring different points of view, perceptions of the risk, and
how
to address the problem. Emergency response brings actors from
many UN agencies, national organizations, civil society (the
NGO
“community”), and the private, for-profit sector. This is
sometimes
referred to as “the humanitarian circus”. Lack of a strong and
effective ringleader results in a humanitarian response from the
health sector that is usually relatively uncoordinated,
unsupervised,
and totally unregulated. The solution is to empower countries,
with
technical support of WHO and convening power of the UN
system,
to develop “whole of society” operational plans; exercise and
regularly update them to ensure that local, national, regional
and, if
feasible, international authorities are able to implement
technically
sound and fully coordinated assessment and response activities.
The role of NGOs and health sector partners
Many different institutional actors including NGOs, particularly
those
that are faith-based, are important providers of health care in
poorer
parts of the world. The West Africa Ebola experience highlights
the
speed and adaptability of non-governmental humanitarian
actors,
it underscores the importance of their role in responding, but it
also
reflects the need to partner with NGOs to increase their capacity
to address non-traditional hazards, including infectious disease
outbreaks. NGOs must be considered equal and vital partners in
epidemic preparedness, response and recovery as the Africa
Ebola
outbreak shows including coordination, working alongside UN
and
local and foreign governmental agencies. Looking ahead we
need
to consider the opportunities to improve partnerships and
enhance
our collective response capacity to future outbreaks, building on
our
comparative advantages.
All humanitarian actors must be recognized and
their complementary strengths enhanced for
infectious diseases. Coordination during a response
should bring them together for collective action but
with countries in the lead.
Fig. 2: Stages of epidemic emergence
Emergence of pandemic zoonotic disease (ref: Morse SS et al
Lancet 2012; 380: 1956-65)
STAGE 3
STAGE 2
STAGE 1
PANDEMIC EMERGENCE
LOCALISED EMERGENCE
PRE-EMERGENCE
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The session moderator highlighted the progressive stages of
emergence of epidemics from wildlife and
livestock pathogens crossing over to humans, resulting in a
zoonotic outbreak and sometimes becoming
human-to-human transmissible (e.g. SARS and MERS-CoV).
This last stage is too late to contain novel path-
ogens and so the question remains: can we anticipate microbes
in the animal sphere and assess their risk
as potential pathogens for humans? H1N1 was not a failure of
the signal but a failure in our understanding
of the virus. Can we identify common patterns for emergence
and control at source? This requires a better
understanding of what is circulating in animals but this is a
huge list so how to prioritize? How do we assess
risk given the diversity of potential microbes? To understand
whether zoonotic events precede transmissibility
from human to human some knowledge gaps exist, for instance:
• Influenza – there has been an attempt to structure risk
assessment using IRAT (CDC) and ECDC’s risk assess-
ment tool. Should we do the same for other diseases?
• Routes of transmission, host factors, genetic diversity of
viruses among human populations. Can we identify
common pathways by which they emerge? For influenza:
interventions that we know will trigger emer-
gence.
Finally, the issue of emergence of epidemics coming from
animals requires an integrated approach of One
Health (human, animal and environment).
04 SESSION 2
Future epidemics: moving and blurry targets
The session explored the following key questions:
• How can we better use our knowledge of the human-animal
interface to anticipate and respond to
emerging infectious diseases?
• What could be the impact of the new infectious disease
paradigm (microbiota) on the understanding
and control of outbreaks?
• How can we holistically and systematically apply our
knowledge on the human-animal interface and
the microbiome to mitigate epidemics?
• What concrete steps can be implemented to anticipate
emergence and prevent amplification?
Knowledge on microbiome and research
In the past centuries, the classic Pasteurian paradigm, in which
the pathogen comes from outside the host,
has shaped the strategies and methods for control of infection
and epidemics. Cutting-edge research on the
human microbiota has revealed that a new paradigm of
pathogen-host interaction is required. Gut microbiota
have co-evolved symbiotically with the host with functions
ranging from absorption of nutrients and
contribution to the development of the immune response. The
concept of invasion of the host by a pathogen
is therefore complicated by the theories of the imbalance within
the host’s own bacterial ecology, i.e. the the
microbiome, rather than simply invasion of the host by a
pathogen from an external source. The development
of therapeutic and preventive interventions and diagnostic
methods being explored in addressing gut
microbiome disorders range from nutrition complements to
stimulate immunity to fecal transplantation to
treat gut infections.
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From science to action: microbiome and respiratory diseases
Modern, culture-independent techniques have revealed that
healthy lungs are not sterile as once believed but harbour
diverse
communities of micro-organisms. Many questions remain
unanswered regarding their role including respiratory dysbiosis
in
pathogenesis and treatment; whether they can be manipulated
for
therapeutic effect; and how viruses affect the ecology of
respiratory
tract. Research is ongoing to address important insights into the
pathogenesis of acute lower respiratory tract infections, the role
of
epidemic viruses in causing or triggering severe respiratory
disease,
and identification of novel therapeutic or prophylactic
interventions.
Managing the risks of emergence at the animal level
We are all inter-connected. From the animals that populate our
human environment on which we rely for food, draught power,
savings, security and companionship, to the wildlife inhabiting
sky,
land and sea. Early warning of disease events is critical.
Livestock
health is the weakest link in our global health chain, and disease
drivers in livestock as well as wildlife have increasing impacts
on humans. To respond effectively the following are necessary:
(1) evidence to understand problems and opportunities for
change;
(2) enabling inter-sectoral dialogue and information exchange;
(3) raising awareness, promoting health-conscious innovation,
improving the way we produce, buy, sell and consume animal
products; and (4) enhancing how we jointly investigate and
respond
to health threats.
It is imperative that we continuously understand and apply the
newest scientific tools
and knowledge to respond to emerging diseases. New
opportunities from the field of the
microbiome must be exploited for health.
Our inter-connectedness with our environment
requires close cooperation with joint actions between
animal and human health. The two networks must be
systematically linked and engaged for preparedness
as well as response.
Fig. 3: Ecological determinants of the respiratory microbiome
REGIONAL GROWTH CONDITIONS
MICROBIAL IMMIGRATION
Microaspiration Inhalation of bacteria
Direct mucosal dispersion
Di
ck
so
n R
P,
Hu
ffn
ag
le
GB
. P
Lo
S
Pa
th
og
20
15
, 1
1(
7)
: e
10
04
92
3
MICROBIAL ELIMINATION
IMMIGRATION & ELIMINATION
HEALTH SEVERE LUNG DISEASE
REGIONAL GROWTH CONDITIONS
Cough Mucociliary clearance
Innate and adaptive host defenses
Nutrient availability
Oxygen tension
Temperature
pH
Concentration of inflammatory cells
Activation of inflammatory cells
Local microbial competition
Host epithelial cell interactions
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Human-animal interface: anticipating risks of emergence
Identification of the first cases, i.e. the first clusters, of a
disease
and to subsequently limit the spread of the disease can only
be achieved with improvement of capacities for early detection
and notification of sanitary events observed in animals. That
means better knowledge of zoonotic pathogens through research
programmes and development of laboratory networks etc. But it
is
also critical to connect with the people who are in close contact
with
animals as they can serve as sentinels. It is important to
combine
sophisticated scientific work with studies of predictive
epidemiology
and multidisciplinary fieldwork to obtain good quality data and
to
coordinate and organize networks that can disseminate these
data.
In order to enhance anticipation of epidemics,
ecological risk assessment methods to identify drivers
of emergence and amplification will present a holistic
picture and enable improved risk reduction and
mitigation measures.
Ecosystem surveillance: predicting the next emergence?
USAID’s EPT (Emerging Pathogenic Threats) Program has
advanced
the understanding of ecologic and behavioural drivers
underlying
zoonotic disease emergence and reshaped our approaches to
disease surveillance as well as strategies for preventing the
emergence of new threats. Advances in genomics and
informatics
have further expanded our understanding of the biology of
disease
emergence and provided indications to how we we can approach
the early detection of future threat (ecological, behavioural and
biological drivers). Two areas of ongoing work being supported
under USAID’s EPT program are “prediction of emergence” and
assessing the potential for the “prevention of emergence”
looking
at evolution and spread.
Ecological Drivers
Land Use
Climate Change
Natural Resource Extraction
Economic Development
Migration
Behavioral Drivers
Bush meat consumption
Animal production & marketing
Animal-human interfacing
Globalization
Biological Drivers
Re-assortment
Genetic drift
Host factors
Fig. 4: Drivers of Zoonotic Disease Emergence (Adapted
from USAID/Predict project)
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The session moderator emphasized that new and different
solutions were needed to strengthen national and
subnational capacities to make sure they are at the optimum.
This would be complemented by “planetary
security” – global security at its broadest with supra-national
institutions, e.g. the UN system, NGOs, partners
should work together as equal partners. The weakest link
argument is more relevant rather than the old cliché:
“diseases respect no borders”. Health and health care industries
have to look at the aviation industry, new
development banks, insurance and financial sectors and to R&D.
The R&D solutions mean innovations and
technological solutions. How should we direct the R&D and
incentivise manufacturers to make the needed
investments and ensure their products come to market? By
putting patients and communities back at the
centre.
05 SESSION 3
Science and technology: opportunities and
challenges
What’s new for surveillance and detection?
Targeted single isolate detection has been a valuable tool,
however,
the dramatic increase in emerging and mixed microbial
infections,
and rising association of food-associated and intestinal
microbial
community in human and animal health and wellness has led to
a
need to identify the entire microbial community to understand
the
dynamics of infections. The ability of next generation
sequencing
to generate large amounts of DNA sequence data has
considerably
facilitated metagenomics studies, including of food-associated
and
intestinal microbes. Specific applications of metagenomics in
food
safety include, among others, (i) identification, from clinical
specimens,
of novel and non-culturable agents that cause foodborne
disease; (ii)
characterization of microbial communities (including pathogens
and
indicator organisms) in foods and food associated environments
(e.g.,
processing plants); and (iii) characterization of animal and
human
intestinal microbiomes to allow for identification of microbiota
that
may protect against infection with foodborne pathogens.
The session explored the following questions:
• How can new scientific advances and technologies influence
the surveillance, detection and control
of emerging pathogens?
• What is the impact of increased accessibility, availability and
visibility of technologies on risk percep-
tion and how should communication strategies be adapted to
make them successful?
• How can we best use new technologies to rapidly detect,
communicate and respond to epidemics?
• What tools can help to better engage the communities and
other actors in outbreak response?
Health security requires
application of a dynamic
shift to find new solutions to
old problems using the best
science and technology has to
offer. But application of new
tools and approaches means
opening our traditional health
perspectives to views from
other disciplines.
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What’s new in diagnostics?
Many of the tools first deployed in life sciences research have
now been turned into clinical in vitro diagnostic devices with
fit-
for-purpose features that make them attractive for use in many
developing world settings. Ease of access is a key element, i.e.
local staff near patient settings without special training and an
ability to transmit resultant data in real-time. There are a
number
of opportunities provided by these advances in technology. Now
a new generation of immunoassays is in development that offer
multiplexing, quantitation, automation, and electronic reporting
and molecular testing systems have been developed for clinical
use
that automate specimen processing, amplification, detection,
and
wireless reporting. However, there are some persistent obstacles
to their broad impact in public health. Investment for
diagnostics
development is necessary in the inter-epidemic period along
with
a global architecture by harnessing partnerships to deploy
earliest
in an epidemic.
Advances in biology and their applications
Nature is still better at producing human threats than we are.
For
detection and analysis, biosensors from synthetic biology (DNA
sequencing and engineering) may enhance our capabilities in
differentiating closely related strains. For instance,
metagenomic
sequencing to analyse patterns that drive diseases. For known
emerging infectious diseases, synthetic biology may help by
developing support methods for existing technologies such as
combinations of biotechnology and nanotechnologies. Analytic
and database tools are being put together. Response in the form
of treatment or prophylaxis is the area where synthetic biology
can greatly enhance our capabilities as well as accelerate
vaccine
development. But getting the product to the people and making
it
viable is the basic principle for responsible research in science
and
technology.
Risk perception and community engagement
Risk perception is the core to how an individual and community
understand, interpret and react to risk and it influences
decisions
about the acceptability of risk and behaviour before, during and
after the risk has passed. Ability to translate information from
global
Information technology is ubiquitously owned
by everyone which brings with it risk perception
challenges. Community engagement and risk
communication tools are critical components of any
epidemic response.
To systematically build preparedness and
response capacities investment in innovations
and new technologies must be harnessed
during inter-epidemic periods.
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level into language that is understood by communities is vital so
that complex information on risk is understood within societal
and
cultural influences and is aligned with actual risk to
communities, as
accurately as possible. The revolution of social media and dire
need
of better and faster risk communication has driven the use of
more
technologies including mass SMS, radio, internet (Facebook,
social
media), but interpersonal communication is still the way we
make
a difference when psychosocial support is required. Challenges
remain as to how to use the networks of Red Cross volunteers
(17
million) to pass messages at scale and use them in an alert
system.
Communicating in the 21st Century
Central importance of communities and community ownership
highlights the central importance of people taking actions. Five
key principles in community engagement are: (1) trust - source
of information needs to be trusted by building trust in the health
system and through intermediaries; (2) listening is as important
as messaging – build on communities’ reference and understand
the cultural context (3) professionalism – communication cannot
be improvised so it is imperative to build national capacities;
(4)
ensuring coherence in complex fields – interagency cluster
system;
and (5) communities compare information from multiple
channels
so there is a key role for innovations. Investment for the long-
term
is needed because we cannot just start at the beginning of the
outbreak, rather resources are needed for preparedness.
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The session moderator described the UK’s experience with the
Olympic Games in London. As much good
information as possible was collected through laboratory and
syndromic surveillance in which 30 million
people were registered and trends observed. Some of the more
challenging questions that were dealt with
were: what is the baseline? When does it change? When is it
significant change? They are now using social
media, the added value of which remains to be seen.
06 SESSION 4
Making the most of Big Brother
Modelling outbreaks: pros and cons
Modelling goes hand in hand with analysis and is not a
theoretical
exercise. The cycle involves preparedness, real time analysis,
and
retrospective analysis with on-going monitoring during an
event.
Modelling can help with “what if” scenarios. It can be a
retrospective
“what if” (impact of strategies implemented earlier) and it can
be a
simulation for preparedness, considering a possible set of
scenarios.
Challenges include access to (timely) data for analysis, who
will see
the result and if widely available how will they make sense out
of it,
how to separate the noise from the signals, and how to
coordinate a
modelling group(s) to get the best value out of them?
The session explored the following questions:
• How can real-time information be better used for timely and
relevant responses?
• Forecasting: what can public health learn from other sectors?
• How can big data approaches be applied to enable epidemic
anticipation?
• How do we capture, collect and optimally analyse data on the
drivers and amplifiers of epidem-
ics?
• What can the health sector learn from other sectors that are
further ahead in using newer tech-
nologies to anticipate risks?
A number of newer, more
extensive, real-time data
sources and analytic
methodologies have become
available that will allow us to
better anticipate outbreaks
and their evolution. It is time
to apply these at a global scale.
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Index B
husband
mother
died at home undiagnosed
Changi General Hospital
National University Hospital
Healthcare worker
Tan Tock Seng Hospital
CGH
NUH
HCW
TTSH
C
father playmate HCW (CGH) 4 HCWs (TTSH)
patientvisitor
(NUH) (NUH)
son sonHCW (CGH) HCW
3 patients (TTSH) 7 visitors of TTSH 10 HCWs (TTSH)
(Source: Tan Tock Seng Hospital, Singapore)
We can learn from other sectors that have analyzed
large, dynamic datasets for prediction, such as
meteorology and insurance, and adapt their concepts,
techniques and strategies for epidemic anticipation.
Use of big data to anticipate epidemics and their evolution
Understanding migration and human mobility is critical in
infectious
diseases providing important insights into risk. Of the almost 6
trillion
kilometres travelled 1/6th comes from just the US and a quarter
from
just three countries: US, UK and China. Hotspots for risk are
linked to
unequal distribution of movement. In the last 10 years there has
been
a 60% increase in mobility which is accelerating quicker and
faster than
our ability to prevent and control infectious diseases; we are
getting
better at amplifying threats by our global movement. There are
better
opportunities to get data: internet (GPHIN / ProMed),
meteorological
(satellite), smartphones with computing power, and social,
behavioural,
cultural aspects of epidemics. We are working on many kinds of
data
(open data, from industry, personal health information) but we
have to
overcome the following challenges: managing a growing volume
of
data; security/privacy issue; mechanisms to share data; who is
going to
have access to this data (who is Big Brother?). We need some
entity to
have a panoramic view – an incident manager – whom we can
all trust.
Fig. 5: SARS, chain of human-to-human transmission,
Singapore 2003
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A key issue is the use of different kinds of data to make
decisions BY whom, FOR whom? Data ownership,
privacy, confidentiality, quality etc are considerable
challenges that must be address for the use of big data.
Learning from successes in meteorology
Evolution of technology since World War II has been a success
for
weather forecasting which is based on collection and sharing of
large
amounts of data, thanks to satellites, resulting in real-time
sharing
to the point where data is gathered every six hours from
satellites
airplanes and ships, down to a resolution of 15 kilometres.
Availability
of data is not the only element (only 20% of satellite data is
used).
The big question is how we translate these data using
mathematical
models and simulations. What matters most is “initial
conditions” after
which, using additional new information you correct your initial
guess.
Weather forecasting has moved from a deterministic to a
probabilistic
approach. By providing probabilities you share the
responsibility
whereby interpretation of the probability is left to the user. Key
questions remain on how far we can go (i.e. seasonal forecast)
and
what kind of details we can provide (i.e. 500 or 100 metres)?
Learning from the insurance expertise
Health surveillance is often a rather reactive process, with no
real
integration of early signals and wild cards. As a consequence
it is difficult to detect radical changes having a strong impact
on
public health in the medium or long term. To embed this
proactive
dimension and increase proactivity, foresight is a key approach
to use
and many such methods exist among which the scenario
approach
will be explored. In describing possible future scenarios, as
well as
the elements in favour of one scenario rather than another,
health
surveillance can help decision makers to influence the context
in order
to guide towards one or more favourable futures.
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The session moderator highlighted the impact on healthcare
workers during Ebola and SARS as an example
of the critical importance of the health system in handling all
kinds of emergencies. But these healthcare
workers require the best support possible in terms of training
and tools to ensure they serve as a positive
influence in managing epidemic emergencies rather than have a
negative impact due to poor practices.
07
Clinical practices and emerging diseases
Key lessons learned from the MERS-CoV outbreak in Saudi
Arabia include: never underestimate a novel virus;
get prepared (planning, training, evaluation and auditing);
ensure safe hospitals with security check points;
“outbreak quad” (overcrowding, absence of triage, low index of
suspicion, non-adherence to IPC measures);
sick patients are efficient in getting and efficient in transmitting
MERS-CoV; transmission happens because
of what we do and not because of what the hospital looks like;
administration involvement is critical; line
of communication with communities is necessary for mobilizing
them; disease does not respect national
borders; build a national surge plan.
It is vital to recognize that the health care system can propagate
outbreaks just as it can
contain them. This requires proper management of the entire
system, not only one
aspect such as infection prevention or one element such as the
health worker.
The session explored the following key questions:
• How can the health systems of the future minimize the risk
of amplifying epidemics and what ele-
ments must be in place to mitigate impact of epidemics?
• What kinds of innovations in medical technologies and
patient care will improve epidemic detection
and control?
• What kind of research is needed for the 21st Century to
better address the challenge of emerging
pathogens?
• How can we change routine clinical practices including
adaptation to cultural beliefs and practices to
better prevent and manage infections?
SESSION 5
Curing and not harming: that is the question
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Health care facilities are defined by the physical
infrastructure but the human factors and people
who staff them are the most important and must
be addressed explicitly to ensure appropriate
containment of outbreaks.
Systemic view of infections in health care facilities
From Ebola we learned that adherence to simple and basic
measure
such as hand hygiene is more important than building high-tech
facilities. At the same time we also learned that high-tech
facilities
can help contain the infection, providing an argument for
building
well-equipped health care institutions in the developing world
as well. Health care institutions of the future should
amalgamate
modern strategies to improve human behaviour and at the same
time build and design health care facilities to provide a safe
environment with the least risk of creation of dangerous
pathogens
and amplification of the spread of infection.
Patient–doctor relationship at the age of the Internet
By offering free, unlimited, easily and anonymously accessible
health information, the web and social networks incite patients
to take more control over their own health. As a result the
patient-
provider relationship is evolving such that patients often expect
to
discuss and sometimes challenge their doctors’
recommendations.
Health professionals’ role needs to evolve, and in this regard,
one size does not fit all. Healthcare providers need to take into
consideration the health behaviour profile of their patients in
order
to build and maintain a trusting relationship.
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Patients can now take responsibility for their
own health-related behavior as a direct result of
widespread availability of information. Providers
need to capitalize on this dynamic to forge new
relationships with their patients.
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
7-
Mar Mar Mar Mar Mar May May May May May Jun Jun JunApr
Apr Apr Apr Apr
13- 19- 25- 31- 6- 5-12- 12-18- 18-24- 24-30- 30- 11- 17-6-
Non health care workers
315 cases
250 (80%) deaths
Health care workers
Fig. 6: Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever by mode of transmission,
Kikwit Zaire, 1995 (Source: WHO/CDC)
Impact of strengthening the overall health system
When implemented adequately, comprehensive components of
health system strengthening should contribute to mitigating the
impact of epidemics. The most deadly epidemics occur
generally in
low-income countries where governments’ investments in health
remain low despite their political commitment. Unless this lack
of
ownership is addressed, health system strengthening
sustainability
is doomed to failure. Among critical issues for the future are:
(i) a thorough multi-stakeholders health system assessment/
review identify gaps; (ii) a “menu à la carte” of low cost and
high
impact interventions to address gaps; (iii) learning from
previous
experiences on inter-country cooperation; (iv) enhance socio-
anthropology component of health system strengthening.
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The session moderator highlighted the issue of defining global
drivers and addressing risks in this world
where interdependence and interconnectedness clearly show
how global security has changed. Outbreaks
and diseases are seen as destabilizing factors in the new health
security paradigm where security is contrasted
with global public good and solidarity. Risks are always defined
virtually so the notion of threat becomes very
important, i.e. who is defined as vulnerable and has to be
supported? Managing risks means also manag-
ing the political dimension. Risk definition is a power game:
who defines the risk? who holds the narrative?
Looking from a WHO perspective, who gets to define a PHEIC
– a committee of technical experts or a publicly
elected director?
08 SESSION 6
Preventing the spread of infectious diseases
in a global village
The session explored the following questions:
• How can we include socio-economic and political
determinants into outbreak control?
• How can we modernize “traditional” control measures
(isolation, quarantine, culling etc) in today’s world?
• What are the politics and political challenges of responding to
escalating outbreaks?
• What are the key drivers of epidemics in today’s
interconnected global ecosystem and the evolving
social habitat?
• How to better engage with societies of today for
preparedness and response to epidemics?
• What public health measures should we revisit and/or adapt,
and how do we move from a biomedical
approach to a more holistic one?
International Sanitary Regulations
List-based. Cholera, plague, yellow
fever (smallpox, typhus, relapsing
fever).
Quarantines, limit restrictions to
trade and travel
Physical Infrastructure (trade
routes)
Disjointed response
Country-based response
Surprise
Official government reporting
No reporting of capability to meet
the regulations
French government. 14
International Sanitary Conferences
Table 1: The Evolution of Global Health Security
International Health Regulations
PHEIC (emerging infections including
bioterrorism)
Improved Reporting & Building National
Capacity
Post-Industrial Infrastructure - electricity,
electronics
Revolutionary international law and
global governance but still fragmented
Multilateral response
Expect (managing certainty)
Non-state actors (organizations & media)
Self-assessments
WHA (health centric) & WHO
International Health Security Framework
All public health emergencies, including
climate change, emerging infections,
antimicrobial resistance, & synthetic biology
Prevention & Preparedness at National Level
Knowledge Infrastructure
Integrated
Shared Information Response
Global Response Teams
Response Contingency Fund
Global Fund for Health Security
Predict and Prevent (managing uncertainty)
Everybody
Global Health Security Preparedness Index
UN Under-Secretary for Health Security
(multi-sectoral)
Past (19th to mid-20th Century) Present (20th Century)
Proposed Future (21st Century)
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Local contexts (e.g. urbanization) as well as global ones (e.g.
migration, travel) must all be addressed to mitigate risks to
the most vulnerable with particular attention to economic,
social and political drivers and impacts.
A whole of society approach to health security must include
diverse disease drivers: genetics and biological factors,
ecology and the physical environment; human behavior and
demographics; and social, political, and economic factors
Revisiting traditional containment measures
The key to success is aligning incentives of victims, the
exposed and a
fearful public by building trust and investing in community
supports.
This means not only food, water, early diagnostics, available
treatment
and prevention; but also psychosocial support in culturally
relevant
manner through empowerment. We must recognize the limited
times
when compulsory measures of isolation and quarantine are
necessary
and not fear to use them sparingly and in time-limited fashion.
The
use of public health measures must delicately balance a fearful
public
without stigmatizing victims while justifiably controlling
transmission
through restrictive means. Transparent communication prior and
during
implementation is paramount in building support and trust for
such a
complex task.
Managing epidemics in urban settings
The challenges associated with managing epidemics in urban
areas
are particularly acute in low and middle income countries with
public
sector resource and capacity constraints, and weak health
systems. It is
noteworthy that inequalities in living circumstances, incomes
and access
to services has become a feature of many large cities, which can
leave
people in certain parts of a city more vulnerable to disease
because of
trade-offs between health and livelihood. The implications of
urban in-
equalities and urban informality for health risk in urban areas
and for
seeking strategies for preventative responses that could mitigate
risk
and build resilience in urban and peri-urban areas require a
better un-
derstanding of local contexts and perspectives. Local
innovations for risk
mitigation and control require pragmatism in risk assessment
within a
“safe” informality.
Evolution of health security concepts
Health security at a national level is broad-based protection,
response,
and recovery efforts to ALL public health threats and it requires
capacity
in ALL countries centred on government ownership and
responsibility.
Current reform efforts should consider establishing an essential
core in
all countries consisting of an emergency operation and data
fusion unit
with domains derived from the IHR. Fire-fighters and smoke-
detectors –
one and all, we are in the prevention business. However,
ensuring global
health security is not just a function of the health sector and
requires na-
tional level leadership and the in-country support and planning
of multi-
ple other sectors. The drivers include changes in genetics and
biological
factors, ecology and the physical environment; human behaviour
and
demographics; and social, political, and economic factors. They
must all
be part of one system.
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Close collaboration across various
sectors and partners in developing
risk reduction and risk mitigation
strategies can be achieved under the
guidance of national governments
who are empowered to forge
partnerships and alliances.
Epidemics and tourism
Travel and tourism is a growing important economic and
societal activity.
Many countries are using travel and tourism as a priority tool
for eco-
nomic development. The sector is heavily dependent on an
intact en-
vironment, whether this is natural, cultural, social or human or
animal
health environment and thus, can be easily affected by negative
events
such as epidemics, as it is a trust and belief product. Close
cooperation
with WHO and other key actors is critical to provide timely
information
and to promote safe travelling behavior, while ensuring
uniformity in
information sharing, developing practical response strategies,
and pro-
viding recommendations for the tourism and travel sector.
Political perspectives of global risk
Political authorities face three major challenges in responding
to epi-
demic threats:
• How to apply in the 21st century traditional public health
measures in
a complex, mobile and selfish society in crisis?
• How to talk about risk and uncertainty given the approach
adopted by
new media sources such as internet?
• How to guarantee fair access to resources in case of a crisis
in demo-
cratic societies?
Political choices are described for preparation of societies and
health sys-
tem changes. Key actions are highlighted to fight threats
associated with
emerging infectious diseases: raising public awareness through
infor-
mation; coordinating multiple sectors and multidisciplinary
methods;
preventing non-health threats to health; promoting traditional
preven-
tion protocols as well as new tools for combating epidemics;
manage
operational health systems elements; and harmonize global
policies for
access to vaccines.
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Dr Sylvie Briand presented a summary of each of the sessions
of the meeting. She described “bingo” words
that we brought up a number of times: trust, training, social
science, solidarity.
09 CLOSING SESSION
Convergence and looking forward
Dr Marie Paul Kieny, Assistant Director General for Health
Systems Innovation at WHO, presented the recently
developed WHO R&D Blueprint which is an attempt to map
what should be done to have the world better
prepared through R&D. The Blueprint aims to prepare for the
inevitable – what is uncertain is what and when.
It has two complementary objectives:
• Roadmap for priority pathogens – 5 to 10 that are the most
threatening in the next years plus unknown
pathogens.
• Enable roll out of an emergency R&D response
It aims to reduce time between declaration of PHEIC and
availability of effective medical technologies by
encouraging production of diagnostic tools and generating
safety data (Phase 1 trials) for vaccines and treat-
ments for most promising experimental products for priority
diseases. It also aims to map knowledge and
good practices, identify gaps and establish enabling
environment for sharing of data so it is a collaborative
effort. There are five work streams:
(1) Prioritization of pathogens
(2) Identification of research priorities
(3) Coordination of stakeholders and expertise
(4) Alignment of preparedness and impact of intervention
(5) Development of innovative funding options
For the finale, Dr David Nabarro, Special United Nations
Secretary-General’s Special Envoy on Ebola, spoke
about having to reassess our thinking and put the lessons
learned into practice. The 2030 development
agenda (SDGs) required massive change. For instance, climate
has now become global citizen issue (COP
21, Paris) and no longer something discussed behind closed
doors. This is a period of review of institutional
orientation and considerable rethinking at WHO which is in a
process of reengineering their work.
Two concrete outcomes were to:
• Develop new types of information systems to better
anticipate risks but these have to rely on
new approaches and engaging new partners.
• Revisit the concept of preparedness. It has been 10 years that
we have been developing IHR
core capacities but new approaches are necessary.
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Dr Nabarro presented thirteen points for consideration by the
partic-
ipants as outlined below.
(1) More presidents and prime ministers are thinking of global
health now than ever before. More journalists are writing about
global health. There is a greater sense that health risks warrant
political attention. The paradigm is “keep us safe in ways we
can
trust”.
(2) More actors are involved in public health. We have to look
at our
narrative and make it much more acceptable and understand-
able to all kinds of actors. We can no longer say “we are the ex-
perts, we’ll tell you what to do” because we are not providers of
truth but partners.
(3) Societies are putting more focus on being strong and
resilient.
They have a wish to have greater control on their destiny and
leadership must be able to work with multiple actors.
(4) Early detection involves listening to multiple actors, not
just
health people. Everybody has to be engaged to find a potential
threat. Risk assessment will not only be based on health profes-
sionals – rumors will come from everywhere.
(5) Humans are becoming increasingly embroiled with nature
and
health threats are going to reflect this. Agro-ecology: close co-
habitation people-animal has public health implications.
(6) Communications have to be two-way. We cannot just
convey
information – we must use empathy, transparency, trustworthi-
ness in the business of earning trust (respect to all).
(7) What is done with data (forecast) – ethical use, sharing and
ac-
cessibility, inter-operability – is key as is applying information
to action.
(8) Rather than the term “health systems” use “systems for
health”
– systems for life, ability, functions that are predictable,
account-
able, accessible for all at a quality that can be trusted.
(9) Trust and respect come from creating space so that each
has
a place and a role. Coordination so that others can participate,
provide a contribution that is respected in safe spaces with de-
fined roles.
(10) Real relearning we have to do is multi-disciplinary, multi-
di-
mensional, and multi-sectorial. The SDGs signify that the goals
are universal, people centred, collaborative, respect for all so
no one is left behind.
(11) What to do now? This meeting is about paradigm shifts –
new
ways of thinking and acting. Allow new thoughts and thought
models to emerge, enriched by talking to each other we can
apply new ways and be agents of transformation. Be ready to
evolve – regenerating and renewal for public health.
(12) We are all communities. As a community of health
profession-
als we can challenge the power structures using the language
of “we” and be change agents whilst maintaining humility.
(13) Power and politics requires a disciplined and ethical use
of
power. We need to become good at power games. We are
all humanitarians regardless of our organizational mandate
which sometimes create differences between us and those
whom we are trying to help.
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10
Recent epidemics have highlighted critical deficiencies in our
response mechanisms and control measures.
There is little doubt that new paradigms are necessary for
developing creative solutions to current problems.
Some of the key areas for reforming our approaches were
reflected in the plenary discussions:
• In an emergency response, coordination and collaboration for
collective action between the various actors
is crucial. Clearly defined roles based on an assessment of
strengths and weaknesses of the different sectors
is necessary to ensure adequate local operational and logistics
mechanisms, as well as engagement with
local communities. Incident management systems allow for
command and control but trusted leadership
and mechanisms are keys to success. The fear factor is what
makes decision-making irrational.
• National governments have to be at the forefront and held
accountable to ensure their surveillance sys-
tems are designed to pick up early “signals”. Clinicians have to
be linked to the public health infrastructure
through appropriate communication channels and networks. The
private sector brings impressive resourc-
es and a lot of goodwill but mechanisms and accountability for
their engagement requires good leadership
by national authorities. How can we convince the public to
invest sustainably in preparedness even for risks
that may not happen? The issue of trusting politicians was
raised, with the suggestion of a public debate af-
ter each event to teach them to make the better decisions.
Ensuring countries have the necessary functional
national IHR core capacities by testing them in exercises
(exercise the “unthinkable” scenario) requires
adequate investments for preparedness during the inter-epidemic
periods – this is a continuing challenge
for government attention and resources.
• We need to move beyond the biomedical approach to
epidemics because they are social problems as much
as medical ones. Social sciences need to be an integral part of
surge capacities – perhaps reverse the order
of the disciplines brought into a response by having
anthropologists as first responders – so that we can
address issues of fear and trust within the social context.
Communities need to be engaged in advance as
part of preparedness to ensure that there is an understanding of
the human ecology. This will link commu-
nity and biomedical perspectives for enhancing effective
partnerships ensuring pre-existing relationships
are built to respond to epidemics. There is a clear need to have
anthropologists working in the field and to
coordinate information so it rapidly combines what people know
from the frontline with emerging medical
evidence.
• We could “get ahead of the curve” by using technologies and
working jointly to assess risk and uncertain-
ties to respond to potential threats. Laboratory capacity for
detection of a wide range of pathogens in the
field level was discussed including ensuring biosafety and
biocontainment; PCR and supply chain logistics;
identifying existing subnational capacities available through
large public health programs such as polio,
influenza and tuberculosis; and possibility of target product
profiles for outbreak detection. Strategic, tar-
geted and evidence-based tools can help understand the
mechanisms of emergence and engineer ways
of reducing the risks for humans by prioritizing hotspots based
on geographical, biological and ecological
data. For instance, tools that knock down viral load and
undercut viral evolution opportunities or ones that
reduce opportunities for reassortment in virally diverse
geographical locations.
MAJOR DISCUSSION THEMES
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• Strengthening of the workforce through education – training
of the next generation of public health pro-
fessionals, doctors and veterinarians so that they think through
problems together by working horizontally
across ministries (e.g. health and agriculture) will empower the
health system to work towards prevention.
For instance, the One Health approach supported by WHO,
FAO, OIE and USAID ensures a close relation-
ship through coordination mechanism across human and animal
sectors at all levels (central to local) that
requires sharing of information as well as triggering a joint
response.
• New technologies won’t solve the issues of communication
and community engagement. Dealing with
uncertainty and adjusting messages throughout an evolving
epidemic requires real-time information
sharing, data analysis, and feedback. This remains a challenge
for the research community, particularly
maintaining quality control in the process of translational
research. Journalists covering science are consid-
ered to be trustworthy sources of information amongst the many
sources of information the public is now
exposed to daily. The relationship between these journalists and
the public health community should be
nurtured during the inter-epidemic periods so that effective
technologies and interventions can be imple-
mented built on trust.
• Compiling big data is no longer the limiting factor. It is the
shared responsibility of interpretation with
the end-users who are non-scientist politicians where the issues
are to establish ground rules for analysis
and privacy and ownership of data. A number of data-related
issues were raised: how do we address scale,
data gaps and possible innovations, connecting models, data
security, privacy and consent, working across
sectors, translation at community level for action, “popular”
epidemiology to empower local communities
to analyse their own data and make local decisions, lack of
baseline data, outcomes of foresight scenarios
translated into actions, is big data harmful?, ability to
geolocalize. Huge opportunities but also challenges
exist in using big data.
• On one hand we need to focus outside the health system, on
communities and individuals, for disease
control measures to work. But addressing the health system
deficiencies based on health system research
to identify gaps, is also critical, particularly for addressing
outbreaks and reducing mortality. These include
recognizing the role of health care workers in spreading
infection; primary health care; individual respon-
sibility of every citizen; lack of basic facilities in developing
countries for sanitation and hygiene; need for
political will; cross sectoral challenges for public health
systems; and role of family level care givers. For hos-
pitals in particular, challenges include hospital accreditation
across large and small hospitals and ensuring
surge capacity when they operate at full capacity in normal
times.
• The concept of “health security” is implicitly inequitable
because it begs the question “whose security?”
(e.g. influenza vaccines held by rich countries are not equally
distributed to poor ones). Reducing the gap
in access to science and technology for developing countries is
a key barrier to address but one that requires
resources and investment. Global health security should be
made a world issue, like climate change, so that
it works at all levels. Recognition that health security is broader
than just the health sector and requires a
holistic, multisectoral approach that will engender global
solidarity for health protection.
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Annex 1
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Professor Frank Møller Aarestrup
Head of Research Group - National
Food Institute, Technical University of
Denmark, Kgs. Lyngby, Denmark
Dr James Ajioka
Senior Lecturer, Department of
Pathology, University of Cambridge,
Cambridge, UK
Dr Hamoud S. Al Garni
Director of Health Authority at Point
of Entry, Ministry of Health of Saudi
Arabia, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Dr Tammam Aloudat
Deputy Medical Director, Médecins
Sans Frontières, Geneva, Switzerland
Dr Ray Arthur
Director, Global Disease Detection
Operations Center Division of Global
Health Protection, Center Global
Health, Atlanta, USA
Dr Rana Jawad Asghar
Resident Advisor, Field Epidemiology
& Laboratory Training Program,
National Institute of Health,
Islamabad, Pakistan
Dr Juliet Bedford
Director and Founder, Anthrologica,
York, UK
Ms Barbara Bentein
Head - Principal Advisor Ebola Crisis
Cell, UNICEF HQ, New York, USA
Dr Ariel Beresniak
Chief Executive Officer, Data Mining
International SA, Geneva, Switzerland
Mr David Bestwick
Technical Director, Avanti
Communication Group plc, London,
UK
Dr Peter Black
Deputy Regional Manager, FAO
Regional Office for Asia and the
Pacific, Bangkok, Thailand
Professor Mathilde Bourrier
Professeure Ordinaire, Départment
de Sociologie, Université de Genéve,
Geneva, Switzerland
Dr Philippe Calain
Médecin, Chargé de recherche,
Médecins Sans Frontières, Geneva,
Switzerland
Dr Dennis Carroll
Director Pandemic Influenza and
other Emerging Threats Unit, United
States Agency for International
Development, Washington DC, USA
Mr Sean Casey
Emergency Response Team Leader,
International Medical Corps, Los
Angeles, USA
Dr Marty Cetron
Director Division of Global Migration
and Quarantine, Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, Atlanta, USA
Dr Andrew Clements
Senior Scientific Adviser, Global
Health Security and Development
Unit Bureau for Global Health,
United States Agency for International
Development, Washington DC, USA
Professor Maire Connolly
Professor, National University of
Ireland Galway, Galway, Ireland
Dr Denis Coulombier
Head of Unit, Surveillance and
Response Support, European Centre
for Disease Prevention and Control,
Solna, Sweden
Mr Thomas Czernichow
Head of the Software and Services
Department, EpiConcept, Paris, France
Dr Inger Damon
Director, Division of High-
Consequence Pathogens and
Pathology, Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, Atlanta, USA
Professor Xavier De Lamballerie
Director of the Research Unit (EPV),
IRD Marseille, Marseille, France
Ms Emma Diggle
Epidemics and Vaccination Adviser,
Save the Children, London, UK
Professor Dialo Diop
Lecturer in in Virology in Africa, Dakar,
Senegal
Professor Christl Donnelly
Professor of Statistical Epidemiology,
Imperial College London, London, UK
Dr Henry Dowlen
Senior Manager, Health, Government
and Public Sector (GPS), Ernst & Young
LLP, London, UK
Dr Monique Eloit
Deputy Director, World Organization
for Animal Health, Paris, France
Dr Delia Enria
Director, Instituto Nacional de
Enfermedades Virales Humanas,
Pergamino, Argentina
Dr Abdul Ghafur
Consultant in Infectious Diseases,
Apollo Hospital, Chennai, India
Dr Dirk Glaesser
Director for the Sustainable
Development Programme, World
Tourism Organization, Madrid, Spain
Professor Herman Goossens
Head, Department for Microbiology,
University Antwerp, Wilrijk, Belgium
Professor Stephan Günther
Bernhard-Nocht-Institute for Tropical
Medicine, Hamburg, Germany
Dr Jessica Halverson
Manager, HIV/AIDS and TB Section,
Surveillance and Epidemiology
Division, Centre for Communicable
Diseases and Infection Control, Public
Health Agency of Canada, Ottawa,
Canada
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Professor Marion Koopmans
Professor of Public Health Virology,
ErasmusMC, Rotterdam, the
Netherlands
Professor Gerard Krause
Head of Department Epidemiology,
Helmholtz Centre for Infection
Research, Braunschweig, Germany
Ms Rhonda Kropp
Director General, Centre for
Immunization and Respiratory
Infectious Diseases, Public Health
Agency of Canada, Ottawa, Canada
Dr Melissa Leach
Director, Institute of Development
Studies, University of Sussex,
Brighton, UK
Dr James Le Duc
Director, Galveston National
Laboratory, The University of Texas
Medical Branch, Galveston, USA
Professor Vernon Lee
Deputy Director, Communicable
Diseases Ministry of Health,
Singapore and Head, Singapore
Armed Forces Biodefence Centre,
Singapore
Ms Hélène Lepetit
Managing Partner, Co-founder, IDM -
Institut des Mamans, Paris, France
Professor Gabriel Leung
Dean - Li Ka Shing Faculty of
Medicine, University of Hong Kong,
Hong Kong, China
Dr Woraya Luang-on
Director, Bureau of Emerging
Infectious Diseases, Ministry of Public
Health, Nonthaburi, Thailand
Dr Hayley MacGregor
Research Fellow, Institute of
Development Studies - University of
Sussex, Brighton, UK
Ms Debora MacKenzie
Health and Global Security Issues
Reporter, New Scientist, London, UK
Professor John Mackenzie
Research Associate and Professor of
Tropical Infectious Disease, Curtin
University, Bentley, Perth, Australia
Dr Lawrence C. Madoff
Editor, ProMED-mail, Brookline, USA
Ms Joanne Manrique
President and Editor in Chief, Centre
for Global Health and Diplomacy,
Washington DC, USA
Dr Jean-Claude Manuguerra
Research Director, Head of laboratory
for Urgent Response to Biological
Threats. Institut Pasteur, Paris, France
Ms Margaux Mathis
Consultant, Paris, France
Dr Amanda McClelland
Senior Officer, Emergency Health,
International Federation of Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC),
Geneva, Switzerland
Dr Brian McCloskey
Director of Global Health, Public
Health England Wellington House,
London, UK
Dr James Meegan
Director, Office of Global Research,
National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases, United States
Department of Health and Human
Services, National Institute of Health,
Betsheda, USA
Dr Shoji Miyagawa
Director, Infectious Diseases
Information Surveillance Office,
Ministry of Health, Labour and
Welfare, Tokyo, Japan
Dr Anne-Marie Moulin
Research Director Emeritus, Centre
National de la Recherche Scientifique,
Paris, France
Dr David Murdoch
Head of Department, Department of
Pathology, Christchurch, New Zealand
Annex 1: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS continued
Dr Nur A. Hasan
Adjunct Faculty, University of
Maryland Institute for Advanced
Computer Studies, College Park, USA
Professor David Heymann
Head and Senior Fellow, Centre on
Global Health Security - The Royal
Institute of International Affairs,
Chatham House, London, UK
Dr Didier Houssin
President, Agence d’Evaluation de
la Recherche et de l’Enseignement
Supérieur, Paris, France
Dr T Jacob John
Chairman, Child Health Foundation,
Christian Medical College, Vellore,
India
Senator Fabienne Keller
Senator, Sénat, Paris, France
Dr Ali S Khan
Dean College of Public Health,
University of Nebraska Medical
Centre, Nebraska Omaha, USA
Dr Kamran Khan
Research Scientist, Centre for Research
on Inner City Health St Michael’s
Hospital, Toronto, Canada
Dr Nadia Khelef
International Affairs Senior Advisor,
Institut Pasteur, Paris, France
Professor Ilona Kickbusch
Director of the Global Health
Programme and Adjunct Professor,
Interdisciplinary Programmes,
Graduate Institute of International
and Development Studies, Geneva,
Switzerland
Dr Ann Marie Kimball
Strategic Advisor, Rockefeller
Foundation, New York, USA
Dr Gary P Kobinger
Head of Special Pathogens, Head,
Vector Design and Immunotherapy,
Special Pathogens Program, National
Microbiology Laboratory, Public
Health Agency of Canada, Manitoba,
Canada
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Annex 1: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS continued
Dr Vickneshwaran Muthu
Senior Principal Assistant Director,
Ministry of Health of Malaysia,
Disease Control Division, Wilayah
Persekutuan Putrajaya, Malaysia
Dr David Nabarro
United Nations Secretary-General’s
Special Envoy on Ebola, United
Nations Headquarter New York,
New York, USA
Dr Josh Nesbit
Chief Executive Officer, Medic Mobile,
San Francisco, USA
Dr Carl Newman
Deputy Chief Scientist, Cooperative
Biological Engagement Program,
Cooperative Threat Reduction,
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Fort
Belvoir, USA
Dr Patrick L Osewe
Lead Health Specialist, World Bank,
Pretoria, South Africa
Dr Heather Papowitz
Senior Advisor, Health-Emergencies,
UNICEF HQ, New York, USA
Dr Malik Peiris
Director, Division of Public Health
Laboratory Sciences, University of
Hong Kong School of Public Health,
Hong Kong, China
Prof Jorge Pérez Avila
Director General, Instituto de
Medicina Tropical “Pedro Kouri”, La
Habana, Cuba
Dr Mark Perkins
Chief Scientific Officer, Foundation for
Innovative New Diagnostics, Geneva,
Switzerland
Dr Julio Pinto
Animal Health Officer, FAO HQ, Rome,
Italy
Dr Paolo Ruti
Chief, World Weather Research
Division, World Meteorological
Organisation, Geneva, Switzerland
Dr Ronald K Saint John
Consultant, St John Public Health
Consulting International Inc,
Manotick, Canada
Dr Gérard Salem
Directeur du Laboratoire Espace, Santé
et Territoires, Université Paris Ouest
Nanterre La Defense, Nanterre, France
Dr Amadou Alpha Sall
Scientific Director, Institut Pasteur de
Dakar, Dakar, Senegal
Dr Mark Salter
Consultant in Global Health, Public
Health England Wellington House,
London, UK
Dr Lars Schaade
Vice President, Robert Koch Institute,
Berlin, Germany
Ms Laura Scheske
WHO/WMO Joint Office
Dr Jan Slingenbergh
Senior Animal Health Officer/Head of
EMPRES, FAO HQ, Rome, Italy
Dr Franck Smith
Campaign Director “No More
Epidemics”, Management Sciences for
Health, Medford, USA
Dr Idrissa Sow
Expert on Infectious Disease
Epidemics, Mauritanie
Professor Oyewale Tomori
Professor of Virology, Redeemer’s
University, Nigeria
Dr Shinya Tsuzuki
Medical Officer, Tuberculosis and
Infectious Diseases Control Division,
Ministry of Health, Labour and
Welfare, Tokyo, Japan
Dr Fabio Turone
Presedent, Science Writers in
Italy, World Federation of Science
Journalists, Milan, Italy
Mr Richard Vaux
Project Manager for the GloPID-R
Project, Fondation Mérieux, Lyon,
France
Dr Niteen Wairagkar
Lead, Influenza/RSV Initiative, Bill &
Melinda Gates Foundation, Seattle,
USA
Professor Ronald Waldman
Professor, Public Health Department,
George Washington University,
Washington, USA
Dr John Watson
Deputy Chief Medical Officer,
Department of Health Richmond
House, London, UK
Dr Cécile Wendling
Associate Researcher, Sociology
Organization Centre, Paris, France
Dr Teresa Zakaria
Head of the Health Assistance for
Crisis Affected Populations Unit,
International Organization for
Migration, Geneva, Switzerland
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Dr R. Bruce Aylward
Executive Director a.i. Outbreaks and
Health Emergencies and Special
Representative of the Director-General
for the Ebola Response, HQ
Dr Marie-Paule Kieny
Assistant Director-General, Health
Systems and Innovation, HQ/HIS
Dr Eric Bertherat
Medical Officer, Control of Epidemic
Diseases, HQ/ WHE
Dr Caroline Sarah Brown
Programme Manager, EU/IRP
Influenza and other Respiratory
Pathogens, DCE/VPR/IRP, Copenhagen
Ms Kara Durski
Epidemiologist, Ebola Virus Outbreak
Response, HQ/ WHE
Dr Sarah B. England
Senior Adviser, Office of the Director-
General, HQ/ODG
Ms Geraldine Hagon
Intern, Communication Capacity
Building, HQ/CCB
Dr Dominique Legros
Medical Officer, Control of Epidemic
Diseases, HQ/WHE
Dr Elizabeth Mumford
Scientist, Food Safety, Zoonoses and
Foodborne Diseases, HQ/FOS
Dr William Augusto Perea Caro
Coordinator, Control of Epidemic
Diseases, HQ/WHE
Dr Cathy Ellen Roth
Technical Adviser, Health Systems and
Innovation, HQ/HIA ADGO
Dr Gina Samaan
Consultant, Influenza, Hepatitis and
PIP Framework, HQ/WHE
Ms Carmen Savelli
Technical Officer, Risk Assessment and
Management, HQ/RAM
Dr Anthony Paul Stewart
Consultant, Global Preparedness,
Surveillance and Response, HQ/PSR
Dr Kathleen Louise Strong
Technical Officer, Influenza, Hepatitis
and PIP Framework, HQ/WHE
Dr Angelika Maria Tritscher
Coordinator, Risk Assessment and
Management, HQ/ WHE
Dr Katelijn A.H. Vandemaele
Medical Officer, Influenza, Hepatitis
and PIP Framework, HQ/WHE
Mr Leender Van Gurp
Manager, Business Intelligence
Competency Centre, HQ/CMS
Dr Wenqing Zhang
Scientist, Influenza, Hepatitis and PIP
Framework, HQ/WHE
Dr Weigong Zhou
Medical Officer, Influenza, Hepatitis
and PIP Framework, HQ/ WHE
Dr Theodor Ziegler
Consultant, Influenza, Hepatitis and
PIP Framework, HQ/HIP
World Health Organization
WHO Secretariat
Annex 1: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS continued
Dr Sylvie Briand
Director Pandemic and Epidemic
Diseases Department of Outbreaks
and Health Emergencies HQ/WHE
Ms Nyka Alexander
Consultant, Pandemic and Epidemic
Diseases, HQ/WHE
Ms Mara Frigo
Technical Officer, Pandemic and
Epidemic Diseases, HQ/WHE
Dr Gaya Manori Gamhewage
Medical Officer, Pandemic and
Epidemic Diseases, HQ/ WHE
Ms Erika Garcia
Technical Officer, Control of Epidemic
Diseases, HQ/WHE
Ms Sandra Garnier
Technical Officer, Pandemic and
Epidemic Diseases, HQ/WHE
Dr Asheena Khalakdina
Technical Officer, Pandemic and
Epidemic Diseases, HQ/WHE
Ms Qiu Yi Khut
Information Officer, Pandemic and
Epidemic Disease, HQ/WHE
Ms Kaveri Khasnabis
Secretary, Pandemic and Epidemic
Diseases , HQ/WHE
Ms Anais Legand
Technical Officer, Pandemic and
Epidemic Diseases, HQ/WHE
Mr Oliver Gerd Stucke
Technical Officer, Communication
Capacity Building, HQ/WHE
Ms Ursula Zhao Yu
Consultant, HQ/DGO/DGD/DCO
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9:00 – 10:00
10:30 – 12:00
13:00 – 14:30
15:00 – 16:30
Opening session
Session 1
Back to the future:
Learning from the past
Session 2
Future epidemics:
moving and blurry targets
Session 3
Science and technology:
opportunities and challenges
• Welcome
• Purpose and methods of the consultation
• Introduction of experts and stakeholders
• Group photograph
• Ebola West Africa: drivers and lessons learned
• Multidisciplinary response: strengths and challenges
• New perspectives on outbreak response after SARS in
Canada
• A mild pandemic: critics and anticipation
• The role of NGOs and health sector partners
• Discussion
• Human-animal interface: anticipating risks of emergence
• Managing the risks of emergence at the animal level
• Knowledge on microbiome and research
• From science to action: microbiome and respiratory diseases
• Ecosystem surveillance: predicting the next emergence?
• Discussion
• What’s new for surveillance and detection?
• Advances in biology and their applications
• What’s new in diagnostics?
• Risk perception and community engagement
• Communicating in the 21st Century
• Discussion
Tuesday, 01 December 2015
Time Session Topics
Annex 2
AGENDA AT A GLANCE
Wrap-up16:30 – 17:00
Coffee break
Lunch
Coffee break
10:00 – 10:30
12:00 – 13:00
14:30 – 15:00
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Annex 2: AGENDA AT A GLANCE continued
9:00 – 10:30
11:00 – 12:30
13:30 – 15:00
15:30 – 17:00
Session 4
Making the most of Big
Brother
Session 5
Curing and not harming –
that is the question
Session 6
Preventing the spread of
infectious diseases in a
global village
Final session
Convergence and looking
forward
• Modelling outbreaks: pros and cons
• Learning from successes in meteorology
• Use of big data to anticipate epidemics and their evolution
• Learning from the insurance expertise
• Discussion
• Clinical practices and emerging diseases
• Systemic view of infectious in health care facilities
• Patient-doctor relationship at the age of the Internet
• Impact of strengthening the overall health system
• Discussion
• Evolution of health security concepts
• Revisiting traditional containment measures
• Managing epidemics in urban settings
• Epidemics and tourism
• Political perspectives of global risk
• Discussion
• Summary of the meeting deliberations
• WHO’s R&D Blueprint for epidemic preparedness
• The changing landscape for WHO: Global ecosystems,
partners and mechanisms
Tuesday, 01 December 2015
Time Session Topics
Close17:00 – 17:30
Coffee break
Lunch
Coffee break
10:30 – 11:00
12:30 – 13:30
15:00 – 15:30
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Annex 3
SPEAKERS BY SESSION
SESSION 1: Back to the future: Learning from the past
Moderator: Didier Houssin
Oyewale Tomori (Nigeria)
Ron Waldman (George Washington University)
Ron St John (Canada)
John Watson (UK PHE)
Sean Casey (International Medical Corps)
SESSION 2: Future epidemics: Moving and blurry targets
Moderator: Malik Peiris
Nadia Khelef (Institut Pasteur International Network (RIIP))
David Murdoch (University of Otago, New Zealand)
Monique Eliot (World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE))
Julio Pinto (Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN
(FAO))
Dennis Carroll (USAID)
SESSION 3: Science and Technology: Opportunities and
challenges
Moderator: Gabriel Leung
Nur Hassan (COSMOSID)
Jim Ajioka (University of Cambridge)
Mark Perkins (FIND)
Amanda McClelland (International Federation of the Red Cross
(IFRC))
Barbara Bentein (UNICEF)
SESSION 4: Making the most of Big Brother
Moderator: Brian McCloskey
Christl Donnelly (Imperial College, London)
Paolo Ruti (World Meteorological Organisation (WMO))
Kamran Khan (University of Toronto)
Cécile Wendling (AXA Insurance Company)
SESSION 5: Curing and not harming: that is the question
Moderator: David Heymann
Abdullah M Assiri (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)
Abdul Ghafur (Apollo Hospital, Chennai, India)
Hélène Lepetit (Institut des Mamans (IDM))
Idrissa Sow (Mauritania)
SESSION 6: Preventing the spread of infectious diseases in a
global village
Moderator: Ilona Kickbusch
Ali S. Khan (University of Nebraska)
Inger Damon (US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC))
Hayley MacGregor (Institute for Development Studies)
Dirk Glaesser (UN World Tourism Organization (UNWTO))
Fabienne Keller (France)
63
AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 63 07/11/16 13:20
The Ideas Wall and Ideas Box collected written, anonymous
comments from participants. They are reproduced below,
verbatim, with minor edits.
Annex 4
IDEAS WALL AND IDEAS BOX
Learning from the past
- Rapid and easy communication of new findings to those
who need local and global overview is essential.
-
Solution
could be web-based data collection system
for both syndromic info as well as e.g. genomic info.
This could be combined with novel IT tools for genomic
analysis and text – mining, machine learning and A.I.
Session 1 Remark
One is struck by the blatant discrepancy between the
delayed reaction to the severe west-African EVD outbreak
(both at national and international level) and the strong
over-reaction to a mild influenza pandemic in the UK.
Similarly the contradiction is conspicuous between large
scale endemic infections and parasitic diseases which
have been neglected for decades and limited epidemics
attracting both public resources and media focus. These
issues should be addressed adequately.
Instead of emphasizing on enhancement of IHR/capacity
building, have we explored the root causes of why
countries are not doing these activities, and address the
root causes?
We need a global advocacy campaign that will
engage multiple stakeholders, especially non-health
stakeholders, to both expand ownership of the issue and
increase political support for epidemic preparedness/
disease surveillance and response. This will ensure
greater support and drive up public participation on this
issue.
We need to be communicating about epidemics
between epidemics, not only when outbreaks happen.
Communities need to be seen as partners in surveillance
and response, not just terrains of response, therefore
we need to integrate this into education and public
information and communication department as soon as
possible.
How do we train to be surprised? Factors of resilience are
key.
Anthropologists are not new to these topics! A lot of work
had been done (see DVD, Formenty, Epelboin, Ebola, no
laughter) ➔ rediscovery?
There are many possible contributors or amplifiers of
epidemics. How do we focus our attention to the key
drivers, so that we can best utilize our limited resources.
Can we model this?
In terms of preventions, we should distinguish the
primary one aiming at blocking the very emergence of
the outbreak from secondary prevention targeting the
spread of the epidemic. The tool of the first type is science
and technology whereas the second type depends on
multidimensional social factors (political will mostly
The main note during today’s Sessions is: Coordination is
1-2 December 2015      Geneva, SwitzerlandWHO INFORMAL CO.docx
1-2 December 2015      Geneva, SwitzerlandWHO INFORMAL CO.docx
1-2 December 2015      Geneva, SwitzerlandWHO INFORMAL CO.docx
1-2 December 2015      Geneva, SwitzerlandWHO INFORMAL CO.docx
1-2 December 2015      Geneva, SwitzerlandWHO INFORMAL CO.docx
1-2 December 2015      Geneva, SwitzerlandWHO INFORMAL CO.docx
1-2 December 2015      Geneva, SwitzerlandWHO INFORMAL CO.docx
1-2 December 2015      Geneva, SwitzerlandWHO INFORMAL CO.docx
1-2 December 2015      Geneva, SwitzerlandWHO INFORMAL CO.docx
1-2 December 2015      Geneva, SwitzerlandWHO INFORMAL CO.docx
1-2 December 2015      Geneva, SwitzerlandWHO INFORMAL CO.docx
1-2 December 2015      Geneva, SwitzerlandWHO INFORMAL CO.docx
1-2 December 2015      Geneva, SwitzerlandWHO INFORMAL CO.docx
1-2 December 2015      Geneva, SwitzerlandWHO INFORMAL CO.docx
1-2 December 2015      Geneva, SwitzerlandWHO INFORMAL CO.docx
1-2 December 2015      Geneva, SwitzerlandWHO INFORMAL CO.docx
1-2 December 2015      Geneva, SwitzerlandWHO INFORMAL CO.docx
1-2 December 2015      Geneva, SwitzerlandWHO INFORMAL CO.docx
1-2 December 2015      Geneva, SwitzerlandWHO INFORMAL CO.docx
1-2 December 2015      Geneva, SwitzerlandWHO INFORMAL CO.docx

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1-2 December 2015 Geneva, SwitzerlandWHO INFORMAL CO.docx

  • 1. 1-2 December 2015 | Geneva, Switzerland WHO INFORMAL CONSULTATION MEETING REPORT Anticipating Emerging Infectious Disease Epidemics AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 1 07/11/16 13:20 © World Health Organization 2016 All rights reserved. Publications of the World Health Organization are available on the WHO website (www.who.int) or can be purchased from WHO Press, World Health Organization, 20 Avenue Appia, 1211 Geneva 27, Switzerland (tel.: +41 22 791 3264; fax: +41 22 791 4857; e-mail: [email protected] who.int). Requests for permission to reproduce or translate WHO publications –whether for sale or for non-commercial distribution– should be addressed to WHO Press through the WHO website (www.who.int/about/licensing/copyright_form/en/index.html). The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Health Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or
  • 2. concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted and dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement. The mention of specific companies or of certain manufacturers’ products does not imply that they are endorsed or recommended by the World Health Organization in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned. Errors and omissions excepted, the names of proprietary products are distinguished by initial capital letters. All reasonable precautions have been taken by the World Health Organization to verify the information contained in this publication. However, the published material is being distributed without warranty of any kind, either expressed or implied. The responsibility for the interpretation and use of the material lies with the reader. In no event shall the World Health Organization be liable for damages arising from its use. WHO/OHE/PED/2016.2 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 2 07/11/16 13:20 Foreword Executive summary 01 Introduction 02 Opening Session
  • 3. 03 Session 1: Back to the future: Learning from the past 04 Session 2: Future epidemics: moving and blurry targets 05 Session 3: Science and technology: opportunities and challenges 06 Session 4: Making the most of Big Brother 07 Session 5: Curing and not harming: that is the question 08 Session 6: Preventing the spread of infectious diseases in a global village 09 Closing session: Convergence and looking forward 10 Major discussion themes Annex 1: List of Participants Annex 2: Agenda at a glance Annex 3: Speakers by session Annex 4: Ideas Wall and Ideas Box 4 5 10 13 14
  • 4. 21 26 33 38 45 50 54 57 61 63 64 TABLE OF CONTENTS AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 3 07/11/16 13:20 One of the greatest threats to global health is the spread of uncontrolled epidemics due to highly pathogenic infectious diseases, especially those that easily cross borders and have the potential to wreak havoc on societies and their economies. The West Africa Ebola outbreak sounded an alarm to all of the actors involved in securing the health of populations by highlighting the critical need for forethought and pre-emptive action, even when
  • 5. dealing with well-known epidemic-prone diseases. Anticipation and preparedness are key to safeguarding global health security. Today we have at our disposal, more than at any other time in history, technological advances and collaborative partnerships that can transcend the outdated tactic of reactive outbreak control. Epidemics are complex phenomena, the details of which must be better understood to rapidly and effectively detect their emergence, control their spread and mitigate their impact. The increasing convergence of a number of factors that drive and amplify outbreaks requires multi-disciplinary, multi- sectoral and multi-faceted approaches. This consultation of experts was an open forum, conducted as the first in a series of steps the World Health Organization (WHO) is taking to further explore and address the complexity of epidemics. By understanding all the diverse elements involved in infectious disease epidemics – not just the pathogens and their hosts but also and in particular the biologic, socioeconomic, and physical environments in which they interact – we will gain a clearer picture of how and when we can best intervene to limit their spread. The discussions and deliberations in this consultation are aiding WHO as it adapts to the changing world of global health, with a clear vision based on solid evidence and a strong spirit of partnership to ensure countries and their health systems are resilient enough to withstand future epidemic threats. Dr R Bruce Aylward Executive Director a.i. Outbreaks and Health Emergencies and Special Representative of the Director-General for the Ebola Response
  • 6. FOREWORD 4 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 4 07/11/16 13:20 Background Having the ability to anticipate epidemic-prone emerging infectious diseases will give us the necessary edge to battle outbreaks which are becoming more frequent. This foresight, if reliable, is central to global health security and provides the tools and strategies to reduce avoidable loss of life, minimize illness and suffering, and reduce harm to national and global economies. With the rapid evolution of technology, know-how, and an increasing appreciation of the interconnectedness of everyone on the planet, on 1 and 2 December 2015, the World Health Organization convened some of the world’s most eminent scientists, experts and practitioners to identify a path forward to better, more accurately and systematically predict epidemics and thereby meaningfully strengthen global and national readiness to address these emerging infectious disease threats. The informal consultation on anticipating epidemics was the first step in an intensified initiative to better predict and be ready to respond to epidemics. It aimed to (1) create a forum for discussion by bringing together multi-disciplinary experts in a forward-thinking exercise on how to better anticipate and prepare for epidemics; (2) engage with a wide range of expertise and experience in order to shape international collaboration to tackle future infectious risks; and (3) identify approaches to improve detection, early analysis and interpretation of factors that drive emergence and
  • 7. amplification of infectious disease epidemics. Summary of discussion The experts agreed that the frame has changed fundamentally for preventing, detecting, responding to and managing global epidemics in the recent years. Some of these key shifts include: • From managing known outbreaks we have to manage uncertainties and unknowns • From relying on official government reports to anyone potentially alerting on unusual events • A proliferation of information and technology in the hands of many, almost everyone, rather than a few • Health-centred approach (mostly MOH, WHO) to multisectoral approach (all UN, whole of society, One Health) • Explosion of initiatives and players that require coordination (e.g. GHSA, PEF, NGOs, defence agencies, etc.) • Rather than be centrist, there is a need to engage and empower local communities in all aspects of preparedness and response • Human activity and behaviour are the main drivers of emergence and amplification of new pathogens (globalization, food, trade, population expansion, urbanization, tourism, migration etc) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 5 07/11/16 13:20
  • 8. Based on this, many traditional concepts and interventions, such as restrictions at points of entry, quarantine measures, are out-of-date and increasingly difficult to implement. They need to be reviewed as international borders become increasingly porous and movement of people and goods follow ever-increasing and crowded paths. Therefore the overall approach to and strategy for preparedness, readiness and response needs to be overhauled. Deploying resources has to be re-thought. Strategies to build trust among an increasing number of players, in turn enabling coordination, need to be crafted and dynamically reviewed as the context evolves. At-risk populations and the communities to which they belong are no longer homogeneous groups in a specific location. The concept of “community“ is increasingly complex and they must each be identified for their beliefs, values, behaviours along with their role in combating epidemics. They need to be understood by their interests and often virtual and dispersed in large geographic areas. Community engagement should be strengthened, especially understanding the “resistance” of local frontline communities affected by epidemics to desired behaviours to manage the outbreak. The role of social scientists in preparedness and response and in two-way communication, especially reaching out to the most vulnerable (e.g. periurban populations defined by inequality and informality), is crucial early in an epidemic. The fundamental and changing role of the health sector in controlling epidemics requires recognition of the key function of clinicians in the early identification of outbreaks. Engaging the community of health care workers who play a critical function in detecting and responding to outbreaks is essential. However, they are often criticized for not following public health principles of infection control measures and vaccination
  • 9. compliance. Acknowledgement of their potential to amplify epidemics as a result of their role within the health system is essential to ensuring appropriate prevention is in place. The number of players interested and involved in preparedness and response to epidemics has increased significantly leading to a coordination challenge of the many disciplines and many sectors with different but important agendas, perspectives and approaches. Participants at the consultation called for an improved management of the “humanitarian circus” where coordination creates space for everyone to contribute constructively. Some of the elements that are needed include a good definition of roles and responsibilities; a good incident management system that allows inter- operability between players; and a willing leadership as well as followership. New technologies allow for a rapid access to many more types of information and their sources than ever before. Given the multidimensional nature of infectious disease risks, integrating data elements from the micro level (genes) to the macro level (social, political, climate, global mobility patterns) would allow for better information systems to anticipate, assess risks and prepare for epidemics. New approaches such as foresight to identify blind spots, popular epidemiology and local risk mapping are to be considered to ensure the relevant analysis of complex events that could give us an added edge to curtailing their amplification. There are still a number of challenges for the use of data (quality, privacy, data sharing, ownership, ethics) and its interpretation (analysis, risk assessment) and eventually translation into actions (political, social, individual). Public health strategies and interventions are based on the traditional biomedical paradigms for infectious
  • 10. disease but these are becoming obsolete. New and emerging paradigms demand that we re-visit the approach accordingly. Early detection can only happen if front line responders (health care workers, clinicians, farmers) are involved in the preparedness, surveillance and response. Endemic problems and known risks 6 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 6 07/11/16 13:20 should be utilized to strengthen multidisciplinary and multisectoral preparedness and readiness especially in low resources settings so that prevention is prioritized, for Rift Valley Fever outbreaks that occur regularly. Disease outbreaks may be inevitable but epidemics are preventable. There are known hot spots for emergence and amplification where targeted efforts for preparedness, surveillance, prevention and response should be focussed using the analogy of smoke detectors and fire fighters being in the same place. There is a need to identify those hot spots analysing biological, ecological and behavioural drivers and concentrating appropriate resources and efforts from different players in specific at-risk settings to ensure more sustainable and robust investments. Multidisciplinary outbreak investigation teams including social and political scientists as well as risk communication experts are needed to fully understand the risks and, barriers to response actions and identify the most effective options for containment within the early phase of the epidemic. Many new technologies (diagnostics, software applications) are now available to improve detection and control of epidemics that need to be better integrated into
  • 11. mainstream public health strategies and systems. Nevertheless, it is people who remain at the centre. Improved education and training is necessary for the epidemic prevention and control workforce of tomorrow to be in line with contemporary and future risks and interventions. Risk communication is perhaps the most essential element of the response to epidemics in the 21st Century. Communication can hamper or facilitate a good response. With ubiquity of the internet and communication technologies, modalities of risk communication have changed fundamentally. Principles of transparency, consistency and trust remain paramount in communicating with affected populations. New elements to consider and to be better understood for the future are the social-emotional patterns of fear and hope in communities and individuals and the social thermometer of risk perception. It is necessary to have multiple channels of communication including local and religious leaders not only during the an epidemic but also during inter-epidemic periods. Health care givers who are usually the most trusted information source for the population have to adapt to new technologies and use them appropriately to remain a solid pillar of the response. Conclusion Three major conclusions emerged from this consultation: (1) just response is not enough in dealing with epidemics. Preparedness for outbreaks requires increased readiness and building resilient health system. (2) technologically advanced tools are required to anticipate the emergence and, more so, the amplification of infectious disease outbreaks.
  • 12. (3) new risks in the context of big cities and intense mobility of a globalized world necessitate newer, better adapted public health interventions. Effectively anticipating epidemics will contribute to reinforcing global health security mechanisms including assessment of infectious disease risks under the IHR 2005. It is expected that the outputs of this consultation will inform and guide preparedness efforts in the future. 7 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 7 07/11/16 13:20 8 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 8 07/11/16 13:20 9 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 9 07/11/16 13:20 Background and purpose The world stands at a critical juncture in public health. Epidemics of infectious diseases are able to disrupt many spheres of human existence and the impact can be felt across the globe. To better prepare for and respond to those threats, it is imperative that we make fundamental changes to the way we understand them.
  • 13. Significant changes in the world today, mean that it is not enough to just implement traditional measures such as quarantine and isolation for epidemic control. We have to move beyond and find innovative approaches that are relevant for today’s fast-paced, technologically- advanced world and, more importantly, that of the future. Recent major public health crises such as the SARS, H1N1 2009 Pandemic and Ebola in West Africa have unequivocally demonstrated the importance of understanding the many non-biomedical factors that influence the emergence and spread of epidemics. There is no doubt that such epidemic and pandemic diseases will continue to threaten humanity. Following the re-emergence of H5N1 and the spread of SARS, WHO Member States adopted the revised International Health Regulations (IHR 2005). After Ebola in West Africa in 2014, the global community is similarly looking at the necessary mechanisms to better protect humankind from devastating epidemics. We have the benefit of hindsight and an unprecedented opportunity to revamp our collective approach to preventing and controlling epidemics so that we can mitigate their impact. As a forward-thinking exercise, this meeting engaged a broad range of global experts from multi-disciplinary fields along with key stakeholders and partners to define the elements within which epidemics of the future will occur. The ideas and deliberations elucidated some of the drivers of emergence and amplification of infectious disease outbreaks. It is expected that the outputs of this consultation will guide and inform future preparedness; calibrate response, including research and development efforts; and reinforce global health security mechanisms. Objectives The specific objectives of this consultation were:
  • 14. • To create a forum for discussion by bringing together multi- disciplinary experts in a forward-thinking exercise on how to better anticipate and prepare for epidemics; • To engage with a wide range of expertise and experience in order to shape international collaboration to tackle future infectious risks; • To identify approaches to improve detection, early analysis and interpretation of factors that drive emergence and amplification of emerging disease epidemics. 01 INTRODUCTION 10 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 10 07/11/16 13:20 Methodology The consultation was designed to include a variety of disciplines and partners relevant to emerging infectious diseases from all over the world. The structure of the meeting entailed moderated panels for each of six sessions followed by extensive discussion with the audience. The panelists’ remarks were restricted to five minutes each with the aim of engendering as much dialogue amongst the participants as possible in order to spark ideas and exchange. The meeting followed Chatham House rules whereby comments are not directly attributed to individuals in order to maintain their confidentiality and therefore allow them to speak candidly. The full proceedings of the meeting were recorded in real-time by a “live scribe” who graphically represented
  • 15. the topics and issues as they were being discussed. These graphic posters along with biographical sketches of each of the participants; abstracts of the panelists; video interviews; and the presentations from each of the sessions are available on the WHO meeting website (http://www.who.int/csr/disease/anticipating_epidemics/ events/informal-consultation/en/). This report summarizes the proceedings. To capture additional ideas and thoughts, participants were encouraged to write these down and post them on an “idea wall” or put them in a box. These comments have been collated and can be found as an annex to this report (Annex 4). This report itself provides a brief summary of the interventions by moderators and panellists and a summary of the discussion with the audience. 11 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 11 07/11/16 13:20 12 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 12 07/11/16 13:20 Dr R Bruce Aylward, acting Executive Director of WHO’s recently established WHO Health Emergencies Programme, said the new Programme has been one of several responses by the Organization in the face of the increasing frequency of epidemics in recent years, their increasing severity, and their destabilizing effects on nations, regions, and – in the case of Ebola virus disease – the world. It is clear that health
  • 16. systems have to be better at anticipating outbreaks so that responses can be more rapid and effective. The enormously complex challenge of doing so will be made more difficult by broad trends such as urbanization, deforestation, and climate change. Accordingly, those present at the meeting included not only health experts but experts in the environment and meteorology, the social sciences, information and communication technology, and other fields. It was important to remember that whatever high- level or technically complex steps are taken in coming years, they will depend for success on what communities do: non-experts have to be able to understand disease threats and often have to be persuaded to change traditional behaviours. “If we don’t get that right,” Dr Aylward said, “it will be very hard to combat epidemics.” Dr Sylvie Briand, Director of the WHO Department of Pandemic and Epidemic Diseases, said upcoming crises likely will be different from those recently faced. Steps can be taken to define possible scenarios, to guide preparedness, and to build in the flexibility necessary for responding to the unexpected. The goal is to have a global system that allows for anticipation, for early detection of emerging disease threats, for rapid containment, and for mitigation. 02 OPENING SESSION EMERGENCE DRIVERS FOR EMERGENCE DRIVERS FOR AMPLIFICATION OUTBREAK Localized
  • 17. transmission EPIDEMIC Amplification CONTROL Anticipation Early detection Containment Mitigation Fig. 1: Drivers for emergence and amplification 13 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 13 07/11/16 13:20 This first session focussed on lessons learned from the recent epidemics of Ebola, H1N1 pandemic, SARS and the collective global response to similar emerging disease epidemics. The moderator highlighted that though we know that we must learn from our past experiences, we tend to have a forgetful memory. Anticipating new outbreaks and for epidemic risk assessment and risk management a better understanding of human factors is required in order to understand the impact of changing global trends including intensification of air travel and migration, political upheaval, climate change and deforestation, and new communications tools. We need to modernize and put at the forefront the social sciences for making decisions by focussing on trust,
  • 18. behaviours, and beliefs. 03 Ebola in West Africa: drivers and lessons learned Seven countries in Africa had Ebola outbreaks in 2014-15. In three countries, there were devastating events; but in the other four the spread was contained. Rapidly detecting the imported cases and establishing accurate laboratory diagnosis of the infection, they introduced classical infection prevention and control (IPC) measures to successfully contain Ebola virus disease (EVD) from spreading widely in their territories. These countries demonstrated that given basic facilities and infrastructures, combined with strong political leadership, effective coordination of an immediate and aggressive response, disease outbreaks can be controlled before they become major public health events. Securing the health of citizens of a nation, including protection from the ravages of disease outbreaks, is the primary responsibility of the government of the nations in which they occur. This first session focussed on lessons learned from the recent epidemics of Ebola, H1N1 pandemic, SARS and the collective global response to similar emerging disease epidemics. The moderator highlighted that though we know that we must learn from our past experiences, we tend to have a forgetful memory. Anticipating new
  • 19. outbreaks and for epidemic risk assessment and risk management a better understanding of human factors is required to understand changing global trends including intensification of air travel and It is primarily the national governments’ responsibility to ensure their populations are protected from epidemics. This requires not only a strong health system but also government-led coordination with many non-health sectors. SESSION 1 Back to the future: Learning from the past The session explored the following key questions: • What are the critical lessons to be learned from major recent epidemics? • What signals and information should we have anticipated that made “routine” events extraordinary? • What are the drivers of emergence and amplification that can turn an outbreak into an epidemic? • What important drivers need to be integrated into the risk assessment? • How can we enhance our preparedness and response by “thinking outside the box”? 14 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 14 07/11/16 13:20
  • 20. 15 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 15 07/11/16 13:20 Preparedness requires planning and exercising to be rigorous. But in the midst of uncertainties, the response must allow for nimble and flexible implementation of strategies to meet actual needs. migration, political upheaval, climate change and deforestation, and new communications tools. We need to modernize and put at the forefront the social sciences for making decisions by focussing on trust, behaviours, and beliefs. Ebola in West Africa: drivers and lessons learned Seven countries in Africa had Ebola outbreaks in 2014-15. In three countries, there were devastating events; but in the other four the spread was contained. Rapidly detecting the imported cases and establishing accurate laboratory diagnosis of the infection, they introduced classical infection prevention and control (IPC) measures to successfully contain EVD from spreading widely in their territories. These countries demonstrated that given basic facilities and infrastructures, combined with strong political leadership, effective coordination of an immediate and aggressive response
  • 21. , disease outbreaks can be controlled before they become major public health events. Securing the health of citizens of a nation, including protection from the ravages of disease outbreaks, is the primary responsibility of the government of the nations in which they occur. New perspectives on outbreak response after SARS in Canada SARS was the first major international event of this century which showed that any local crisis can become an international problem and that no country can consider itself isolated from the impacts. In many ways it is an example of what might be expected when the next global outbreak occurs. Secondary effects were felt beyond surveillance, morbidity and mortality in terms of travel and transportation, social services for quarantined persons, huge economic consequences for the city, media frenzies, political 16 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 16 07/11/16 13:20 concerns, and more. The experience raised the spectre of a more easily transmissible agent that will produce even greater, far- reaching distress. A mild H1N1 pandemic: critics and anticipation There are medical interventions such as vaccines and antivirals available for influenza but their use raised a number of criticisms and suspicions in many affected countries with parliamentarian investigations after the 2009 H1N1 pandemic crisis. As the world
  • 22. had been preparing for the next pandemic for many years, response plans were deployed including the rapid development of pandemic- specific influenza vaccine and the use of antiviral stockpiles (in those countries where they were available). The overall impact of the pandemic was ultimately considered comparable to that of a moderately severe influenza season. Criticism of over-reaction was voiced and many lessons were learned that led to revision of the WHO global approach to pandemic influenza as well as to national response plans. Multidisciplinary response: strengths and challenges Different partners exist, including non-health sector ones, and they each bring different points of view, perceptions of the risk, and how to address the problem. Emergency response brings actors from many UN agencies, national organizations, civil society (the NGO “community”), and the private, for-profit sector. This is sometimes referred to as “the humanitarian circus”. Lack of a strong and effective ringleader results in a humanitarian response from the health sector that is usually relatively uncoordinated, unsupervised, and totally unregulated. The solution is to empower countries, with technical support of WHO and convening power of the UN system, to develop “whole of society” operational plans; exercise and regularly update them to ensure that local, national, regional and, if feasible, international authorities are able to implement
  • 23. technically sound and fully coordinated assessment and response activities. The role of NGOs and health sector partners Many different institutional actors including NGOs, particularly those that are faith-based, are important providers of health care in poorer parts of the world. The West Africa Ebola experience highlights the speed and adaptability of non-governmental humanitarian actors, it underscores the importance of their role in responding, but it also reflects the need to partner with NGOs to increase their capacity to address non-traditional hazards, including infectious disease outbreaks. NGOs must be considered equal and vital partners in epidemic preparedness, response and recovery as the Africa Ebola outbreak shows including coordination, working alongside UN and local and foreign governmental agencies. Looking ahead we need to consider the opportunities to improve partnerships and enhance our collective response capacity to future outbreaks, building on our comparative advantages. All humanitarian actors must be recognized and their complementary strengths enhanced for infectious diseases. Coordination during a response should bring them together for collective action but with countries in the lead.
  • 24. Fig. 2: Stages of epidemic emergence Emergence of pandemic zoonotic disease (ref: Morse SS et al Lancet 2012; 380: 1956-65) STAGE 3 STAGE 2 STAGE 1 PANDEMIC EMERGENCE LOCALISED EMERGENCE PRE-EMERGENCE 17 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 17 07/11/16 13:20 18 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 18 07/11/16 13:20 19 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 19 07/11/16 13:20 20
  • 25. AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 20 07/11/16 13:20 The session moderator highlighted the progressive stages of emergence of epidemics from wildlife and livestock pathogens crossing over to humans, resulting in a zoonotic outbreak and sometimes becoming human-to-human transmissible (e.g. SARS and MERS-CoV). This last stage is too late to contain novel path- ogens and so the question remains: can we anticipate microbes in the animal sphere and assess their risk as potential pathogens for humans? H1N1 was not a failure of the signal but a failure in our understanding of the virus. Can we identify common patterns for emergence and control at source? This requires a better understanding of what is circulating in animals but this is a huge list so how to prioritize? How do we assess risk given the diversity of potential microbes? To understand whether zoonotic events precede transmissibility from human to human some knowledge gaps exist, for instance: • Influenza – there has been an attempt to structure risk assessment using IRAT (CDC) and ECDC’s risk assess- ment tool. Should we do the same for other diseases? • Routes of transmission, host factors, genetic diversity of viruses among human populations. Can we identify common pathways by which they emerge? For influenza: interventions that we know will trigger emer- gence. Finally, the issue of emergence of epidemics coming from
  • 26. animals requires an integrated approach of One Health (human, animal and environment). 04 SESSION 2 Future epidemics: moving and blurry targets The session explored the following key questions: • How can we better use our knowledge of the human-animal interface to anticipate and respond to emerging infectious diseases? • What could be the impact of the new infectious disease paradigm (microbiota) on the understanding and control of outbreaks? • How can we holistically and systematically apply our knowledge on the human-animal interface and the microbiome to mitigate epidemics? • What concrete steps can be implemented to anticipate emergence and prevent amplification? Knowledge on microbiome and research In the past centuries, the classic Pasteurian paradigm, in which the pathogen comes from outside the host, has shaped the strategies and methods for control of infection and epidemics. Cutting-edge research on the human microbiota has revealed that a new paradigm of pathogen-host interaction is required. Gut microbiota have co-evolved symbiotically with the host with functions ranging from absorption of nutrients and contribution to the development of the immune response. The concept of invasion of the host by a pathogen is therefore complicated by the theories of the imbalance within the host’s own bacterial ecology, i.e. the the microbiome, rather than simply invasion of the host by a
  • 27. pathogen from an external source. The development of therapeutic and preventive interventions and diagnostic methods being explored in addressing gut microbiome disorders range from nutrition complements to stimulate immunity to fecal transplantation to treat gut infections. 21 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 21 07/11/16 13:20 From science to action: microbiome and respiratory diseases Modern, culture-independent techniques have revealed that healthy lungs are not sterile as once believed but harbour diverse communities of micro-organisms. Many questions remain unanswered regarding their role including respiratory dysbiosis in pathogenesis and treatment; whether they can be manipulated for therapeutic effect; and how viruses affect the ecology of respiratory tract. Research is ongoing to address important insights into the pathogenesis of acute lower respiratory tract infections, the role of epidemic viruses in causing or triggering severe respiratory disease, and identification of novel therapeutic or prophylactic interventions. Managing the risks of emergence at the animal level We are all inter-connected. From the animals that populate our human environment on which we rely for food, draught power, savings, security and companionship, to the wildlife inhabiting sky,
  • 28. land and sea. Early warning of disease events is critical. Livestock health is the weakest link in our global health chain, and disease drivers in livestock as well as wildlife have increasing impacts on humans. To respond effectively the following are necessary: (1) evidence to understand problems and opportunities for change; (2) enabling inter-sectoral dialogue and information exchange; (3) raising awareness, promoting health-conscious innovation, improving the way we produce, buy, sell and consume animal products; and (4) enhancing how we jointly investigate and respond to health threats. It is imperative that we continuously understand and apply the newest scientific tools and knowledge to respond to emerging diseases. New opportunities from the field of the microbiome must be exploited for health. Our inter-connectedness with our environment requires close cooperation with joint actions between animal and human health. The two networks must be systematically linked and engaged for preparedness as well as response. Fig. 3: Ecological determinants of the respiratory microbiome REGIONAL GROWTH CONDITIONS MICROBIAL IMMIGRATION Microaspiration Inhalation of bacteria Direct mucosal dispersion
  • 30. 92 3 MICROBIAL ELIMINATION IMMIGRATION & ELIMINATION HEALTH SEVERE LUNG DISEASE REGIONAL GROWTH CONDITIONS Cough Mucociliary clearance Innate and adaptive host defenses Nutrient availability Oxygen tension Temperature pH Concentration of inflammatory cells Activation of inflammatory cells Local microbial competition Host epithelial cell interactions 22 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 22 07/11/16 13:20 Human-animal interface: anticipating risks of emergence Identification of the first cases, i.e. the first clusters, of a disease and to subsequently limit the spread of the disease can only
  • 31. be achieved with improvement of capacities for early detection and notification of sanitary events observed in animals. That means better knowledge of zoonotic pathogens through research programmes and development of laboratory networks etc. But it is also critical to connect with the people who are in close contact with animals as they can serve as sentinels. It is important to combine sophisticated scientific work with studies of predictive epidemiology and multidisciplinary fieldwork to obtain good quality data and to coordinate and organize networks that can disseminate these data. In order to enhance anticipation of epidemics, ecological risk assessment methods to identify drivers of emergence and amplification will present a holistic picture and enable improved risk reduction and mitigation measures. Ecosystem surveillance: predicting the next emergence? USAID’s EPT (Emerging Pathogenic Threats) Program has advanced the understanding of ecologic and behavioural drivers underlying zoonotic disease emergence and reshaped our approaches to disease surveillance as well as strategies for preventing the emergence of new threats. Advances in genomics and informatics have further expanded our understanding of the biology of disease emergence and provided indications to how we we can approach the early detection of future threat (ecological, behavioural and
  • 32. biological drivers). Two areas of ongoing work being supported under USAID’s EPT program are “prediction of emergence” and assessing the potential for the “prevention of emergence” looking at evolution and spread. Ecological Drivers Land Use Climate Change Natural Resource Extraction Economic Development Migration Behavioral Drivers Bush meat consumption Animal production & marketing Animal-human interfacing Globalization Biological Drivers Re-assortment Genetic drift Host factors Fig. 4: Drivers of Zoonotic Disease Emergence (Adapted from USAID/Predict project) 23 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 23 07/11/16 13:20
  • 33. 24 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 24 07/11/16 13:20 25 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 25 07/11/16 13:20 The session moderator emphasized that new and different solutions were needed to strengthen national and subnational capacities to make sure they are at the optimum. This would be complemented by “planetary security” – global security at its broadest with supra-national institutions, e.g. the UN system, NGOs, partners should work together as equal partners. The weakest link argument is more relevant rather than the old cliché: “diseases respect no borders”. Health and health care industries have to look at the aviation industry, new development banks, insurance and financial sectors and to R&D. The R&D solutions mean innovations and technological solutions. How should we direct the R&D and incentivise manufacturers to make the needed investments and ensure their products come to market? By putting patients and communities back at the centre. 05 SESSION 3 Science and technology: opportunities and challenges
  • 34. What’s new for surveillance and detection? Targeted single isolate detection has been a valuable tool, however, the dramatic increase in emerging and mixed microbial infections, and rising association of food-associated and intestinal microbial community in human and animal health and wellness has led to a need to identify the entire microbial community to understand the dynamics of infections. The ability of next generation sequencing to generate large amounts of DNA sequence data has considerably facilitated metagenomics studies, including of food-associated and intestinal microbes. Specific applications of metagenomics in food safety include, among others, (i) identification, from clinical specimens, of novel and non-culturable agents that cause foodborne disease; (ii) characterization of microbial communities (including pathogens and indicator organisms) in foods and food associated environments (e.g., processing plants); and (iii) characterization of animal and human intestinal microbiomes to allow for identification of microbiota that may protect against infection with foodborne pathogens. The session explored the following questions: • How can new scientific advances and technologies influence the surveillance, detection and control
  • 35. of emerging pathogens? • What is the impact of increased accessibility, availability and visibility of technologies on risk percep- tion and how should communication strategies be adapted to make them successful? • How can we best use new technologies to rapidly detect, communicate and respond to epidemics? • What tools can help to better engage the communities and other actors in outbreak response? Health security requires application of a dynamic shift to find new solutions to old problems using the best science and technology has to offer. But application of new tools and approaches means opening our traditional health perspectives to views from other disciplines. 26 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 26 07/11/16 13:20 27 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 27 07/11/16 13:20 What’s new in diagnostics?
  • 36. Many of the tools first deployed in life sciences research have now been turned into clinical in vitro diagnostic devices with fit- for-purpose features that make them attractive for use in many developing world settings. Ease of access is a key element, i.e. local staff near patient settings without special training and an ability to transmit resultant data in real-time. There are a number of opportunities provided by these advances in technology. Now a new generation of immunoassays is in development that offer multiplexing, quantitation, automation, and electronic reporting and molecular testing systems have been developed for clinical use that automate specimen processing, amplification, detection, and wireless reporting. However, there are some persistent obstacles to their broad impact in public health. Investment for diagnostics development is necessary in the inter-epidemic period along with a global architecture by harnessing partnerships to deploy earliest in an epidemic. Advances in biology and their applications Nature is still better at producing human threats than we are. For detection and analysis, biosensors from synthetic biology (DNA sequencing and engineering) may enhance our capabilities in differentiating closely related strains. For instance, metagenomic sequencing to analyse patterns that drive diseases. For known emerging infectious diseases, synthetic biology may help by developing support methods for existing technologies such as combinations of biotechnology and nanotechnologies. Analytic and database tools are being put together. Response in the form
  • 37. of treatment or prophylaxis is the area where synthetic biology can greatly enhance our capabilities as well as accelerate vaccine development. But getting the product to the people and making it viable is the basic principle for responsible research in science and technology. Risk perception and community engagement Risk perception is the core to how an individual and community understand, interpret and react to risk and it influences decisions about the acceptability of risk and behaviour before, during and after the risk has passed. Ability to translate information from global Information technology is ubiquitously owned by everyone which brings with it risk perception challenges. Community engagement and risk communication tools are critical components of any epidemic response. To systematically build preparedness and response capacities investment in innovations and new technologies must be harnessed during inter-epidemic periods. 28 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 28 07/11/16 13:20 level into language that is understood by communities is vital so
  • 38. that complex information on risk is understood within societal and cultural influences and is aligned with actual risk to communities, as accurately as possible. The revolution of social media and dire need of better and faster risk communication has driven the use of more technologies including mass SMS, radio, internet (Facebook, social media), but interpersonal communication is still the way we make a difference when psychosocial support is required. Challenges remain as to how to use the networks of Red Cross volunteers (17 million) to pass messages at scale and use them in an alert system. Communicating in the 21st Century Central importance of communities and community ownership highlights the central importance of people taking actions. Five key principles in community engagement are: (1) trust - source of information needs to be trusted by building trust in the health system and through intermediaries; (2) listening is as important as messaging – build on communities’ reference and understand the cultural context (3) professionalism – communication cannot be improvised so it is imperative to build national capacities; (4) ensuring coherence in complex fields – interagency cluster system; and (5) communities compare information from multiple channels so there is a key role for innovations. Investment for the long- term is needed because we cannot just start at the beginning of the outbreak, rather resources are needed for preparedness.
  • 39. 29 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 29 07/11/16 13:20 30 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 30 07/11/16 13:20 31 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 31 07/11/16 13:20 32 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 32 07/11/16 13:20 The session moderator described the UK’s experience with the Olympic Games in London. As much good information as possible was collected through laboratory and syndromic surveillance in which 30 million people were registered and trends observed. Some of the more challenging questions that were dealt with were: what is the baseline? When does it change? When is it significant change? They are now using social media, the added value of which remains to be seen. 06 SESSION 4
  • 40. Making the most of Big Brother Modelling outbreaks: pros and cons Modelling goes hand in hand with analysis and is not a theoretical exercise. The cycle involves preparedness, real time analysis, and retrospective analysis with on-going monitoring during an event. Modelling can help with “what if” scenarios. It can be a retrospective “what if” (impact of strategies implemented earlier) and it can be a simulation for preparedness, considering a possible set of scenarios. Challenges include access to (timely) data for analysis, who will see the result and if widely available how will they make sense out of it, how to separate the noise from the signals, and how to coordinate a modelling group(s) to get the best value out of them? The session explored the following questions: • How can real-time information be better used for timely and relevant responses? • Forecasting: what can public health learn from other sectors? • How can big data approaches be applied to enable epidemic anticipation? • How do we capture, collect and optimally analyse data on the drivers and amplifiers of epidem- ics? • What can the health sector learn from other sectors that are further ahead in using newer tech-
  • 41. nologies to anticipate risks? A number of newer, more extensive, real-time data sources and analytic methodologies have become available that will allow us to better anticipate outbreaks and their evolution. It is time to apply these at a global scale. 33 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 33 07/11/16 13:20 Index B husband mother died at home undiagnosed Changi General Hospital National University Hospital Healthcare worker Tan Tock Seng Hospital CGH NUH HCW TTSH C
  • 42. father playmate HCW (CGH) 4 HCWs (TTSH) patientvisitor (NUH) (NUH) son sonHCW (CGH) HCW 3 patients (TTSH) 7 visitors of TTSH 10 HCWs (TTSH) (Source: Tan Tock Seng Hospital, Singapore) We can learn from other sectors that have analyzed large, dynamic datasets for prediction, such as meteorology and insurance, and adapt their concepts, techniques and strategies for epidemic anticipation. Use of big data to anticipate epidemics and their evolution Understanding migration and human mobility is critical in infectious diseases providing important insights into risk. Of the almost 6 trillion kilometres travelled 1/6th comes from just the US and a quarter from just three countries: US, UK and China. Hotspots for risk are linked to unequal distribution of movement. In the last 10 years there has been a 60% increase in mobility which is accelerating quicker and faster than our ability to prevent and control infectious diseases; we are getting better at amplifying threats by our global movement. There are better opportunities to get data: internet (GPHIN / ProMed), meteorological
  • 43. (satellite), smartphones with computing power, and social, behavioural, cultural aspects of epidemics. We are working on many kinds of data (open data, from industry, personal health information) but we have to overcome the following challenges: managing a growing volume of data; security/privacy issue; mechanisms to share data; who is going to have access to this data (who is Big Brother?). We need some entity to have a panoramic view – an incident manager – whom we can all trust. Fig. 5: SARS, chain of human-to-human transmission, Singapore 2003 34 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 34 07/11/16 13:20 A key issue is the use of different kinds of data to make decisions BY whom, FOR whom? Data ownership, privacy, confidentiality, quality etc are considerable challenges that must be address for the use of big data. Learning from successes in meteorology Evolution of technology since World War II has been a success for weather forecasting which is based on collection and sharing of large amounts of data, thanks to satellites, resulting in real-time
  • 44. sharing to the point where data is gathered every six hours from satellites airplanes and ships, down to a resolution of 15 kilometres. Availability of data is not the only element (only 20% of satellite data is used). The big question is how we translate these data using mathematical models and simulations. What matters most is “initial conditions” after which, using additional new information you correct your initial guess. Weather forecasting has moved from a deterministic to a probabilistic approach. By providing probabilities you share the responsibility whereby interpretation of the probability is left to the user. Key questions remain on how far we can go (i.e. seasonal forecast) and what kind of details we can provide (i.e. 500 or 100 metres)? Learning from the insurance expertise Health surveillance is often a rather reactive process, with no real integration of early signals and wild cards. As a consequence it is difficult to detect radical changes having a strong impact on public health in the medium or long term. To embed this proactive dimension and increase proactivity, foresight is a key approach to use and many such methods exist among which the scenario approach will be explored. In describing possible future scenarios, as well as the elements in favour of one scenario rather than another,
  • 45. health surveillance can help decision makers to influence the context in order to guide towards one or more favourable futures. 35 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 35 07/11/16 13:20 36 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 36 07/11/16 13:20 37 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 37 07/11/16 13:20 The session moderator highlighted the impact on healthcare workers during Ebola and SARS as an example of the critical importance of the health system in handling all kinds of emergencies. But these healthcare workers require the best support possible in terms of training and tools to ensure they serve as a positive influence in managing epidemic emergencies rather than have a negative impact due to poor practices. 07 Clinical practices and emerging diseases Key lessons learned from the MERS-CoV outbreak in Saudi
  • 46. Arabia include: never underestimate a novel virus; get prepared (planning, training, evaluation and auditing); ensure safe hospitals with security check points; “outbreak quad” (overcrowding, absence of triage, low index of suspicion, non-adherence to IPC measures); sick patients are efficient in getting and efficient in transmitting MERS-CoV; transmission happens because of what we do and not because of what the hospital looks like; administration involvement is critical; line of communication with communities is necessary for mobilizing them; disease does not respect national borders; build a national surge plan. It is vital to recognize that the health care system can propagate outbreaks just as it can contain them. This requires proper management of the entire system, not only one aspect such as infection prevention or one element such as the health worker. The session explored the following key questions: • How can the health systems of the future minimize the risk of amplifying epidemics and what ele- ments must be in place to mitigate impact of epidemics? • What kinds of innovations in medical technologies and patient care will improve epidemic detection and control? • What kind of research is needed for the 21st Century to better address the challenge of emerging pathogens? • How can we change routine clinical practices including adaptation to cultural beliefs and practices to
  • 47. better prevent and manage infections? SESSION 5 Curing and not harming: that is the question 38 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 38 07/11/16 13:20 39 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 39 07/11/16 13:20 Health care facilities are defined by the physical infrastructure but the human factors and people who staff them are the most important and must be addressed explicitly to ensure appropriate containment of outbreaks. Systemic view of infections in health care facilities From Ebola we learned that adherence to simple and basic measure such as hand hygiene is more important than building high-tech facilities. At the same time we also learned that high-tech facilities can help contain the infection, providing an argument for building well-equipped health care institutions in the developing world as well. Health care institutions of the future should amalgamate modern strategies to improve human behaviour and at the same
  • 48. time build and design health care facilities to provide a safe environment with the least risk of creation of dangerous pathogens and amplification of the spread of infection. Patient–doctor relationship at the age of the Internet By offering free, unlimited, easily and anonymously accessible health information, the web and social networks incite patients to take more control over their own health. As a result the patient- provider relationship is evolving such that patients often expect to discuss and sometimes challenge their doctors’ recommendations. Health professionals’ role needs to evolve, and in this regard, one size does not fit all. Healthcare providers need to take into consideration the health behaviour profile of their patients in order to build and maintain a trusting relationship. 40 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 40 07/11/16 13:20 Patients can now take responsibility for their own health-related behavior as a direct result of widespread availability of information. Providers need to capitalize on this dynamic to forge new relationships with their patients. 16 14
  • 49. 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 7- Mar Mar Mar Mar Mar May May May May May Jun Jun JunApr Apr Apr Apr Apr 13- 19- 25- 31- 6- 5-12- 12-18- 18-24- 24-30- 30- 11- 17-6- Non health care workers 315 cases 250 (80%) deaths Health care workers Fig. 6: Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever by mode of transmission, Kikwit Zaire, 1995 (Source: WHO/CDC) Impact of strengthening the overall health system When implemented adequately, comprehensive components of health system strengthening should contribute to mitigating the impact of epidemics. The most deadly epidemics occur generally in low-income countries where governments’ investments in health
  • 50. remain low despite their political commitment. Unless this lack of ownership is addressed, health system strengthening sustainability is doomed to failure. Among critical issues for the future are: (i) a thorough multi-stakeholders health system assessment/ review identify gaps; (ii) a “menu à la carte” of low cost and high impact interventions to address gaps; (iii) learning from previous experiences on inter-country cooperation; (iv) enhance socio- anthropology component of health system strengthening. 41 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 41 07/11/16 13:20 42 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 42 07/11/16 13:20 43 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 43 07/11/16 13:20 44 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 44 07/11/16 13:20
  • 51. The session moderator highlighted the issue of defining global drivers and addressing risks in this world where interdependence and interconnectedness clearly show how global security has changed. Outbreaks and diseases are seen as destabilizing factors in the new health security paradigm where security is contrasted with global public good and solidarity. Risks are always defined virtually so the notion of threat becomes very important, i.e. who is defined as vulnerable and has to be supported? Managing risks means also manag- ing the political dimension. Risk definition is a power game: who defines the risk? who holds the narrative? Looking from a WHO perspective, who gets to define a PHEIC – a committee of technical experts or a publicly elected director? 08 SESSION 6 Preventing the spread of infectious diseases in a global village The session explored the following questions: • How can we include socio-economic and political determinants into outbreak control? • How can we modernize “traditional” control measures (isolation, quarantine, culling etc) in today’s world? • What are the politics and political challenges of responding to escalating outbreaks? • What are the key drivers of epidemics in today’s interconnected global ecosystem and the evolving social habitat? • How to better engage with societies of today for preparedness and response to epidemics? • What public health measures should we revisit and/or adapt, and how do we move from a biomedical
  • 52. approach to a more holistic one? International Sanitary Regulations List-based. Cholera, plague, yellow fever (smallpox, typhus, relapsing fever). Quarantines, limit restrictions to trade and travel Physical Infrastructure (trade routes) Disjointed response Country-based response Surprise Official government reporting No reporting of capability to meet the regulations French government. 14 International Sanitary Conferences Table 1: The Evolution of Global Health Security International Health Regulations PHEIC (emerging infections including bioterrorism)
  • 53. Improved Reporting & Building National Capacity Post-Industrial Infrastructure - electricity, electronics Revolutionary international law and global governance but still fragmented Multilateral response Expect (managing certainty) Non-state actors (organizations & media) Self-assessments WHA (health centric) & WHO International Health Security Framework All public health emergencies, including climate change, emerging infections, antimicrobial resistance, & synthetic biology Prevention & Preparedness at National Level Knowledge Infrastructure Integrated Shared Information Response Global Response Teams Response Contingency Fund Global Fund for Health Security
  • 54. Predict and Prevent (managing uncertainty) Everybody Global Health Security Preparedness Index UN Under-Secretary for Health Security (multi-sectoral) Past (19th to mid-20th Century) Present (20th Century) Proposed Future (21st Century) 45 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 45 07/11/16 13:20 Local contexts (e.g. urbanization) as well as global ones (e.g. migration, travel) must all be addressed to mitigate risks to the most vulnerable with particular attention to economic, social and political drivers and impacts. A whole of society approach to health security must include diverse disease drivers: genetics and biological factors, ecology and the physical environment; human behavior and demographics; and social, political, and economic factors Revisiting traditional containment measures The key to success is aligning incentives of victims, the exposed and a fearful public by building trust and investing in community supports. This means not only food, water, early diagnostics, available
  • 55. treatment and prevention; but also psychosocial support in culturally relevant manner through empowerment. We must recognize the limited times when compulsory measures of isolation and quarantine are necessary and not fear to use them sparingly and in time-limited fashion. The use of public health measures must delicately balance a fearful public without stigmatizing victims while justifiably controlling transmission through restrictive means. Transparent communication prior and during implementation is paramount in building support and trust for such a complex task. Managing epidemics in urban settings The challenges associated with managing epidemics in urban areas are particularly acute in low and middle income countries with public sector resource and capacity constraints, and weak health systems. It is noteworthy that inequalities in living circumstances, incomes and access to services has become a feature of many large cities, which can leave people in certain parts of a city more vulnerable to disease because of trade-offs between health and livelihood. The implications of urban in- equalities and urban informality for health risk in urban areas and for seeking strategies for preventative responses that could mitigate
  • 56. risk and build resilience in urban and peri-urban areas require a better un- derstanding of local contexts and perspectives. Local innovations for risk mitigation and control require pragmatism in risk assessment within a “safe” informality. Evolution of health security concepts Health security at a national level is broad-based protection, response, and recovery efforts to ALL public health threats and it requires capacity in ALL countries centred on government ownership and responsibility. Current reform efforts should consider establishing an essential core in all countries consisting of an emergency operation and data fusion unit with domains derived from the IHR. Fire-fighters and smoke- detectors – one and all, we are in the prevention business. However, ensuring global health security is not just a function of the health sector and requires na- tional level leadership and the in-country support and planning of multi- ple other sectors. The drivers include changes in genetics and biological factors, ecology and the physical environment; human behaviour and demographics; and social, political, and economic factors. They must all be part of one system.
  • 57. 46 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 46 07/11/16 13:20 Close collaboration across various sectors and partners in developing risk reduction and risk mitigation strategies can be achieved under the guidance of national governments who are empowered to forge partnerships and alliances. Epidemics and tourism Travel and tourism is a growing important economic and societal activity. Many countries are using travel and tourism as a priority tool for eco- nomic development. The sector is heavily dependent on an intact en- vironment, whether this is natural, cultural, social or human or animal health environment and thus, can be easily affected by negative events such as epidemics, as it is a trust and belief product. Close cooperation with WHO and other key actors is critical to provide timely information and to promote safe travelling behavior, while ensuring uniformity in information sharing, developing practical response strategies, and pro- viding recommendations for the tourism and travel sector.
  • 58. Political perspectives of global risk Political authorities face three major challenges in responding to epi- demic threats: • How to apply in the 21st century traditional public health measures in a complex, mobile and selfish society in crisis? • How to talk about risk and uncertainty given the approach adopted by new media sources such as internet? • How to guarantee fair access to resources in case of a crisis in demo- cratic societies? Political choices are described for preparation of societies and health sys- tem changes. Key actions are highlighted to fight threats associated with emerging infectious diseases: raising public awareness through infor- mation; coordinating multiple sectors and multidisciplinary methods; preventing non-health threats to health; promoting traditional preven- tion protocols as well as new tools for combating epidemics; manage operational health systems elements; and harmonize global policies for access to vaccines. 47 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 47 07/11/16 13:20
  • 59. 48 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 48 07/11/16 13:20 49 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 49 07/11/16 13:20 Dr Sylvie Briand presented a summary of each of the sessions of the meeting. She described “bingo” words that we brought up a number of times: trust, training, social science, solidarity. 09 CLOSING SESSION Convergence and looking forward Dr Marie Paul Kieny, Assistant Director General for Health Systems Innovation at WHO, presented the recently developed WHO R&D Blueprint which is an attempt to map what should be done to have the world better prepared through R&D. The Blueprint aims to prepare for the inevitable – what is uncertain is what and when. It has two complementary objectives: • Roadmap for priority pathogens – 5 to 10 that are the most threatening in the next years plus unknown pathogens. • Enable roll out of an emergency R&D response It aims to reduce time between declaration of PHEIC and
  • 60. availability of effective medical technologies by encouraging production of diagnostic tools and generating safety data (Phase 1 trials) for vaccines and treat- ments for most promising experimental products for priority diseases. It also aims to map knowledge and good practices, identify gaps and establish enabling environment for sharing of data so it is a collaborative effort. There are five work streams: (1) Prioritization of pathogens (2) Identification of research priorities (3) Coordination of stakeholders and expertise (4) Alignment of preparedness and impact of intervention (5) Development of innovative funding options For the finale, Dr David Nabarro, Special United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Envoy on Ebola, spoke about having to reassess our thinking and put the lessons learned into practice. The 2030 development agenda (SDGs) required massive change. For instance, climate has now become global citizen issue (COP 21, Paris) and no longer something discussed behind closed doors. This is a period of review of institutional orientation and considerable rethinking at WHO which is in a process of reengineering their work. Two concrete outcomes were to: • Develop new types of information systems to better anticipate risks but these have to rely on new approaches and engaging new partners. • Revisit the concept of preparedness. It has been 10 years that we have been developing IHR core capacities but new approaches are necessary. 50
  • 61. AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 50 07/11/16 13:20 Dr Nabarro presented thirteen points for consideration by the partic- ipants as outlined below. (1) More presidents and prime ministers are thinking of global health now than ever before. More journalists are writing about global health. There is a greater sense that health risks warrant political attention. The paradigm is “keep us safe in ways we can trust”. (2) More actors are involved in public health. We have to look at our narrative and make it much more acceptable and understand- able to all kinds of actors. We can no longer say “we are the ex- perts, we’ll tell you what to do” because we are not providers of truth but partners. (3) Societies are putting more focus on being strong and resilient. They have a wish to have greater control on their destiny and leadership must be able to work with multiple actors. (4) Early detection involves listening to multiple actors, not just health people. Everybody has to be engaged to find a potential threat. Risk assessment will not only be based on health profes- sionals – rumors will come from everywhere. (5) Humans are becoming increasingly embroiled with nature and health threats are going to reflect this. Agro-ecology: close co-
  • 62. habitation people-animal has public health implications. (6) Communications have to be two-way. We cannot just convey information – we must use empathy, transparency, trustworthi- ness in the business of earning trust (respect to all). (7) What is done with data (forecast) – ethical use, sharing and ac- cessibility, inter-operability – is key as is applying information to action. (8) Rather than the term “health systems” use “systems for health” – systems for life, ability, functions that are predictable, account- able, accessible for all at a quality that can be trusted. (9) Trust and respect come from creating space so that each has a place and a role. Coordination so that others can participate, provide a contribution that is respected in safe spaces with de- fined roles. (10) Real relearning we have to do is multi-disciplinary, multi- di- mensional, and multi-sectorial. The SDGs signify that the goals are universal, people centred, collaborative, respect for all so no one is left behind. (11) What to do now? This meeting is about paradigm shifts – new ways of thinking and acting. Allow new thoughts and thought models to emerge, enriched by talking to each other we can apply new ways and be agents of transformation. Be ready to evolve – regenerating and renewal for public health.
  • 63. (12) We are all communities. As a community of health profession- als we can challenge the power structures using the language of “we” and be change agents whilst maintaining humility. (13) Power and politics requires a disciplined and ethical use of power. We need to become good at power games. We are all humanitarians regardless of our organizational mandate which sometimes create differences between us and those whom we are trying to help. 51 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 51 07/11/16 13:20 52 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 52 07/11/16 13:20 53 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 53 07/11/16 13:20 10 Recent epidemics have highlighted critical deficiencies in our response mechanisms and control measures. There is little doubt that new paradigms are necessary for developing creative solutions to current problems.
  • 64. Some of the key areas for reforming our approaches were reflected in the plenary discussions: • In an emergency response, coordination and collaboration for collective action between the various actors is crucial. Clearly defined roles based on an assessment of strengths and weaknesses of the different sectors is necessary to ensure adequate local operational and logistics mechanisms, as well as engagement with local communities. Incident management systems allow for command and control but trusted leadership and mechanisms are keys to success. The fear factor is what makes decision-making irrational. • National governments have to be at the forefront and held accountable to ensure their surveillance sys- tems are designed to pick up early “signals”. Clinicians have to be linked to the public health infrastructure through appropriate communication channels and networks. The private sector brings impressive resourc- es and a lot of goodwill but mechanisms and accountability for their engagement requires good leadership by national authorities. How can we convince the public to invest sustainably in preparedness even for risks that may not happen? The issue of trusting politicians was raised, with the suggestion of a public debate af- ter each event to teach them to make the better decisions. Ensuring countries have the necessary functional national IHR core capacities by testing them in exercises (exercise the “unthinkable” scenario) requires adequate investments for preparedness during the inter-epidemic periods – this is a continuing challenge for government attention and resources. • We need to move beyond the biomedical approach to epidemics because they are social problems as much
  • 65. as medical ones. Social sciences need to be an integral part of surge capacities – perhaps reverse the order of the disciplines brought into a response by having anthropologists as first responders – so that we can address issues of fear and trust within the social context. Communities need to be engaged in advance as part of preparedness to ensure that there is an understanding of the human ecology. This will link commu- nity and biomedical perspectives for enhancing effective partnerships ensuring pre-existing relationships are built to respond to epidemics. There is a clear need to have anthropologists working in the field and to coordinate information so it rapidly combines what people know from the frontline with emerging medical evidence. • We could “get ahead of the curve” by using technologies and working jointly to assess risk and uncertain- ties to respond to potential threats. Laboratory capacity for detection of a wide range of pathogens in the field level was discussed including ensuring biosafety and biocontainment; PCR and supply chain logistics; identifying existing subnational capacities available through large public health programs such as polio, influenza and tuberculosis; and possibility of target product profiles for outbreak detection. Strategic, tar- geted and evidence-based tools can help understand the mechanisms of emergence and engineer ways of reducing the risks for humans by prioritizing hotspots based on geographical, biological and ecological data. For instance, tools that knock down viral load and undercut viral evolution opportunities or ones that reduce opportunities for reassortment in virally diverse geographical locations. MAJOR DISCUSSION THEMES
  • 66. 54 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 54 07/11/16 13:20 • Strengthening of the workforce through education – training of the next generation of public health pro- fessionals, doctors and veterinarians so that they think through problems together by working horizontally across ministries (e.g. health and agriculture) will empower the health system to work towards prevention. For instance, the One Health approach supported by WHO, FAO, OIE and USAID ensures a close relation- ship through coordination mechanism across human and animal sectors at all levels (central to local) that requires sharing of information as well as triggering a joint response. • New technologies won’t solve the issues of communication and community engagement. Dealing with uncertainty and adjusting messages throughout an evolving epidemic requires real-time information sharing, data analysis, and feedback. This remains a challenge for the research community, particularly maintaining quality control in the process of translational research. Journalists covering science are consid- ered to be trustworthy sources of information amongst the many sources of information the public is now exposed to daily. The relationship between these journalists and the public health community should be nurtured during the inter-epidemic periods so that effective technologies and interventions can be imple- mented built on trust.
  • 67. • Compiling big data is no longer the limiting factor. It is the shared responsibility of interpretation with the end-users who are non-scientist politicians where the issues are to establish ground rules for analysis and privacy and ownership of data. A number of data-related issues were raised: how do we address scale, data gaps and possible innovations, connecting models, data security, privacy and consent, working across sectors, translation at community level for action, “popular” epidemiology to empower local communities to analyse their own data and make local decisions, lack of baseline data, outcomes of foresight scenarios translated into actions, is big data harmful?, ability to geolocalize. Huge opportunities but also challenges exist in using big data. • On one hand we need to focus outside the health system, on communities and individuals, for disease control measures to work. But addressing the health system deficiencies based on health system research to identify gaps, is also critical, particularly for addressing outbreaks and reducing mortality. These include recognizing the role of health care workers in spreading infection; primary health care; individual respon- sibility of every citizen; lack of basic facilities in developing countries for sanitation and hygiene; need for political will; cross sectoral challenges for public health systems; and role of family level care givers. For hos- pitals in particular, challenges include hospital accreditation across large and small hospitals and ensuring surge capacity when they operate at full capacity in normal times. • The concept of “health security” is implicitly inequitable because it begs the question “whose security?” (e.g. influenza vaccines held by rich countries are not equally
  • 68. distributed to poor ones). Reducing the gap in access to science and technology for developing countries is a key barrier to address but one that requires resources and investment. Global health security should be made a world issue, like climate change, so that it works at all levels. Recognition that health security is broader than just the health sector and requires a holistic, multisectoral approach that will engender global solidarity for health protection. 55 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 55 07/11/16 13:20 56 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 56 07/11/16 13:20 Annex 1 LIST OF PARTICIPANTS Professor Frank Møller Aarestrup Head of Research Group - National Food Institute, Technical University of Denmark, Kgs. Lyngby, Denmark Dr James Ajioka Senior Lecturer, Department of Pathology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK Dr Hamoud S. Al Garni
  • 69. Director of Health Authority at Point of Entry, Ministry of Health of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia Dr Tammam Aloudat Deputy Medical Director, Médecins Sans Frontières, Geneva, Switzerland Dr Ray Arthur Director, Global Disease Detection Operations Center Division of Global Health Protection, Center Global Health, Atlanta, USA Dr Rana Jawad Asghar Resident Advisor, Field Epidemiology & Laboratory Training Program, National Institute of Health, Islamabad, Pakistan Dr Juliet Bedford Director and Founder, Anthrologica, York, UK Ms Barbara Bentein Head - Principal Advisor Ebola Crisis Cell, UNICEF HQ, New York, USA Dr Ariel Beresniak Chief Executive Officer, Data Mining International SA, Geneva, Switzerland Mr David Bestwick Technical Director, Avanti Communication Group plc, London, UK
  • 70. Dr Peter Black Deputy Regional Manager, FAO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok, Thailand Professor Mathilde Bourrier Professeure Ordinaire, Départment de Sociologie, Université de Genéve, Geneva, Switzerland Dr Philippe Calain Médecin, Chargé de recherche, Médecins Sans Frontières, Geneva, Switzerland Dr Dennis Carroll Director Pandemic Influenza and other Emerging Threats Unit, United States Agency for International Development, Washington DC, USA Mr Sean Casey Emergency Response Team Leader, International Medical Corps, Los Angeles, USA Dr Marty Cetron Director Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, USA Dr Andrew Clements Senior Scientific Adviser, Global Health Security and Development Unit Bureau for Global Health,
  • 71. United States Agency for International Development, Washington DC, USA Professor Maire Connolly Professor, National University of Ireland Galway, Galway, Ireland Dr Denis Coulombier Head of Unit, Surveillance and Response Support, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Solna, Sweden Mr Thomas Czernichow Head of the Software and Services Department, EpiConcept, Paris, France Dr Inger Damon Director, Division of High- Consequence Pathogens and Pathology, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, USA Professor Xavier De Lamballerie Director of the Research Unit (EPV), IRD Marseille, Marseille, France Ms Emma Diggle Epidemics and Vaccination Adviser, Save the Children, London, UK Professor Dialo Diop Lecturer in in Virology in Africa, Dakar, Senegal Professor Christl Donnelly
  • 72. Professor of Statistical Epidemiology, Imperial College London, London, UK Dr Henry Dowlen Senior Manager, Health, Government and Public Sector (GPS), Ernst & Young LLP, London, UK Dr Monique Eloit Deputy Director, World Organization for Animal Health, Paris, France Dr Delia Enria Director, Instituto Nacional de Enfermedades Virales Humanas, Pergamino, Argentina Dr Abdul Ghafur Consultant in Infectious Diseases, Apollo Hospital, Chennai, India Dr Dirk Glaesser Director for the Sustainable Development Programme, World Tourism Organization, Madrid, Spain Professor Herman Goossens Head, Department for Microbiology, University Antwerp, Wilrijk, Belgium Professor Stephan Günther Bernhard-Nocht-Institute for Tropical Medicine, Hamburg, Germany Dr Jessica Halverson Manager, HIV/AIDS and TB Section,
  • 73. Surveillance and Epidemiology Division, Centre for Communicable Diseases and Infection Control, Public Health Agency of Canada, Ottawa, Canada 57 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 57 07/11/16 13:20 Professor Marion Koopmans Professor of Public Health Virology, ErasmusMC, Rotterdam, the Netherlands Professor Gerard Krause Head of Department Epidemiology, Helmholtz Centre for Infection Research, Braunschweig, Germany Ms Rhonda Kropp Director General, Centre for Immunization and Respiratory Infectious Diseases, Public Health Agency of Canada, Ottawa, Canada Dr Melissa Leach Director, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK Dr James Le Duc Director, Galveston National Laboratory, The University of Texas
  • 74. Medical Branch, Galveston, USA Professor Vernon Lee Deputy Director, Communicable Diseases Ministry of Health, Singapore and Head, Singapore Armed Forces Biodefence Centre, Singapore Ms Hélène Lepetit Managing Partner, Co-founder, IDM - Institut des Mamans, Paris, France Professor Gabriel Leung Dean - Li Ka Shing Faculty of Medicine, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China Dr Woraya Luang-on Director, Bureau of Emerging Infectious Diseases, Ministry of Public Health, Nonthaburi, Thailand Dr Hayley MacGregor Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies - University of Sussex, Brighton, UK Ms Debora MacKenzie Health and Global Security Issues Reporter, New Scientist, London, UK Professor John Mackenzie Research Associate and Professor of Tropical Infectious Disease, Curtin University, Bentley, Perth, Australia
  • 75. Dr Lawrence C. Madoff Editor, ProMED-mail, Brookline, USA Ms Joanne Manrique President and Editor in Chief, Centre for Global Health and Diplomacy, Washington DC, USA Dr Jean-Claude Manuguerra Research Director, Head of laboratory for Urgent Response to Biological Threats. Institut Pasteur, Paris, France Ms Margaux Mathis Consultant, Paris, France Dr Amanda McClelland Senior Officer, Emergency Health, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), Geneva, Switzerland Dr Brian McCloskey Director of Global Health, Public Health England Wellington House, London, UK Dr James Meegan Director, Office of Global Research, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, United States Department of Health and Human Services, National Institute of Health, Betsheda, USA
  • 76. Dr Shoji Miyagawa Director, Infectious Diseases Information Surveillance Office, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Tokyo, Japan Dr Anne-Marie Moulin Research Director Emeritus, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, France Dr David Murdoch Head of Department, Department of Pathology, Christchurch, New Zealand Annex 1: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS continued Dr Nur A. Hasan Adjunct Faculty, University of Maryland Institute for Advanced Computer Studies, College Park, USA Professor David Heymann Head and Senior Fellow, Centre on Global Health Security - The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, UK Dr Didier Houssin President, Agence d’Evaluation de la Recherche et de l’Enseignement Supérieur, Paris, France Dr T Jacob John Chairman, Child Health Foundation, Christian Medical College, Vellore,
  • 77. India Senator Fabienne Keller Senator, Sénat, Paris, France Dr Ali S Khan Dean College of Public Health, University of Nebraska Medical Centre, Nebraska Omaha, USA Dr Kamran Khan Research Scientist, Centre for Research on Inner City Health St Michael’s Hospital, Toronto, Canada Dr Nadia Khelef International Affairs Senior Advisor, Institut Pasteur, Paris, France Professor Ilona Kickbusch Director of the Global Health Programme and Adjunct Professor, Interdisciplinary Programmes, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland Dr Ann Marie Kimball Strategic Advisor, Rockefeller Foundation, New York, USA Dr Gary P Kobinger Head of Special Pathogens, Head, Vector Design and Immunotherapy, Special Pathogens Program, National Microbiology Laboratory, Public
  • 78. Health Agency of Canada, Manitoba, Canada 58 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 58 07/11/16 13:20 Annex 1: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS continued Dr Vickneshwaran Muthu Senior Principal Assistant Director, Ministry of Health of Malaysia, Disease Control Division, Wilayah Persekutuan Putrajaya, Malaysia Dr David Nabarro United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Envoy on Ebola, United Nations Headquarter New York, New York, USA Dr Josh Nesbit Chief Executive Officer, Medic Mobile, San Francisco, USA Dr Carl Newman Deputy Chief Scientist, Cooperative Biological Engagement Program, Cooperative Threat Reduction, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Fort Belvoir, USA Dr Patrick L Osewe Lead Health Specialist, World Bank,
  • 79. Pretoria, South Africa Dr Heather Papowitz Senior Advisor, Health-Emergencies, UNICEF HQ, New York, USA Dr Malik Peiris Director, Division of Public Health Laboratory Sciences, University of Hong Kong School of Public Health, Hong Kong, China Prof Jorge Pérez Avila Director General, Instituto de Medicina Tropical “Pedro Kouri”, La Habana, Cuba Dr Mark Perkins Chief Scientific Officer, Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics, Geneva, Switzerland Dr Julio Pinto Animal Health Officer, FAO HQ, Rome, Italy Dr Paolo Ruti Chief, World Weather Research Division, World Meteorological Organisation, Geneva, Switzerland Dr Ronald K Saint John Consultant, St John Public Health Consulting International Inc, Manotick, Canada
  • 80. Dr Gérard Salem Directeur du Laboratoire Espace, Santé et Territoires, Université Paris Ouest Nanterre La Defense, Nanterre, France Dr Amadou Alpha Sall Scientific Director, Institut Pasteur de Dakar, Dakar, Senegal Dr Mark Salter Consultant in Global Health, Public Health England Wellington House, London, UK Dr Lars Schaade Vice President, Robert Koch Institute, Berlin, Germany Ms Laura Scheske WHO/WMO Joint Office Dr Jan Slingenbergh Senior Animal Health Officer/Head of EMPRES, FAO HQ, Rome, Italy Dr Franck Smith Campaign Director “No More Epidemics”, Management Sciences for Health, Medford, USA Dr Idrissa Sow Expert on Infectious Disease Epidemics, Mauritanie Professor Oyewale Tomori Professor of Virology, Redeemer’s
  • 81. University, Nigeria Dr Shinya Tsuzuki Medical Officer, Tuberculosis and Infectious Diseases Control Division, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Tokyo, Japan Dr Fabio Turone Presedent, Science Writers in Italy, World Federation of Science Journalists, Milan, Italy Mr Richard Vaux Project Manager for the GloPID-R Project, Fondation Mérieux, Lyon, France Dr Niteen Wairagkar Lead, Influenza/RSV Initiative, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Seattle, USA Professor Ronald Waldman Professor, Public Health Department, George Washington University, Washington, USA Dr John Watson Deputy Chief Medical Officer, Department of Health Richmond House, London, UK Dr Cécile Wendling Associate Researcher, Sociology Organization Centre, Paris, France
  • 82. Dr Teresa Zakaria Head of the Health Assistance for Crisis Affected Populations Unit, International Organization for Migration, Geneva, Switzerland 59 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 59 07/11/16 13:20 Dr R. Bruce Aylward Executive Director a.i. Outbreaks and Health Emergencies and Special Representative of the Director-General for the Ebola Response, HQ Dr Marie-Paule Kieny Assistant Director-General, Health Systems and Innovation, HQ/HIS Dr Eric Bertherat Medical Officer, Control of Epidemic Diseases, HQ/ WHE Dr Caroline Sarah Brown Programme Manager, EU/IRP Influenza and other Respiratory Pathogens, DCE/VPR/IRP, Copenhagen Ms Kara Durski Epidemiologist, Ebola Virus Outbreak Response, HQ/ WHE Dr Sarah B. England
  • 83. Senior Adviser, Office of the Director- General, HQ/ODG Ms Geraldine Hagon Intern, Communication Capacity Building, HQ/CCB Dr Dominique Legros Medical Officer, Control of Epidemic Diseases, HQ/WHE Dr Elizabeth Mumford Scientist, Food Safety, Zoonoses and Foodborne Diseases, HQ/FOS Dr William Augusto Perea Caro Coordinator, Control of Epidemic Diseases, HQ/WHE Dr Cathy Ellen Roth Technical Adviser, Health Systems and Innovation, HQ/HIA ADGO Dr Gina Samaan Consultant, Influenza, Hepatitis and PIP Framework, HQ/WHE Ms Carmen Savelli Technical Officer, Risk Assessment and Management, HQ/RAM Dr Anthony Paul Stewart Consultant, Global Preparedness, Surveillance and Response, HQ/PSR Dr Kathleen Louise Strong
  • 84. Technical Officer, Influenza, Hepatitis and PIP Framework, HQ/WHE Dr Angelika Maria Tritscher Coordinator, Risk Assessment and Management, HQ/ WHE Dr Katelijn A.H. Vandemaele Medical Officer, Influenza, Hepatitis and PIP Framework, HQ/WHE Mr Leender Van Gurp Manager, Business Intelligence Competency Centre, HQ/CMS Dr Wenqing Zhang Scientist, Influenza, Hepatitis and PIP Framework, HQ/WHE Dr Weigong Zhou Medical Officer, Influenza, Hepatitis and PIP Framework, HQ/ WHE Dr Theodor Ziegler Consultant, Influenza, Hepatitis and PIP Framework, HQ/HIP World Health Organization WHO Secretariat Annex 1: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS continued Dr Sylvie Briand Director Pandemic and Epidemic Diseases Department of Outbreaks
  • 85. and Health Emergencies HQ/WHE Ms Nyka Alexander Consultant, Pandemic and Epidemic Diseases, HQ/WHE Ms Mara Frigo Technical Officer, Pandemic and Epidemic Diseases, HQ/WHE Dr Gaya Manori Gamhewage Medical Officer, Pandemic and Epidemic Diseases, HQ/ WHE Ms Erika Garcia Technical Officer, Control of Epidemic Diseases, HQ/WHE Ms Sandra Garnier Technical Officer, Pandemic and Epidemic Diseases, HQ/WHE Dr Asheena Khalakdina Technical Officer, Pandemic and Epidemic Diseases, HQ/WHE Ms Qiu Yi Khut Information Officer, Pandemic and Epidemic Disease, HQ/WHE Ms Kaveri Khasnabis Secretary, Pandemic and Epidemic Diseases , HQ/WHE Ms Anais Legand Technical Officer, Pandemic and
  • 86. Epidemic Diseases, HQ/WHE Mr Oliver Gerd Stucke Technical Officer, Communication Capacity Building, HQ/WHE Ms Ursula Zhao Yu Consultant, HQ/DGO/DGD/DCO 60 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 60 07/11/16 13:20 9:00 – 10:00 10:30 – 12:00 13:00 – 14:30 15:00 – 16:30 Opening session Session 1 Back to the future: Learning from the past Session 2 Future epidemics: moving and blurry targets Session 3 Science and technology: opportunities and challenges
  • 87. • Welcome • Purpose and methods of the consultation • Introduction of experts and stakeholders • Group photograph • Ebola West Africa: drivers and lessons learned • Multidisciplinary response: strengths and challenges • New perspectives on outbreak response after SARS in Canada • A mild pandemic: critics and anticipation • The role of NGOs and health sector partners • Discussion • Human-animal interface: anticipating risks of emergence • Managing the risks of emergence at the animal level • Knowledge on microbiome and research • From science to action: microbiome and respiratory diseases • Ecosystem surveillance: predicting the next emergence? • Discussion • What’s new for surveillance and detection? • Advances in biology and their applications • What’s new in diagnostics? • Risk perception and community engagement • Communicating in the 21st Century • Discussion Tuesday, 01 December 2015 Time Session Topics Annex 2 AGENDA AT A GLANCE Wrap-up16:30 – 17:00
  • 88. Coffee break Lunch Coffee break 10:00 – 10:30 12:00 – 13:00 14:30 – 15:00 61 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 61 07/11/16 13:20 Annex 2: AGENDA AT A GLANCE continued 9:00 – 10:30 11:00 – 12:30 13:30 – 15:00 15:30 – 17:00 Session 4 Making the most of Big Brother Session 5 Curing and not harming – that is the question
  • 89. Session 6 Preventing the spread of infectious diseases in a global village Final session Convergence and looking forward • Modelling outbreaks: pros and cons • Learning from successes in meteorology • Use of big data to anticipate epidemics and their evolution • Learning from the insurance expertise • Discussion • Clinical practices and emerging diseases • Systemic view of infectious in health care facilities • Patient-doctor relationship at the age of the Internet • Impact of strengthening the overall health system • Discussion • Evolution of health security concepts • Revisiting traditional containment measures • Managing epidemics in urban settings • Epidemics and tourism • Political perspectives of global risk • Discussion • Summary of the meeting deliberations • WHO’s R&D Blueprint for epidemic preparedness • The changing landscape for WHO: Global ecosystems, partners and mechanisms Tuesday, 01 December 2015
  • 90. Time Session Topics Close17:00 – 17:30 Coffee break Lunch Coffee break 10:30 – 11:00 12:30 – 13:30 15:00 – 15:30 62 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 62 07/11/16 13:20 Annex 3 SPEAKERS BY SESSION SESSION 1: Back to the future: Learning from the past Moderator: Didier Houssin Oyewale Tomori (Nigeria) Ron Waldman (George Washington University) Ron St John (Canada) John Watson (UK PHE) Sean Casey (International Medical Corps) SESSION 2: Future epidemics: Moving and blurry targets Moderator: Malik Peiris Nadia Khelef (Institut Pasteur International Network (RIIP))
  • 91. David Murdoch (University of Otago, New Zealand) Monique Eliot (World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE)) Julio Pinto (Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO)) Dennis Carroll (USAID) SESSION 3: Science and Technology: Opportunities and challenges Moderator: Gabriel Leung Nur Hassan (COSMOSID) Jim Ajioka (University of Cambridge) Mark Perkins (FIND) Amanda McClelland (International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC)) Barbara Bentein (UNICEF) SESSION 4: Making the most of Big Brother Moderator: Brian McCloskey Christl Donnelly (Imperial College, London) Paolo Ruti (World Meteorological Organisation (WMO)) Kamran Khan (University of Toronto) Cécile Wendling (AXA Insurance Company) SESSION 5: Curing and not harming: that is the question Moderator: David Heymann Abdullah M Assiri (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) Abdul Ghafur (Apollo Hospital, Chennai, India) Hélène Lepetit (Institut des Mamans (IDM)) Idrissa Sow (Mauritania) SESSION 6: Preventing the spread of infectious diseases in a global village Moderator: Ilona Kickbusch Ali S. Khan (University of Nebraska) Inger Damon (US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC))
  • 92. Hayley MacGregor (Institute for Development Studies) Dirk Glaesser (UN World Tourism Organization (UNWTO)) Fabienne Keller (France) 63 AE_meetingReport_FINAL.indd 63 07/11/16 13:20 The Ideas Wall and Ideas Box collected written, anonymous comments from participants. They are reproduced below, verbatim, with minor edits. Annex 4 IDEAS WALL AND IDEAS BOX Learning from the past - Rapid and easy communication of new findings to those who need local and global overview is essential. - Solution could be web-based data collection system for both syndromic info as well as e.g. genomic info. This could be combined with novel IT tools for genomic analysis and text – mining, machine learning and A.I. Session 1 Remark One is struck by the blatant discrepancy between the
  • 93. delayed reaction to the severe west-African EVD outbreak (both at national and international level) and the strong over-reaction to a mild influenza pandemic in the UK. Similarly the contradiction is conspicuous between large scale endemic infections and parasitic diseases which have been neglected for decades and limited epidemics attracting both public resources and media focus. These issues should be addressed adequately. Instead of emphasizing on enhancement of IHR/capacity building, have we explored the root causes of why countries are not doing these activities, and address the root causes? We need a global advocacy campaign that will engage multiple stakeholders, especially non-health stakeholders, to both expand ownership of the issue and increase political support for epidemic preparedness/ disease surveillance and response. This will ensure greater support and drive up public participation on this issue. We need to be communicating about epidemics between epidemics, not only when outbreaks happen. Communities need to be seen as partners in surveillance
  • 94. and response, not just terrains of response, therefore we need to integrate this into education and public information and communication department as soon as possible. How do we train to be surprised? Factors of resilience are key. Anthropologists are not new to these topics! A lot of work had been done (see DVD, Formenty, Epelboin, Ebola, no laughter) ➔ rediscovery? There are many possible contributors or amplifiers of epidemics. How do we focus our attention to the key drivers, so that we can best utilize our limited resources. Can we model this? In terms of preventions, we should distinguish the primary one aiming at blocking the very emergence of the outbreak from secondary prevention targeting the spread of the epidemic. The tool of the first type is science and technology whereas the second type depends on multidimensional social factors (political will mostly The main note during today’s Sessions is: Coordination is
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