This order denies the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and grants the defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment. It finds that the three Seattle ordinances establishing defenses to eviction due to financial hardship during COVID-19 do not conflict with state law and are therefore not preempted. While the ordinance provision staying late fees is preempted, the rest can be harmonized with state eviction statutes as establishing substantive defenses rather than conflicting with the statutes' procedural framework. Controlling Washington precedent has established that the state eviction laws provide only procedures, not substantive rights, so local governments can permissibly provide additional defenses.
The tax court case involved whether commissions Howard Slater received for transferring his annuity accounts qualified for nonqualified deferred compensation treatment under section 409A. The court found that the commissions did not meet the requirements of section 409A as they were not conditioned on future services and the plans did not meet the election requirements. Therefore, the commissions were required to be included in the Slaters' gross income for the 2005 tax year.
Stewart (carol) v stewart (lauriston) ca 2013 jmca civ 47Joniel Jojo Powell
This document summarizes a Court of Appeal case from Jamaica regarding the division of property rights between a divorcing couple, Carol and Lauriston Stewart. The judge had originally ruled that Mr. Stewart was entitled to 75% of the beneficial interest in the family home and Mrs. Stewart 25%, despite the Property Rights of Spouses Act typically requiring equal division. Mrs. Stewart appealed, arguing the judge erred in his assessment. The Court of Appeal considered the relevant act and precedents to determine if the original judgment properly applied the law.
This document is a memorandum from the United States Tax Court regarding a tax case between Joyce A. Perkins and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The Tax Court found that Perkins was liable for a $6,582 income tax deficiency for 2003 but not liable for an accuracy-related penalty. The issues before the court were: 1) whether $26,400 paid to Perkins by her ex-husband in 2003 was alimony income under section 71 of the tax code, and 2) whether Perkins was liable for an accuracy penalty. The court analyzed Tennessee law on alimony and concluded the payments were alimony in futuro, making them taxable income to Perkins. However, the court found Perkins was not liable
Order Denying Injunction Against CDC Eviction BanRoger Valdez
This order addresses a motion for preliminary injunction against the CDC's nationwide eviction moratorium. The order provides background on the COVID-19 pandemic and measures taken, including eviction moratoria. It describes the plaintiffs, who are landlords seeking to evict tenants for nonpayment of rent. It also outlines the requirements to qualify for protection under the CDC moratorium. The order analyzes the motion under the four-part test for preliminary injunctions, considering the plaintiffs' likelihood of success, irreparable injury, balance of harms, and the public interest. It notes defendants challenge plaintiffs' standing and argue failure to join indispensable parties.
Request for Entry of Default Judgment in favor for Angela KaaihueAngela Kaaihue
This document is a request for entry of default from Angela Sue Kaaihue and Yong Nam Fryer, who are pro se defendants and counter-claim plaintiffs, against Newtown Estates Community Association. It includes affidavits from Kaaihue and Fryer stating that the association failed to respond to their counter-claim within the required time period. It requests a default judgment of $43,450,000 including principal of $40 million, interest, costs and attorney's fees. Exhibits of the filed counter-claim and proofs of service are attached in support of the request.
Newtown Loses By Default Judgment- NECA -vs- KaaihueAngela Kaaihue
Newtown Loses By Default Judgment- NECA -vs- Kaaihue, a five year litigation and court battle. When NECA board of directors, and community are jealous for driving right by a property that could have been purchased, but was inherited by Angela Kaaihue, who has turned the property she inherited into a Hawaiian Gold Mine.
Hawaii Appellant Court Supreme Court judge castegnetti, judge jeffrey crabtree, judge karen t. nakasone, judge katherine g. leonard, judge keith hiraoka, judge lisa m. ginoza, judge sonja mccullen, judge clyde j. wadsworth, judge karen holma, judge gary W.B. chang
This document summarizes a Tax Court case regarding Walter and Carol Selph's challenge to tax liabilities and penalties for tax years 1999, 2000, and 2001. The Tax Court found that the Selphs were entitled to challenge their underlying tax liabilities for those years. Additionally, the court found that the Selphs were liable for failure-to-pay penalties for 1999 but not 2000 and 2001 due to Mrs. Selph's health issues those years which constituted reasonable cause for failure to timely file.
The tax court case involved whether commissions Howard Slater received for transferring his annuity accounts qualified for nonqualified deferred compensation treatment under section 409A. The court found that the commissions did not meet the requirements of section 409A as they were not conditioned on future services and the plans did not meet the election requirements. Therefore, the commissions were required to be included in the Slaters' gross income for the 2005 tax year.
Stewart (carol) v stewart (lauriston) ca 2013 jmca civ 47Joniel Jojo Powell
This document summarizes a Court of Appeal case from Jamaica regarding the division of property rights between a divorcing couple, Carol and Lauriston Stewart. The judge had originally ruled that Mr. Stewart was entitled to 75% of the beneficial interest in the family home and Mrs. Stewart 25%, despite the Property Rights of Spouses Act typically requiring equal division. Mrs. Stewart appealed, arguing the judge erred in his assessment. The Court of Appeal considered the relevant act and precedents to determine if the original judgment properly applied the law.
This document is a memorandum from the United States Tax Court regarding a tax case between Joyce A. Perkins and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The Tax Court found that Perkins was liable for a $6,582 income tax deficiency for 2003 but not liable for an accuracy-related penalty. The issues before the court were: 1) whether $26,400 paid to Perkins by her ex-husband in 2003 was alimony income under section 71 of the tax code, and 2) whether Perkins was liable for an accuracy penalty. The court analyzed Tennessee law on alimony and concluded the payments were alimony in futuro, making them taxable income to Perkins. However, the court found Perkins was not liable
Order Denying Injunction Against CDC Eviction BanRoger Valdez
This order addresses a motion for preliminary injunction against the CDC's nationwide eviction moratorium. The order provides background on the COVID-19 pandemic and measures taken, including eviction moratoria. It describes the plaintiffs, who are landlords seeking to evict tenants for nonpayment of rent. It also outlines the requirements to qualify for protection under the CDC moratorium. The order analyzes the motion under the four-part test for preliminary injunctions, considering the plaintiffs' likelihood of success, irreparable injury, balance of harms, and the public interest. It notes defendants challenge plaintiffs' standing and argue failure to join indispensable parties.
Request for Entry of Default Judgment in favor for Angela KaaihueAngela Kaaihue
This document is a request for entry of default from Angela Sue Kaaihue and Yong Nam Fryer, who are pro se defendants and counter-claim plaintiffs, against Newtown Estates Community Association. It includes affidavits from Kaaihue and Fryer stating that the association failed to respond to their counter-claim within the required time period. It requests a default judgment of $43,450,000 including principal of $40 million, interest, costs and attorney's fees. Exhibits of the filed counter-claim and proofs of service are attached in support of the request.
Newtown Loses By Default Judgment- NECA -vs- KaaihueAngela Kaaihue
Newtown Loses By Default Judgment- NECA -vs- Kaaihue, a five year litigation and court battle. When NECA board of directors, and community are jealous for driving right by a property that could have been purchased, but was inherited by Angela Kaaihue, who has turned the property she inherited into a Hawaiian Gold Mine.
Hawaii Appellant Court Supreme Court judge castegnetti, judge jeffrey crabtree, judge karen t. nakasone, judge katherine g. leonard, judge keith hiraoka, judge lisa m. ginoza, judge sonja mccullen, judge clyde j. wadsworth, judge karen holma, judge gary W.B. chang
This document summarizes a Tax Court case regarding Walter and Carol Selph's challenge to tax liabilities and penalties for tax years 1999, 2000, and 2001. The Tax Court found that the Selphs were entitled to challenge their underlying tax liabilities for those years. Additionally, the court found that the Selphs were liable for failure-to-pay penalties for 1999 but not 2000 and 2001 due to Mrs. Selph's health issues those years which constituted reasonable cause for failure to timely file.
This document is an amended plan of reorganization filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court for LodgeNet Interactive Corporation and its affiliates, who are debtors in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. The plan proposes reorganizing the debtors' capital structure and financial obligations under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. It defines key terms used in the plan and establishes classes of claims and interests to determine how prepetition obligations will be treated under the plan.
D'Agostino v Federal Ins Co , 969 F. Supp. 2d 116 (D. Mass. 2013)Richard Goren
1) The parties engaged in settlement negotiations but did not reach an enforceable agreement because while D'Agostino offered $1.15 million for a release, Federal responded with a release containing additional material terms like confidentiality requirements, which were not accepted.
2) The court denied Federal's motions to enforce the alleged settlement agreement and for protective orders, finding no agreement was formed.
3) The court also denied requests for sanctions from both parties, finding neither party's actions warranted sanctions.
2009.08.07 nance sued by Introgen debtors for excessive expendituresHindenburg Research
The Debtors are seeking to recover payments made to David G. Nance, the former CEO and President of the Debtors, totaling over $669,000. The Debtors allege the payments made within two years prior to filing for bankruptcy (totaling over $427,000) and between 2004-2008 (totaling over $669,000) were fraudulent transfers under bankruptcy law and state law. Additionally, the Debtors allege Nance wasted corporate assets and engaged in self-dealing through his unnecessary and extravagant expenditures. The Debtors are seeking repayment of the fraudulent transfers, damages, attorney's fees, and interest.
National union v. redbox order on msj august 7 2014 wd waSeth Row
This order addresses National Union Fire Insurance Company's motion for summary judgment regarding its duties to defend and indemnify Redbox Automated Retail in various lawsuits. The court grants in part and denies in part the motion. Specifically, the court finds that National Union has a duty to defend Redbox in the Cain lawsuit, which alleges violations of Michigan's video rental privacy law, but not in the Mehrens lawsuit, which alleges violations of California's credit card receipt law. The court also finds that while National Union may issue reservations of rights and set reasonable rate caps when defending insureds, it must do so reasonably and in good faith.
NBI, Inc. and William J. Amann, Esq. presents: The Automatic Stay and Bank...William J. Amann
It is my honor to present a 90 minute national, teleconference on the Bankruptcy Code's Automatic Stay (11 U.S.C. sec. 362). Join us for an insightful, fast-paced, comprehensive and lively discussion of the Automatic Stay. This seminar is perfect for attorneys at any practice level, bankers, lenders, business owners and debtors. The seminar promises to be educational but interesting and a lasting and exceptional resource.
When Do Gas Drilling Bans Violate the Constitution of the United StatesKenneth Kamlet
An analysis of whether and when bans or moratoria on unconventional gas drilling and support activities, as practiced in New York by the State (de facto) and numerous localities, violate the "dormant" commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amends the 1964 Civil Rights Act to provide additional protections and remedies against discrimination. Key provisions include allowing compensatory and punitive damages for intentional employment discrimination, codifying standards for disparate impact cases, and facilitating challenges to employment practices resulting from consent decrees. The act aims to strengthen federal civil rights protections and respond to Supreme Court decisions that weakened anti-discrimination laws.
This document is an opinion and order from a United States District Court case between Siltronic Corporation and various insurance companies including Employers Insurance Company of Wausau regarding insurance coverage and payment of defense costs for environmental claims arising from contamination at the Portland Harbor Superfund site. The court considers Siltronic's motion for partial summary judgment that Wausau has a continuing duty to defend Siltronic under its 1978-79 insurance policy and must reimburse unpaid defense costs. The court provides background on the insurance policies and contamination issues before analyzing the relevant policy provisions and ruling on the motions.
The document is a complaint filed in bankruptcy court by Bernard Katz, the trustee of the Christ Hospital Liquidating Trust, against Genova Burns Giantomasi Webster. The complaint seeks to avoid and recover preferential transfers made by Christ Hospital to Genova Burns during the 90-day period prior to Christ Hospital declaring bankruptcy. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Christ Hospital made three transfers totaling $482,728.80 to Genova Burns and that these transfers allowed Genova Burns to receive more than it would have in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The complaint requests that the court avoid the transfers, order Genova Burns to repay the amounts, and disallow any claims Genova Burns has against the bankruptcy estate until repayment is made.
This document is a memorandum in support of a motion in limine regarding the effect of Senate Bill 814 on the parties' agreement concerning defense counsel. It argues that SB 814's independent counsel provisions do not apply in this case for two reasons: 1) The insurance policies give Continental the right to control the defense, triggering the savings clause in SB 814, and 2) The parties previously agreed that Bingham would serve as defense counsel within the traditional tripartite relationship, not as independent counsel, so applying SB 814 would contradict this existing agreement. The memorandum also contends that even if SB 814 did apply, it does not allow Schnitzer to select counsel or pay out-of-forum rates that exceed what is
The debtor, Cordillera Golf Club, LLC, filed a motion seeking approval of procedures for interim compensation and reimbursement of expenses for professionals retained in the chapter 11 case. The motion requests that professionals be allowed to submit monthly fee applications for payment of 80% of fees and 100% of expenses, with interim fee applications submitted every three months. The procedures are consistent with those approved in other large chapter 11 cases and will help streamline the professional compensation process.
The debtor, Cordillera Golf Club, LLC, filed a motion seeking approval of procedures for interim compensation and reimbursement of expenses for professionals retained in the chapter 11 case. The motion requests that professionals be allowed to submit monthly fee applications for payment of 80% of fees and 100% of expenses, with interim fee applications submitted every three months. The procedures are intended to streamline the payment process in this large chapter 11 case.
This document provides notice of Patriot Coal Corporation's motion seeking court approval to conduct rights offerings as part of its chapter 11 reorganization plan. Specifically, the motion seeks authorization to enter into a backstop purchase agreement with certain funds to ensure sufficient proceeds are raised in the rights offerings. The rights offerings will allow eligible creditors to purchase new senior secured notes and warrants. The motion also seeks approval of the proposed rights offerings procedures. Objections to the motion are due by October 30, with a hearing scheduled for November 6.
The court document discusses a case between NML Capital and the Republic of Argentina. It summarizes that the February 23, 2012 order was affirmed on appeal but remanded for clarification. However, high officials in Argentina have declared they will not pay holders of original bonds, in violation of the court's order. As a result, the court vacates the stay on the February 23 order and directs that order be carried out immediately, requiring Argentina to pay into an escrow account in time for the December 15, 2012 bond payment. The amended February 23 order is also being issued.
This document is a status report from the Claims Administrator of the Deepwater Horizon Economic and Property Damages Settlement Agreement to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. It provides updates on the number of claims submitted and reviewed, the identity verification and review processes, exclusions reviews, accounting support reviews, and quality assurance reviews being conducted. The report aims to inform the Court on the current status of implementing the Settlement Agreement.
This appeal involves post-judgment orders from a legal malpractice case brought by Sulphur Mountain Land and Livestock Co., Malibu Broadbeach L.P., and Pacific Coast Management against Knapp, Petersen & Clarke and several individuals. The trial court granted Sulphur and Malibu's motion for attorney's fees and costs, denied the defendants' motion for fees and motion to tax costs, finding Sulphur and Malibu were the prevailing parties. The defendants appeal, arguing: 1) the trial court failed to properly determine the prevailing party under Civil Code §1717 before considering C.C.P. §998; 2) even if it had, it abused its discretion in finding Sulphur and
This order denies the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction on their facial constitutional challenges to Article 19 of the Revised Ordinances of Honolulu. The order finds that: (1) Article 19 is a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction that is content-neutral and narrowly tailored to serve the significant government interest of maintaining public areas; (2) Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on their claim that Article 19 is overly broad in violation of the First Amendment; and (3) Plaintiffs have failed to establish all the required elements for a preliminary injunction, including likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. Therefore, the court denies the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction based on their facial challenges to Article 19.
The report summarizes the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on eviction procedures in Ottawa County, Michigan from March 2020 through November 2020. Key developments include executive orders halting most evictions, the Eviction Diversion Program providing rental assistance to help tenants avoid eviction, and a CDC moratorium on evictions through December 2020. The Eviction Diversion Program administered through local housing agencies has been very successful, providing assistance to hundreds of households in Ottawa County and helping to resolve many pending eviction cases in the 58th District Court.
The document discusses key changes to landlord-tenant law in New York resulting from the passage of the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019 (HSTPA). It focuses on how the HSTPA has impacted nonpayment eviction proceedings by tenants. Specifically, it examines the traditional "good cause" standard tenants must meet to stay an eviction warrant under RPAPL §749(3), and explores how a new provision under RPAPL §753 allowing tenants to claim "extreme hardship" may provide an additional avenue of relief in such proceedings. The article aims to guide practitioners on navigating nonpayment evictions in light of the new law.
This document summarizes a court case between First American Title Insurance Company, Winnebago County Title Company, and TCF Bank regarding a mortgage on a property owned by Patricia Bartholomew. TCF Bank held the first mortgage on the property as a revolving line of credit. Winnebago acted as an agent in a second mortgage taken out by Bartholomew. Winnebago paid off the TCF Bank mortgage but TCF did not release its lien. Bartholomew then took out more funds through the revolving credit and defaulted. The court found that TCF Bank was not legally required to release the lien until the revolving credit was cancelled by Bartholomew. However
This document provides a summary of a presentation on loan modification and bankruptcy basics that was given at the National Conference of Vietnamese American Attorneys. It includes information on foreclosure timelines, proposed foreclosure legislation, bankruptcy chapters and differences between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, common exemptions, ethical obligations for attorneys, and other bankruptcy topics. Key details on the foreclosure process, loan modification requirements, and differences between bankruptcy chapters are outlined.
This document is an amended plan of reorganization filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court for LodgeNet Interactive Corporation and its affiliates, who are debtors in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. The plan proposes reorganizing the debtors' capital structure and financial obligations under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. It defines key terms used in the plan and establishes classes of claims and interests to determine how prepetition obligations will be treated under the plan.
D'Agostino v Federal Ins Co , 969 F. Supp. 2d 116 (D. Mass. 2013)Richard Goren
1) The parties engaged in settlement negotiations but did not reach an enforceable agreement because while D'Agostino offered $1.15 million for a release, Federal responded with a release containing additional material terms like confidentiality requirements, which were not accepted.
2) The court denied Federal's motions to enforce the alleged settlement agreement and for protective orders, finding no agreement was formed.
3) The court also denied requests for sanctions from both parties, finding neither party's actions warranted sanctions.
2009.08.07 nance sued by Introgen debtors for excessive expendituresHindenburg Research
The Debtors are seeking to recover payments made to David G. Nance, the former CEO and President of the Debtors, totaling over $669,000. The Debtors allege the payments made within two years prior to filing for bankruptcy (totaling over $427,000) and between 2004-2008 (totaling over $669,000) were fraudulent transfers under bankruptcy law and state law. Additionally, the Debtors allege Nance wasted corporate assets and engaged in self-dealing through his unnecessary and extravagant expenditures. The Debtors are seeking repayment of the fraudulent transfers, damages, attorney's fees, and interest.
National union v. redbox order on msj august 7 2014 wd waSeth Row
This order addresses National Union Fire Insurance Company's motion for summary judgment regarding its duties to defend and indemnify Redbox Automated Retail in various lawsuits. The court grants in part and denies in part the motion. Specifically, the court finds that National Union has a duty to defend Redbox in the Cain lawsuit, which alleges violations of Michigan's video rental privacy law, but not in the Mehrens lawsuit, which alleges violations of California's credit card receipt law. The court also finds that while National Union may issue reservations of rights and set reasonable rate caps when defending insureds, it must do so reasonably and in good faith.
NBI, Inc. and William J. Amann, Esq. presents: The Automatic Stay and Bank...William J. Amann
It is my honor to present a 90 minute national, teleconference on the Bankruptcy Code's Automatic Stay (11 U.S.C. sec. 362). Join us for an insightful, fast-paced, comprehensive and lively discussion of the Automatic Stay. This seminar is perfect for attorneys at any practice level, bankers, lenders, business owners and debtors. The seminar promises to be educational but interesting and a lasting and exceptional resource.
When Do Gas Drilling Bans Violate the Constitution of the United StatesKenneth Kamlet
An analysis of whether and when bans or moratoria on unconventional gas drilling and support activities, as practiced in New York by the State (de facto) and numerous localities, violate the "dormant" commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amends the 1964 Civil Rights Act to provide additional protections and remedies against discrimination. Key provisions include allowing compensatory and punitive damages for intentional employment discrimination, codifying standards for disparate impact cases, and facilitating challenges to employment practices resulting from consent decrees. The act aims to strengthen federal civil rights protections and respond to Supreme Court decisions that weakened anti-discrimination laws.
This document is an opinion and order from a United States District Court case between Siltronic Corporation and various insurance companies including Employers Insurance Company of Wausau regarding insurance coverage and payment of defense costs for environmental claims arising from contamination at the Portland Harbor Superfund site. The court considers Siltronic's motion for partial summary judgment that Wausau has a continuing duty to defend Siltronic under its 1978-79 insurance policy and must reimburse unpaid defense costs. The court provides background on the insurance policies and contamination issues before analyzing the relevant policy provisions and ruling on the motions.
The document is a complaint filed in bankruptcy court by Bernard Katz, the trustee of the Christ Hospital Liquidating Trust, against Genova Burns Giantomasi Webster. The complaint seeks to avoid and recover preferential transfers made by Christ Hospital to Genova Burns during the 90-day period prior to Christ Hospital declaring bankruptcy. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Christ Hospital made three transfers totaling $482,728.80 to Genova Burns and that these transfers allowed Genova Burns to receive more than it would have in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The complaint requests that the court avoid the transfers, order Genova Burns to repay the amounts, and disallow any claims Genova Burns has against the bankruptcy estate until repayment is made.
This document is a memorandum in support of a motion in limine regarding the effect of Senate Bill 814 on the parties' agreement concerning defense counsel. It argues that SB 814's independent counsel provisions do not apply in this case for two reasons: 1) The insurance policies give Continental the right to control the defense, triggering the savings clause in SB 814, and 2) The parties previously agreed that Bingham would serve as defense counsel within the traditional tripartite relationship, not as independent counsel, so applying SB 814 would contradict this existing agreement. The memorandum also contends that even if SB 814 did apply, it does not allow Schnitzer to select counsel or pay out-of-forum rates that exceed what is
The debtor, Cordillera Golf Club, LLC, filed a motion seeking approval of procedures for interim compensation and reimbursement of expenses for professionals retained in the chapter 11 case. The motion requests that professionals be allowed to submit monthly fee applications for payment of 80% of fees and 100% of expenses, with interim fee applications submitted every three months. The procedures are consistent with those approved in other large chapter 11 cases and will help streamline the professional compensation process.
The debtor, Cordillera Golf Club, LLC, filed a motion seeking approval of procedures for interim compensation and reimbursement of expenses for professionals retained in the chapter 11 case. The motion requests that professionals be allowed to submit monthly fee applications for payment of 80% of fees and 100% of expenses, with interim fee applications submitted every three months. The procedures are intended to streamline the payment process in this large chapter 11 case.
This document provides notice of Patriot Coal Corporation's motion seeking court approval to conduct rights offerings as part of its chapter 11 reorganization plan. Specifically, the motion seeks authorization to enter into a backstop purchase agreement with certain funds to ensure sufficient proceeds are raised in the rights offerings. The rights offerings will allow eligible creditors to purchase new senior secured notes and warrants. The motion also seeks approval of the proposed rights offerings procedures. Objections to the motion are due by October 30, with a hearing scheduled for November 6.
The court document discusses a case between NML Capital and the Republic of Argentina. It summarizes that the February 23, 2012 order was affirmed on appeal but remanded for clarification. However, high officials in Argentina have declared they will not pay holders of original bonds, in violation of the court's order. As a result, the court vacates the stay on the February 23 order and directs that order be carried out immediately, requiring Argentina to pay into an escrow account in time for the December 15, 2012 bond payment. The amended February 23 order is also being issued.
This document is a status report from the Claims Administrator of the Deepwater Horizon Economic and Property Damages Settlement Agreement to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. It provides updates on the number of claims submitted and reviewed, the identity verification and review processes, exclusions reviews, accounting support reviews, and quality assurance reviews being conducted. The report aims to inform the Court on the current status of implementing the Settlement Agreement.
This appeal involves post-judgment orders from a legal malpractice case brought by Sulphur Mountain Land and Livestock Co., Malibu Broadbeach L.P., and Pacific Coast Management against Knapp, Petersen & Clarke and several individuals. The trial court granted Sulphur and Malibu's motion for attorney's fees and costs, denied the defendants' motion for fees and motion to tax costs, finding Sulphur and Malibu were the prevailing parties. The defendants appeal, arguing: 1) the trial court failed to properly determine the prevailing party under Civil Code §1717 before considering C.C.P. §998; 2) even if it had, it abused its discretion in finding Sulphur and
This order denies the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction on their facial constitutional challenges to Article 19 of the Revised Ordinances of Honolulu. The order finds that: (1) Article 19 is a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction that is content-neutral and narrowly tailored to serve the significant government interest of maintaining public areas; (2) Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on their claim that Article 19 is overly broad in violation of the First Amendment; and (3) Plaintiffs have failed to establish all the required elements for a preliminary injunction, including likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. Therefore, the court denies the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction based on their facial challenges to Article 19.
The report summarizes the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on eviction procedures in Ottawa County, Michigan from March 2020 through November 2020. Key developments include executive orders halting most evictions, the Eviction Diversion Program providing rental assistance to help tenants avoid eviction, and a CDC moratorium on evictions through December 2020. The Eviction Diversion Program administered through local housing agencies has been very successful, providing assistance to hundreds of households in Ottawa County and helping to resolve many pending eviction cases in the 58th District Court.
The document discusses key changes to landlord-tenant law in New York resulting from the passage of the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019 (HSTPA). It focuses on how the HSTPA has impacted nonpayment eviction proceedings by tenants. Specifically, it examines the traditional "good cause" standard tenants must meet to stay an eviction warrant under RPAPL §749(3), and explores how a new provision under RPAPL §753 allowing tenants to claim "extreme hardship" may provide an additional avenue of relief in such proceedings. The article aims to guide practitioners on navigating nonpayment evictions in light of the new law.
This document summarizes a court case between First American Title Insurance Company, Winnebago County Title Company, and TCF Bank regarding a mortgage on a property owned by Patricia Bartholomew. TCF Bank held the first mortgage on the property as a revolving line of credit. Winnebago acted as an agent in a second mortgage taken out by Bartholomew. Winnebago paid off the TCF Bank mortgage but TCF did not release its lien. Bartholomew then took out more funds through the revolving credit and defaulted. The court found that TCF Bank was not legally required to release the lien until the revolving credit was cancelled by Bartholomew. However
This document provides a summary of a presentation on loan modification and bankruptcy basics that was given at the National Conference of Vietnamese American Attorneys. It includes information on foreclosure timelines, proposed foreclosure legislation, bankruptcy chapters and differences between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, common exemptions, ethical obligations for attorneys, and other bankruptcy topics. Key details on the foreclosure process, loan modification requirements, and differences between bankruptcy chapters are outlined.
Understanding the Legal Weapons Landlords and Tenants have in Enforcing/Termi...Adam Leitman Bailey, P.C.
Adam Leitman Bailey discusses Understanding the Legal Weapons Landlords and Tenants have in Enforcing/Terminating Commercial Leases and the Secrets of How to Negotiate the Best Abatement/Deferment so both Landlord and Tenant are Happy for AmTrust on 7/15
The legislature in Sacramento is still out but that doesn't change the fact that at some point they'll be back and our business members need our advocacy more than ever. Especially critical when you hear about some of the gut-and-amend bills happening right now like AB 828, which would irreparably harm every landlord in California.
Doc1037 robert oneil paul ballard_todd hickman_seeking approval_settlement & ...malp2009
This document is a Trustee's Motion to Approve Compromise and Settlement with Defendants Robert O'Neal, Paul Ballard and Todd Hickman in an Adversary proceeding. The Trustee is seeking the court's approval of a settlement agreement between the Trustee and the Defendants that would allow portions of the Defendants' claims against the Debtor's estate and resolve all claims between the parties. Key terms of the settlement include allowing 75% of O'Neal's claim, 60% of Ballard's claim, and 60% of Hickman's claim. The Trustee believes the settlement is in the best interest of the estate to avoid costly and uncertain litigation.
The newsletter discusses recent developments in construction adjudication and prompt payment laws in various jurisdictions.
In the UK, the Supreme Court ruled that an insolvent party can refer disputes to adjudication. Additionally, a case clarified when a delay report constitutes a new claim vs supplemental evidence.
In Canada, several provinces have introduced or are considering introducing prompt payment and adjudication legislation similar to Ontario's regime. The federal government has also passed prompt payment legislation.
New Zealand case law confirmed adjudicators can award statutory damages and consider matters already determined in prior adjudications to prevent repeated claims on the same issues.
The document summarizes key points about reviving dormant judgments in Illinois. It discusses how judgments become dormant after 7 years under Illinois law, and the two-step process required to revive them: 1) filing a petition to revive the judgment, and 2) recording the revived judgment. It cautions that failing to properly revive a judgment within time limits could result in the judgment providing no recovery. This is illustrated through an example where a bank fails to revive its 2008 judgment, and then is unable to collect on the debtor's improved assets in 2015. Proper diligence in understanding revival law and taking timely action is important for banks and attorneys to maintain enforceable judgment liens.
This document is a stipulation and order modifying a previous judgment in a divorce case between Gary W. XXXXXX and Barbara K. XXXXXX. It stipulates that (1) Barbara will receive $84,659 from Gary's 401(k) plan, ownership of their Florida condo, funds from rental and personal bank accounts, and levies against Gary's accounts; (2) these transfers settle all child and spousal support claims; (3) the 401(k) transfer is non-taxable; (4) Gary's additional child and spousal support obligations are deemed satisfied; and (5) enforcement actions against Gary will be terminated upon execution of this order.
Miles v. deutsche bank national trust company | find lawJustin Gluesing
This document summarizes a court case involving allegations of wrongful foreclosure. It discusses the plaintiff's claims that the loan servicer engaged in fraudulent behavior during loan modification negotiations, including changing the terms of agreements and demanding unnecessary fees. The court found that the plaintiff had adequately stated claims for breach of contract, fraud, and misrepresentation. It reversed the lower court's dismissal of these claims and the granting of summary judgment on the wrongful foreclosure claim, finding factual disputes remained. The court concluded the plaintiff may be entitled to damages beyond just the lost property value if the foreclosure was wrongful.
PANELISTS:
DAMIAN NASSIRI | CUONG M. NGUYEN
LYNDA T. BUI | ANN N. NGUYEN
National Conference of Vietnamese American Attorneys
NCVAA is the only national organization that provides a forum for distinguished Vietnamese American judges, elected officials and attorneys to celebrate our accomplishments in the U.S. and abroad, promote the high standards of professionalism in law and politics, and discuss legal and community issues affecting Vietnamese Americans.
Past guests, panelists and speakers of NCVAA include Vietnamese Americans that are prominent judges, highly regarded elected officials and accomplished attorneys: Hon. Thang Nguyen Barrett, Hon. Tam Bui, Hon. Jacqueline Duong, Prof. Wendy Duong, Viet V. Le, Hon. Jacqueline Nguyen, Madison Nguyen, Hon. Nho Nguyen, Tasha Nguyen, Prof. Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Thuy Thi Nguyen, Hon. Tu Pham, Assemblyman Van Tran, Prof. Nhan Vu and many more.
We have also been honored with the attendance of esteemed non-Vietnamese Americans that either gave speeches, sat as panelists or attended the events: Jeffrey Bleich (Pres. of CA State Bar), Hon. David O. Carter (U.S. District Court, Central District of CA) Hon. John Chiang (CA State Controller), Justice Ming W. Chin (California Supreme Court), Kamala Harris (San Francisco District Attorney), Peter McHugh (Santa Clara County Supervisor), Hon. Nathan Mihara (CA Sixth Appellate District Court of Appeals), Justice Carlos R. Moren (California Supreme Court), Hon. Alicemarie Stotler (Chief Judge of the US District Court, Central District of CA) and many others.
PANELISTS:
DAMIAN NASSIRI | CUONG M. NGUYEN
LYNDA T. BUI | ANN N. NGUYEN
National Conference of Vietnamese American Attorneys
NCVAA is the only national organization that provides a forum for distinguished Vietnamese American judges, elected officials and attorneys to celebrate our accomplishments in the U.S. and abroad, promote the high standards of professionalism in law and politics, and discuss legal and community issues affecting Vietnamese Americans.
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Time Barred Mortgages in Bankruptcy 2.0Joseph Towne
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Construction Meets Texas Law: Selected Statutory OverridesSean McChristian
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1) Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 16.071, which voids contractual notice periods of less than 90 days and allows notice to any convenient agent of the party requiring notice.
2) Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 16.070, which voids contractual limitation periods of less than two years and one day from when a cause of action accrues.
3) Texas Business and Commerce Code Section 272.001, which allows parties to void contractual provisions requiring litigation, arbitration, or choice of law outside of Texas for construction projects in Texas.
Legal Proceedings Initiated Against Steven de Koenigswarter and Associated En...Theworld Crawler
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The order states that a legal proceeding has been commenced against the defendants by the plaintiff, 2705564 Ontario Inc. The claim made against the defendants is set out in the statement of claim that was served with the notice of action
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2023-08-24 City of Portland Bike Parking Technical Memo w illustrations.pdfRoger Valdez
The Street Trust is proposing changes to Portland's bicycle parking code to remove barriers to housing production and make the code more equitable. The current code requires overly prescriptive bike parking dimensions that reduce usable space in units. The Trust recommends simplifying requirements, increasing flexibility, and centering user needs rather than prioritizing bikes over housing. Specific proposals include reducing long-term bike parking ratios, cargo bike space dimensions, removing the 50% cap on in-unit parking, and making some requirements advisory.
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King county-superior-court-order-on-rha-v-city-of-seattle-22421
1. ORDER ON CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1
Johanna Bender
Judge, King County Superior
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516 3rd
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
FOR KING COUNTY
RENTAL HOUSING ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF SEATTLE,
Defendant.
No. 20-2-13969-6 SEA
ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[Clerk’s Action Required]
THIS MATTER came before the undersigned judge on cross-motions for summary
judgment filed by Plaintiffs Rental Housing Association of Washington, et al. (“Plaintiffs”) and
Defendant City of Seattle (“Defendant”). The Court considered the oral arguments of counsel
and:
1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment;
2. Declaration of RHAWA in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment;
3. Declaration of Elena Bruk in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment;
4. Declaration of Scott Dolfay in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment;
5. Declaration of CJD Investments, LLC and Zella Apartments LLC in Support of
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment;
6. Declaration of John A. Tondini in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment;
7. City’s Response and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment;
8. Declaration of Roger Wynne in Support of City’s Response and Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment;
2. ORDER ON CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
Johanna Bender
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Seattle, WA 98104
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9. Plaintiffs’ Response To Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and
Reply in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment;
10. Supplemental Declaration of CJD Investments, LLC and Zella Apartments LLC in
Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to the
City’s Motion;
11. Supplemental Declaration of RHAWA in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment;
12. Supplemental Declaration of John A. Tondini in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment and in Opposition to the City’s Motion;
13. City’s Reply Regarding Its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment;
14. Second Declaration of Roger Wynne in Support of City of Seattle’s Reply
Regarding Its Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment;
15. Pages 15 (beginning at Section C) through 27 of the Amicus Brief of Northwest
Justice Project; ACLU of Washington; Building Changes; Columbia Legal
Services; Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality; King County Bar
Association; Pro Bono Council; Tenant Law Center; Tenants Union; Washington
Low Income Housing Alliance;
16. Plaintiffs’ Response to Amicus Brief;
17. Notice of Subsequent History; and
18. The other pleadings and papers related to this matter on file with the Court.
The parties have agreed that there are no disputed issues of material fact, and that
Plaintiffs’ claims are properly adjudicated on cross-motions for summary judgment.
The Court hereby enters its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT
Plaintiffs are comprised of a landlord trade association, as well as individual and corporate
landlords who rent units in the City of Seattle. Collectively, they have brought constitutional
challenges to three City of Seattle Ordinances.
3. ORDER ON CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3
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Ordinance 126041 creates an affirmative defense to eviction proceedings for moderate-
income tenants, if the eviction would result in termination of the tenancy between December 1 and
March 1 (hereinafter, the “Winter Eviction Ban”). The Winter Eviction ban has no sunset clause.
Ordinance 126075 creates an affirmative defense to eviction proceedings for tenants who
self-certify a financial hardship. (hereinafter, the “Six-Month Eviction Ban”). This affirmative
defense is available to the tenant only if the eviction proceeding would result in termination of the
tenancy within six months after expiration of the City of Seattle’s current Residential Eviction
Moratorium. The relief is unavailable after the expiration of said six-month period.
Finally, Ordinance 126081 (hereinafter, the “Payment Plan Ordinance”) entitles tenants to
pay overdue rent in installments, when such rent becomes due within six months after the
termination of Seattle’s COVID-10 Proclamation of Civil Emergency. The Ordinance sets forth
certain presumptively valid payment schedules. No evidence of financial hardship is required.
The tenant may raise, as a defense to an eviction proceeding, the landlord’s failure to accept a
payment plan as set forth in the Ordinance. The Ordinance also bans the accrual of late fees,
interest, and other late charges for a period of one year following the termination of the Emergency
Proclamation.
Plaintiffs’ Complaint raises multiple challenges to the Ordinances, all brought pursuant to
the Washington State Constitution. Plaintiffs do not challenge the Proclamation of Civil
Emergency or the Residential Eviction Moratorium.
The Court is aware that there is significant public interest in the outcome of this case.
Housing policy, under normal circumstances, requires a balancing of multiple competing and
complex interests. These include the economic, health, and safety interests of both landlords and
tenants. It is undisputed by the parties, and recognized by the Court, that this challenge arises
4. ORDER ON CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4
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during what are far from normal circumstances. Seattle, already in the throes of a massive
homelessness crisis, is now also a year into a global pandemic which has wrecked devastating
havoc on housing security, economic security (for both landlords and tenants), and public health
and safety. The Court recognizes why this case, and its underlying policy concerns, has generated
public interest. That said, the questions actually before this Court are narrow: Do the Ordinances
survive Constitutional scrutiny? The important and difficult tasks of developing housing law and
policy are left to the executive and legislative branches of government.
II. FINDINGS OF FACT
A. The Ordinances
i. The Winter Eviction Ban
1. To reduce the number of individuals and families becoming homeless during the
harshest weather of the year, the City Council passed the Winter Eviction Ban on February 10,
2020. Decl. of John A. Tondini in Support of Pls.’ Mot. for Summary Judgment; Ex. 1
(Ord. 126041). Under the Winter Eviction Ban, a tenant in an unlawful detainer action may
assert a defense to any eviction that would occur between December 1 and March 1 if: (1) the
tenant household is a “moderate-income household”; and (2) the landlord owns over four rental
housing units in Seattle. “Moderate-income household” means “a household whose income does
not exceed median income,” as defined by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development. SMC 23.84A.016; SMC 23.84A.025.
2. The Winter Eviction Ban has no sunset provision.
ii. The COVID Relief Ordinances
3. The City’s Mayor issued a Proclamation of Civil Emergency on March 3, 2020,
which the City Council amended by Resolution 31937 two days later. The amended
5. ORDER ON CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5
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Judge, King County Superior
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Seattle, WA 98104
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Proclamation remains the operative one and will remain in effect until the Mayor or Council
terminates it.
4. On March 14, 2020, the Mayor issued an emergency order temporarily
establishing a Residential Eviction Moratorium, which the Council amended by Resolution
31938 two days later. The Council’s version remains the operative one, the effective date of
which the Mayor has extended through March 31, 2021.
a. The Six-Month Eviction Ban
5. Recognizing that the City has an interest in avoiding the spread of COVID-19 and
“that economic impacts from the COVID-19 emergency are likely to last much longer than the
civil emergency itself,” the City Council adopted the Six-Month Eviction Ban on May 4, 2020.
Ord. 126075.
6. Pursuant to Ordinance 126075, a tenant in an unlawful detainer action may assert
a defense to any eviction that would occur within six months after the termination of the Eviction
Moratorium if: (1) the landlord seeks eviction because the tenant (a) violated a 14-day notice to
pay rent or vacate for rent due during, or within six months after, the eviction moratorium, or
(b) habitually failed to pay rent resulting in four or more pay-or-vacate notices in a 12-month
period; and (2) the tenant declares they suffered a financial hardship and cannot pay rent.
7. The Six-Month Eviction Ban applies without any requirement that a tenant
provide any objective proof of financial inability or even difficulty to pay rent. The tenant need
only submit a “declaration or self-certification” asserting a “financial hardship.” “Financial
hardship” is not defined.
b. The Payment Plan Ordinance
8. Recognizing that the pandemic would have long-lasting housing and economic
impacts, “that the timing of when such impacts will cause tenants to be unable to pay rent will
6. ORDER ON CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 6
Johanna Bender
Judge, King County Superior
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Seattle, WA 98104
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vary,” and that mitigating those impacts is in City residents’ interests, the Council adopted the
Payment Plan Ordinance on May 11, 2020. Ord. 126081.
9. Under this Ordinance, a tenant who fails to pay rent when due, during or within
six months after the termination of the Proclamation of Civil Emergency, may elect to pay the
overdue rent in installments over three to six months, depending on the number of months the
tenant is in arrears. The landlord’s failure to accept payment under the repayment plan
constitutes a defense to an eviction action.
10. The ordinance also prohibits late fees, interest, and other charges arising from late
payment of rent from accruing during the Proclamation of Civil Emergency or within one year
after its termination.
III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Standing
11. Defendant challenges Plaintiffs’ standing with respect to the Winter Eviction Ban.
In response, Plaintiffs have submitted the Supplemental Declaration of RHAWA, the
Supplemental Declaration of CJD Investments, LLC and Zella Aparments LLC, and the
Declaration of Ginnie Hance. These declarations establish Plaintiffs’ standing. Defendant does
not address the issue of standing in its reply brief, and appears to have abandoned the issue.
B. Standard of Review
12. The Court must presume a law is constitutional unless the challenger proves it
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Island County v. State, 135 Wn.2d 141, 146–47
(1998). Because Plaintiffs bring facial challenges to the Ordinances, the Court must reject
Plaintiffs’ claims “if there are any circumstances where the [challenged law] can constitutionally
be applied.” Washington State Republican Party v. Wash. State Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 141
Wn.2d 245, 282 n.14 (2000).
7. ORDER ON CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 7
Johanna Bender
Judge, King County Superior
Court
516 3rd
Ave., W-739
Seattle, WA 98104
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C. Preemption (all Ordinances).
1. Substantive Defenses
13. Plaintiffs mount a facial conflict preemption challenge against the Ordinances,
Pursuant to Article XI, Section 11 of the Washington State Constitution. Plaintiffs must prove
the Ordinances conflict directly and irreconcilably with state law, permitting what state law
forbids or forbidding what state law permits. Watson v. City of Seattle, 189 Wn.2d 149, 171
(2017). “However, if the statute and ordinance may be read in harmony, no conflict will be
found.” Id.
14. With respect to the stay on interest set forth in the Payment Plan Ordinance, the
Court is persuaded by Plaintiffs’ argument.
15. Plaintiffs cannot sustain their burden, however, with respect to the remainder of
their claims. Under controlling Washington case law and the persuasive California case law on
which it is based, the Ordinances establish substantive defenses that this Court can harmonize
with Washington’s procedural eviction statutes.
16. The Margola and Kennedy cases are dispositive. Margola Associates v. City of
Seattle, 121 Wn.2d 625 (1993) abrogated on other grounds, Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wn.2d
651 (2019), cert. denied 140 S. Ct. 2675 (2020) (Yim I); Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wn.2d 682
(2019) (Yim II); Kennedy v. City of Seattle, 94 Wn.2d 376, 617 P.2d 713 (1980). Both rejected
preemption challenges to City ordinances providing tenants with substantive defenses to
eviction, reasoning that Washington’s eviction statutes, the Forcible Entry and Forcible and
Unlawful Detainer Act (“UDA,” RCW ch. 59.12) and Residential Landlord Tenant Act
(“RLTA,” RCW ch. 59.18), are procedural. Margola, 121 Wn.2d at 631–32, 651–52; Kennedy,
94 Wn.2d at 379–80, 383–84. Kennedy and Margola continue to stand for the principle that the
UDA and RLTA provide no substantive rights; they provide only a procedural vehicle through
8. ORDER ON CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 8
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Judge, King County Superior
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Seattle, WA 98104
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which parties assert claims and substantive defenses as a landlord pursues a writ of restitution,
back rent, and other relief. Under that principle, the UDA and RLTA can be harmonized with the
Ordinances, which provide substantive defenses for tenants in the eviction process.
17. Persuasive California case law suggests the same result. When introducing the
procedural/substantive distinction to Washington law, Kennedy cited Birkenfeld, a then-recent
California Supreme Court decision that recognized California’s similar unlawful detainer
provisions provide no substantive rights. Kennedy, 94 Wn.2d at 384 (citing Birkenfeld v. City of
Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001, 1015–16, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1976)). Applying the Birkenfeld
procedural/substantive distinction that Washington adopted, the California Court of Appeals has
rejected preemption claims leveled at ordinances providing temporary substantive defenses to
evictions. E.g., San Francisco Apartment Ass’n v. City and County of San Francisco, 229 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 124, 126–30 (2018), rev. denied April 25, 2018, S247750; Roble Vista Associates v.
Bacon, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295, 296–97, 299–300 (2002). Consistent with that persuasive
authority, the Ordinances’ temporary defenses cannot be deemed to conflict with Washington’s
procedural eviction statutes.
18. Plaintiffs’ arguments that the UDA and RLTA are substantive, and conflict with
the Ordinances’ substantive defenses, cannot be squared with Kennedy and Margola or the
language of the UDA and RLTA.
19. Even if an Ordinance’s substantive defense might yield a remedy more favorable
to a tenant than would the RLTA provision, that will not always be the result, which is fatal to
Plaintiffs’ facial challenge. For example, under the winter eviction ban, a landlord could secure a
writ of restitution in February ordering an eviction in March, but under the RLTA the judge
could forestall the eviction until May.
9. ORDER ON CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 9
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Judge, King County Superior
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20. Plaintiffs object to provisions in the Payment Plan and Six-Month Eviction Ban
Ordinances that prohibit an award of attorney fees and statutory court costs to a landlord “unless
otherwise allowed by law.” Plaintiffs claim that provision is preempted by various statutes
allowing the recovery of attorney fees and costs. Plaintiffs cannot sustain their claim because the
laws can be harmonized. If a landlord is entitled to statutory attorney fees or costs, the proviso
(“unless otherwise allowed by law”) ensures that no Ordinance prevents it.
21. For the first time in their response-reply brief, Plaintiffs raise a claim they omit
from their Complaint: that Washington’s rent control ban, RCW 35.21.830, preempts the
Ordinances. Even if that claim was fairly before this Court, Plaintiffs fail to sustain their burden
of proof. Because RCW 35.21.830 bans local regulation of “the amount of rent,” not its timing,
the statute does not control the Ordinances, which do not alter the amount of rent a tenant owes.
2. Bar on the accrual of interest
22. The Court’s analysis differs with respect to the interest pan incorporated into the
Payment Plan Ordinance (Ord. 126081). That ordinance reads in part: “No late fee, interest, or
other charge due to late-payment of rent shall accrue during, or within one year after the
termination of, the civil emergency proclaimed by Mayor Durkan on March 3, 2020.” Ord.
126081 (emphasis added). The legislature has clearly created a right for landlords to collect
interest on unpaid rent. See RCW 19.52.010. This is not a procedural scheme; it is a substantive
right. The legislature has pre-empted the field with respect to the payment of pre and post-
judgment interest. In this regard only, the Payment Plan Ordinance is unconstitutional and is
STRICKEN. The Court finds that this provision can be SEVERED from the remainder of the
Payment Plan Ordinance, thus saving the constitutional provisions of the Ordinance.
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D. Separation of powers (all Ordinances).
23. To sustain their separation of powers claim, Plaintiffs must prove that the
Ordinances threaten the Court’s independence or integrity or invade judicial prerogatives. State
v. Moreno, 147 Wn.2d 500, 505–06 (2002) (internal citations omitted). In assessing that claim,
the Court recognizes that the various branches of government “are not hermetically sealed and
some overlap must exist.” City of Fircrest v. Jensen, 158 Wn.2d 384, 394–94 (2006).
24. Plaintiffs rely on Waples v. Yi, 169 Wn.2d 152 (2010) and Putnam v. Wenatchee
Valley Medical Center, P.S., 166 Wn.2d 974 (2009). Those cases each involved legislative
enactments that interfered with processes set forth by court rule. By contrast, the Ordinances do
not conflict with any judicially-created process.
25. The Court additionally finds that the Ordinances, creating substantive defenses to
eviction proceedings, do not burden access to the courts and the right to a jury trial.1
E. Procedural due process (all Ordinances).
26. The City relies on Federal cases that have examined whether government action
in response to the COVID pandemic are violative of procedural due process. “[T]he due process
protection in our state constitution is generally the same as the federal guaranty.” Matter of
Dependency of E.H., 191 Wn.2d 872, 891 (2018). Although Plaintiffs’ claims are brought
pursuant to the State Constitution, the Court relies on both State and Federal authority. See City
of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171, 176 (1990) (applying federal law to a constitutional
challenge where the moving party fails to offer authority establishing that the State Constitution
affords heightened protection, and fails to engage in a Gunwall analysis).
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27. To prove their procedural due process claim, Plaintiffs must “first identify a
property right, second show that the state has deprived him [or her] of that right, and third show
that the deprivation was effected without due process.” Elmsford Apartment Associates, LLC v.
Cuomo, 469 F.Supp.3d 148, 172 (S.D. New York 2020) appeal docketed, No. 20-2565 (2nd Cir.
July 28, 2020) (internal citations omitted). Plaintiffs fail to sustain their burden on these
elements.
28. Plaintiffs assert a right to timely rent payments or eviction. They have not
identified how these property interests exist “independent of the interests asserted in their other
constitutional claims.” Auracle Homes, LLC v. Lamont, __ F. Supp. 3d. __, 2020 WL 4558682,
*19 (D. Conn. Aug. 7, 2020). Accord, Elmsford, 469 F. Supp. 3d at 173. The due process
clause does not provide relief where another constitutional right serves to protect the interest at
stake. Elmsford, 469 F.Supp.3d at 173.
29. Moreover, with the exception of the interest abeyance requirement under the
Payment Plan Ordinance2
, the Ordinances do not act to deprive Plaintiffs of property. Plaintiffs
cite inapposite case law addressing laws that change the status quo by allowing a plaintiff to
seize a defendant’s assets before a hearing. By contrast, the Ordinances leave Plaintiffs’ assets
untouched and do not change the status quo; the Ordinances merely temporarily delay landlords’
ability to evict tenants and collect rent. The tenants, however, remain liable for all rent they owe.
30. Finally, the Ordinances do not deny landlords the fundamental requirement of due
process: “the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976). Plaintiffs are not barred from the Courthouse,
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does not address whether Plaintiffs are denied access to interest payments without due process of law. See
Elmsford, 469 F.Supp.3d at 173.
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and their rights and remedies under the UDA and RLTA remain inviolate. See Elmsford, 469
F.Supp.3d at 173 (finding no procedural due process violation when “Plaintiffs will be able to
initiate new proceedings in the same forum and manner that they always shave, after [expiration
of the eviction ban]”). Due process does not require a meaningful hearing “as soon as a cause of
action accrues.” Id. And given the compelling governmental interests underlying the delays
occasioned by the Ordinances, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that the defenses guaranteed by
the Ordinances violate due process. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 242
(1988) (Court engages in a balancing test in assessing the constitutional burden posed by a delay in
process, weighing the underlying governmental interest served by the delay against the harm caused
by the delay).
E. Substantive due process (all Ordinances).
31. “The substantive component of due process protects against arbitrary and
capricious government action even when the decision to take action is pursuant to
constitutionally adequate procedures.” Yim II, 194 Wn.2d at 688-89 (internal citations omitted).
Washington applies federal substantive due process law to claims under the Washington
Constitution. Id. at 692–93.
1. The “rational basis” analysis.
32. A law regulating the landlord-tenant relationship, even by preventing the landlord
from evicting a tenant, regulates only property for substantive due process purposes. In Yim II,
landlords challenged a City ordinance preventing them from taking “adverse action,” including
eviction, against a tenant for certain reasons. Id. at 686–87. See Seattle Municipal Code
§ 14.09.010 (defining “adverse action”). Yim II ruled that the ordinance was subject only to
“rational basis” review because it regulated property, not a fundamental right. Yim II, 194 Wn.2d
at 698–701.
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33. Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claims are subject to “rational basis” review.
34. “[A] law regulating the use of property violates substantive due process only if it
fails to serve any legitimate governmental objective, making it arbitrary or irrational.” Id. at
693-94 (internal citations omitted).
35. In an apparent attempt to avoid the holding of Yim II, Plaintiffs frame their
substantive due process claim not as a deprivation of property, but as a deprivation of meaningful
access to courts for timely relief. Plaintiffs cite no substantive due process case law identifying
such a right.
2. Application of the deferential “rational basis” analysis.
36. “[A] law that regulates the use of property violates substantive due process only if
it fails to serve any legitimate governmental objective, making it arbitrary or irrational.” Id. at
698 (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S. A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005)). “Even where a law
restricts the use of private property, ordinances are presumed valid, and this presumption is
overcome only by a clear showing or arbitrariness and irrationality.” Id. (internal citations
omitted).
37. The Ordinances pass the deferential “rational basis” test. Pausing evictions during
the winter months rationally advances the goal of minimizing homelessness when the danger of
developing exposure-related conditions is elevated. And the six-month defense and repayment
plan requirement (including a temporary ban on the accrual of interest) rationally address the
economic and public health impacts that will predictably outlast the declared pandemic
emergency. Even the temporary ban on the accrual of interest serves the legitimate
governmental objective of preventing homelessness and the further spread of COVID-19 during
and immediately following the City’s state of civil emergency.
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F. Privileges and immunities (all Ordinances).
38. Article I, § 12 of the Washington Constitution, Washington’s privileges and
immunities clause, provides: “No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or
corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not
equally belong to all citizens, or corporations.” This is Washington’s analogue of the federal
equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution’s 14th Amendment. The rights it confers are
broader than those under the Federal Equal Protection Clause. American Legion Post #149 v.
Washington State Dept. of Health, 164 Wn.2d 570, 606 (2008). Both the State and Federal
provisions serve to prevent discrimination; only the State Privileges and Immunities Clause also
addresses favoritism in legislative enactments. Id.
39. The Privileges and Immunities clause protects only fundamental rights, which are
defined as follows:
[T]he right to remove to and carry on business […] the right, by usual modes, to acquire
and hold property, and to protect and defend the same in the law; the rights to the usual
remedies to collect debts, and to enforce other personal rights; and the right to be exempt,
in property or persons, from taxes or burdens which the property or persons of citizens of
some other state are exempt from.
Id. at 607, quoting Grant County Fire Protection Dist. No. 5 v. City of Moses Lake, 150 Wn.2d
791, (2004) (Grant County II) (further internal citations omitted).
40. A statute that grants a privilege or immunity burdening a fundamental right passes
constitutional muster only if there is a “reasonable ground for granting that privilege or
immunity.” Schroeder v. Weighall, 179 Wn.2d 566, 572–73 (2014) (internal citations omitted).
The reasonable ground analysis “is more exacting than rational basis review.” Id. at 574.
41. The State Privileges and Immunities Clause is “intended to prevent favoritism and
special treatment for a few to the disadvantage of others.” Martinez-Cuevas v. DeRuyter
Brothers Dairy, Inc., 196 Wn.2d 506, 518 (2020) (internal citations omitted). The Ordinances
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benefit no minority, but the significant portion of Seattle’s renters who are financially insecure.
See, e.g., Ordinance 126081, Finding T (citing data showing the large percentage of Americans
who cannot meet their monthly expenses); Ordinance 126075, Finding U (citing data showing
the significant number of evicted tenants who become homeless following eviction).
42. Plaintiffs have not addressed the question posed by the “reasonable grounds” test:
whether the Ordinances actually serve the City’s stated goals. There is no suggestion that the
Ordinances’ ends and means constitute a pretext for favoring an influential minority. Cf.
Schroeder, 179 Wn.2d at 575–76 (an exception to a tort tolling statute benefitted only doctors
with no basis for advancing the claimed purposes of reducing insurance premiums or
meaningfully limiting stale malpractice claims).
G. Contract Clause (all Ordinances).
43. “No . . .law impairing the obligations of contracts shall ever be passed.” Const.,
art. I, § 23. Washington courts give this provision the same effect as the analogous provision of
the U.S. Constitution. Lenander v. Washington State Dept. of Retirement Systems, 186 Wn.2d
393, 414 (2016).
44. The Court owes deference to the legislative branch when evaluating the degree to
which legislation impairs a private contract. Id. (internal citations omitted).
45. “[T]he protections of the Contract Clause are not absolute; its prohibition must be
accommodated to the inherent police power of the Sate to safeguard the vital interests of its
people”. In re Estate of Hambleton, 181 Wn.2d 802, 830 (2014) (internal quotations omitted).
46. The threshold issue in the Contract Clause inquiry is “whether the . . . law has
‘operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.’” Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct.
1815, 1821–22 (2018) (citations omitted). If a plaintiff proves a substantial impairment, a court
asks “whether the state law is drawn in an ‘appropriate’ and ‘reasonable’ way to advance ‘a
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significant and legitimate public purpose.’” Id. at 1822 (citations omitted). Plaintiffs fail to meet
their burden to establish either element.
1. Substantial impairment.
47. In assessing whether a law has operated as a substantial impairment of a
contractual relationship, “the Court [] consider[s] the extent to which the law undermines the
contractual bargain, interferes with a party’s reasonable expectations, and prevents the party
from safeguarding or reinstating his rights.” Id. “The severity of the impairment is said to
increase the level of scrutiny to which the legislation will be subjected.” Energy Reserves Group,
Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411 (1983). The Ordinances do not pose a
substantial impairment to Plainitffs’ contractual relationships.
48. “In determining the extent of the impairment, [the Court considers] whether the
industry the complaining party has entered has been regulated in the past.” Id. The residential
rental business is highly regulated in Washington and Seattle. The RLTA regulates many aspects
of the landlord-tenant relationship by, for example: establishing a duty to keep the premises fit
for human habitation (RCW 59.18.060); requiring notice of rent increases (RCW 59.18.140); and
regulating late fees (RCW 59.18.170), notices of termination (RCW 59.18.200), tenant screening
(RCW 59.18.257), and security deposits (RCW 59.18.260–.280). The Unlawful Detainer Act and
Residential Landlord Tenant Act regulate evictions. See RCW ch. 59.12; RCW 59.18.365 – .410.
Prior to the enactment of the Ordinances, the City had already adopted a just cause standard for
eviction, bolstering the protections to tenants afforded under State law. SMC 22.206.160.
49. The Washington State Supreme Court has held that “parties entering into
residential leases do so subject to further legislation limiting the right to evict.” Margola
Associates v. City of Seattle, 121 Wn.2d 625, 653 (1993), abrogated on other grounds, Yim I,
194 Wn.2d 651 and Yim II, 194 Wn.2d 682 (Declining to find a Contracts Clause violation
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arising from City ordinances requiring registration of rental units and payment of registration
fees).
50. Finally, in considering whether a law operates as a “substantial impairment,” the
Court considers “the extent to which the law undermines the contractual bargain, interferes with
a party's reasonable expectations, and prevents the party from safeguarding or reinstating his
rights.” Sveen, 138 S.Ct. at 1822. As noted elsewhere herein, the Ordinances impose temporary
delays on the collection of rent and the ability to engage in the eviction process. The Ordinances
do not, however, abrogate those rights. The Payment Plan Ordinance does ban the accrual of
interest outright. However, this right to collect interest is not contractual, it is statutory. The
Court’s analysis with respect to that issue is set forth in Section III.C, supra.
2. Whether the Ordinances are drawn appropriately and reasonably to
advance significant and legitimate public purposes.
51. Even if the Ordinances facially and substantially impair Plaintiffs’ contractual
relationships, Plaintiffs cannot sustain their burden as to the second element of their Contract
Clause claim.
52. “If a [Governmental] regulation constitutes a substantial impairment, the
[Government], in justification, must have a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the
regulation, such as the remedying of a broad and general social or economic problem.” Energy
Reserves, 459 U.S at 411-12 (internal citations omitted). “The requirement of a legitimate public
purpose guarantees that the State is exercising its police power, rather than providing a benefit to
special interests.” Id. at 412. The Court “properly defer[s] to legislative judgment as to the
necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure.” Id. at 412-13. Accord, Carlstrom v.
State, 103 Wn.2d 391, 394 (1985). The challenged Ordinances are replete with legislative
findings regarding the serious and emergent nature of the health, safety, and economic
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consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the health and safety implications of
eviction during Seattle’s winter months.
H. Takings (all Ordinances).
53. In Yim I, Washington adopted the federal regulatory takings analysis set forth in
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A, Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 194 Wn.2d at 681 This holding invalidates
Washington’s pre-Yim I regulatory takings jurisprudence. Id., at 662, 668–72.
54. Plaintiffs invoke only one of Lingle’s three tests for regulatory taking: a per se
regulatory taking through a regulation forcing them to suffer a physical invasion. See Lingle, 544
U.S. at 538 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)).
55. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ claim, the City is not directly appropriating Plaintiffs’
property or ousting landlords from their domain. Examples of such “classic” or “paradigmatic”
takings include the government seizing and operating a coal mine or occupying a private
warehouse. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537. The Ordinances, which regulate the relationships between
third parties, do not fit within that category.
56. Plaintiffs cannot sustain their burden to establish a taking by physical invasion.
Courts reject claims that regulating the landlord-tenant relationship can amount to a taking.
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 440 (“This Court has consistently affirmed that States have broad power to
regulate housing conditions in general and the landlord-tenant relationship in particular without
paying compensation for all economic injuries that such regulation entails.”). Accord, Yee v.
City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 528–29 (1992); FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245,
252 (1987).
57. This is especially true of a claimed per se taking from a regulation allegedly
denying a landlord the discretion to exclude individuals who pay on terms the landlord disfavors.
See, e.g., Yee, 503 U.S. at 528 (No Taking Clause violation where landlords may evict tenants,
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“albeit with 6 or 12 months notice.”). Like the law challenged in Yee, the Ordinances at issue in
this matter do not force a landlord to refrain in perpetuity from terminating a tenancy. Like the
Yee landlords, no Plaintiff alleges they want to abandon the landlord business; they consented to
“invasion” by tenants and wish to continue to serve as landlords. And as with the landlords in
Yee, Plaintiffs in this matter retain the right to evict non-paying tenants, albeit within the City’s
regulatory framework.
58. Other jurisdictions have considered constitutional challenges to similar
emergency ordinances, and have relied on Yee to reject “physical invasion” takings claims. E.g.,
Baptiste v. Kennealy, 2020 WL 5751572, at *20 (D. Mass. Sept. 25, 2020); Auracle, 476
F.Supp.3d at 221; Elmsford, 469 F.Supp.3d at 162-163. This authority is persuasive.
59. This Court need not entertain Plaintiffs’ claim that the Ordinances effect a
prohibited taking for a private use. The Ordinances effect no taking, obviating inquiry into its
public or private nature. See Yim I, 194 Wn.2d at 673.
I. Takings; interest (Payment Plan Ordinance)
60. Plaintiffs rely on two seminal IOLTA cases for their claim that the repayment
plan requirement’s temporary ban on interest accruing on overdue rent effects a taking. See
Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216 (2003); Phillips v. Washington Legal
Foundation, 524 U.S. 156 (1998)). But both decisions, which involved the government
confiscating interest accruing on client trust accounts, ruled only that government may not
constitutionally confiscate interest that accrues on an account. Brown, 538 U.S. at 220–35;
Phillips, 524 U.S. at 159–68, 172. Neither involved interest accruing on a debt; only on
deposited principal. See, e.g., Phillips, 524 U.S. at 165 (articulating the “interest follows
principal” rule). Phillips declined to address “whether the owner of the principal has a
constitutionally cognizable interest in the anticipated generation of interest by his funds.”
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Phillips, 524 U.S. at 168 (emphasis added). Accord, Texas State Bank v. United States, 423 F.3d
1370, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (recognizing the limited scope of the Phillips and Brown
decisions). Plaintiffs have submitted no authority for the proposition that the City has taken
interest which has not accrued.
IV. ORDER
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court orders:
1. With respect to the preemption challenge to the ban on the accrual of interest
pursuant to Ordinance 126081, Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED and Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
2. In all other respects, Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED,
and Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
3. Each party shall sustain its own fees and costs.
DATED this 24th day of February, 2021.
Electronically signed and filed
_______________________
Hon. Johanna Bender
21. King County Superior Court
Judicial Electronic Signature Page
Case Number:
Case Title:
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Signed By:
Date:
Judge:
This document is signed in accordance with the provisions in GR 30.
Certificate Hash:
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3/23/2025 1:52:11 PM
3/23/2020 1:52:11 PM
B8E1C819734D5A0DB3139919EE2FA082D4AE5DA7
ORDER RE CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RENTAL HOUSING ASSOCIATION ET AL VS CITY OF
SEATTLE
20-2-13969-6
Johanna Bender
February 24, 2021
Johanna Bender